
SOCIETY AND STATE IN THE GULF AND ARAB PENINSULA



A different perspective

KHALDOUN HASAN AL-NAQEEB

Centre for Arab Unity Studies



Society and state in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

In this challenging and outspoken analysis of the current problems facing the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, Khaldoun al-Naqeeb presents an original thesis on the cultural, political and economic history of the region. Originally published in Arabic, the book has caused considerable controversy in the Arab world.

The book is both a history and a contemporary analysis. The author sees the main turning-points as the growth of the cities along the trade routes during the mercantile period up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, the coming of the East India Companies and the incorporation of the region into the western economic system, the arrival of the petroleum era after World War II and the subsequent growth of the authoritarian state.

It is with this state that al-Naqeeb takes issue, arguing that central bureaucratic control is limiting growth. He describes the state as governed by the interests of the ruling family and merchant elite who, despite increased education and expectations, continue to block opportunities for social mobility. He is also critical of the lack of a broad, productive base in the economy, the export of capital and its effect on investment in local resources, and the technological dependence on the west. One indicator, it is argued, of a society in structural and cultural crisis is the growth of religious fundamentalism, in some ways expanding to fill the gap left by loss of confidence in Arab nationalism.

The book is part of a larger project on relations between state and society in the Arab world, written by Arab scholars. It will generate great interest among students and specialists.

Society and state in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

A different perspective

Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb

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(Project of Translation from Arabic)
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Foreword

This book about society and state in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, by Dr Khaldoun al-Naqeeb, is one of five books dealing with society and state in the Arab homeland, published by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, as part of the Project for the Prospective Future of the Arab Homeland. The other four volumes are as follows:

Society and State in the Arab East, by Dr Ghassan Salamah
Society and State in the Arab West, by Dr ʿAbd al-Baqi al-Hermasi
The Central State in Egypt, by Dr Nazih al-Ayyubi
Society and State in the Arab World, by Dr Saad al-Din Ibrahim *et al.*

Since these five books about society and state are part of a larger and more comprehensive scientific endeavour, they must be read in the context of this project, about which we should say a word.

The Project for the Prospective Future of the Arab Homeland represents the first large co-operative scientific effort in which a select group of Arab scholars, professors, and experts in the various fields of knowledge have tried to explore the potentialities of the Arab nation in the present and the future, within the framework of the numerous variables which dominate the regional and world systems. In spite of previous praiseworthy attempts by colleagues and other organizations in this field, what the Project for the Prospective Future of the Arab Homeland proffers is unprecedented with respect to its comprehensive and encyclopedic nature, its approaches and methodologies, the number of native sons of the Arab nation stretching from the Atlantic to the Gulf who have shared in its studies, the period of time it has taken, and the number of Arab organizations which have participated in and supported it. From this standpoint, the project is an Arab scientific, co-operative, unifying effort in every sense of the word.

The theoretical and methodological considerations which have governed the undertaking of this great project have been presented in

detail in an independent volume which was published by the Centre (Khair el-Din Haseeb *et al.*, *The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Choices*, Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1988). It is sufficient here to address two points: the first regarding the principal foci of the project in general; and the second concerning the 'Society and state' focus in particular.

The Prospective Future Project embraces four related foci. The first focus, that of 'The Arabs and the world', deals with the present and future of the regional and international systems within which the Arab homeland operates, interacting with them, influencing and being influenced, by them, both positively and negatively. The second focus, 'Arab economic development', takes up the present and future of the material and human base of the Arab homeland, the aspects of economic growth it has witnessed in the last three decades, and the probabilities of continued growth in the next three decades. The third focus, 'Society and the state', discusses the continuous and complex dialectical relationship between the evolution of Arab social formations and structures on the one hand, and the origin and growth of the Arab national state on the other. The fourth focus is 'The general model' for the aggregate of the territorial, national, regional and international interaction at the economic, political and social levels in the past and present, as well as their major probabilities for the future. The Centre for Arab Unity Studies issued a number of volumes of studies in the area of each of these four foci and the interaction to which the model gives concrete form, embracing in turn a number of sub-models for which the investigators have utilized quantitative and qualitative methods.

The implemention of the Prospective Future Project has occupied several years. A central team (Dr Khair el-Din Haseeb, Director of the Project and chairman of the team, Dr ʿAli Nassar, Co-ordinator of the 'General model' focus, Dr Ibrahim Saad al-Din, Co-ordinator of the 'Arab economic development' focus, Dr Saad al-Din Ibrahim, Co-ordinator of the 'Society and state in the Arab homeland' focus, Dr ʿAli al-Din Hilal, Co-ordinator of the 'Arabs and the world' focus, and A. Adib al-Jadir, Executive Director of the Project during 1986 and the first part of 1987) has undertaken the design, planning and execution of the Project as a whole from A to Z, resorting to the wisdom and views of scores of Arab thinkers and experts who have conferred and interacted with the central team at every stage. The more important interaction took place between the members of the central team themselves. The same interaction occurred within each focus among the subsidiary groups which were formed to undertake

the implementation of the studies conducted by each of the four foci.

In the 'Society and state' focus, of which this book represents one of the studies, the preparation of the plan for the focus was carried out within the framework of the Project in general. It was discussed in detail by the central team, then by others with knowledge and expertise. A sub-group was also created to carry out the studies pertaining to the 'Society and state' focus, whose members carried on intensive discussions among themselves, then with the Project's central team, both before and during their studies, and upon finishing the draft copies.

The division of labour within the 'Society and state' focus was carried out on a regional, geographic, political and cultural basis. Although the countries of the Arab homeland evince more similarities than dissimilarities, nevertheless the analysis, comprehension and interpretation of the latter presents a real scientific challenge. The studies of the focus fall parallel to the main subdivisions of the Arab homeland: the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf, the Arab East, the Nile Valley, and the Arab West. Each of these regions has specific historical and societal characteristics within the main common stream of Arab social, cultural and political history. This subsidiary, societal specificity is itself reflected to a large degree in the origins of the state, whether in its traditional form prior to the western colonial penetration, or in its modern national form, or in its development since independence.

The members of the 'Society and state' focus team have adhered to a general conceptual plan for the study of each subsidiary region of the Arab homeland, so that the study may answer the basic questions concerning the nature of the main social formations in each country and their relationship with the state in general, and with the existing political system in particular. Within this general conceptual plan, freedom has been left for the members of the team to adopt an ideal methodological approximation, from their point of view, in describing, analysing and elucidating the dialectical relationship between these social formations and the institution of the modern regional state in the Arab homeland. It is worth noting that in spite of the societal specificity and diversity; in spite of the disparities and contrasts in the history of the origin and course of the institution of the national state, especially since independence; and in spite of the disparity between methodological approximations which members of the team have adopted, nevertheless, when they had completed their analysis, many of their findings practically coincided with each other. At the forefront of these findings is the fact that the contemporary

Arab national state does not embody, either in its authority or in its present practices, the legitimate interests of the main social formations in the various countries; and that the gap between civil society on the one hand, and the state on the other is widening. Thus there is a quasi-consensus among the authors of the five volumes in this focus that the national state in the 1980s is passing through a suffocating crisis unprecedented in the four preceding decades, that is since World War II; and that this crisis warns us that in some cases, especially in the peripheral countries with a great ethnic diversity, there is a danger, over the next three decades, of increasing fragmentation of the existing state, or even its disappearance from the regional political map.

Studies in Arabic about the state remain extremely limited in number, possibly with a few exceptions among writers in the Arab West. It appears that one of the reasons for this scarcity is that most Arab writers have felt an alienation or hostility towards the institution of the national state, especially in the Arab East, because it emerged as part of imperialist strategy in the post-World War I settlements, and appeared in opposition to the dreams and hopes of the Arabs for a unified Arab state. Arab authors may have felt that the mere study and analysis of this nation state might impart to it a 'legitimacy' it did not deserve. However, this ideological attitude towards the national state is one thing, while the necessity of studying it objectively as part of the existential Arab present is quite another. Even the desire to change the present reality must begin with an objective analysis and understanding of it. This book, therefore, and the four others, represent an honest pioneering attempt to understand the nation state and its complex relationship with its societies in the Arab homeland. By so doing we hope to have participated in filling a disgraceful vacuum in our knowledge, not merely for the sake of a greater understanding of our living reality, but also to explore the possibilities available to change this reality, and, more importantly, to choose from the best alternatives and work for their realization.

Those working in the Project for the Prospective Future of the Arab Homeland, including the authors of the studies in the 'Society and state' focus, have crystallized three principal scenes or 'scenarios' probable in the Arab future. The first is the prolongation of present conditions without any qualitative change worth mentioning (the continuation of the reality and logic of the fragmentation scenario). This represents the worst possibility for the Arab homeland in general, and for each individual state (irrespective of its size or the extent of its wealth), and especially for certain frontier states on the

margins of the Arab homeland. As for the second scenario, it is the possibility of regional co-operation or general Arab co-ordination, involving the arrest of the decline and a general improvement of Arab performance, whether within each state or in the relations of these states with the regional and international powers waiting to fall upon them. The third scenario is the possibility of Arab unity, whether among regional blocs, or among nation states in the form of a federal union. This is absolutely the best future possibility, not only from the standpoint of the security of the homeland and the dignity of the citizen, but also with regard to the potentialities of comprehensive development and the closure of the gap between the state and civil society.

The first and most urgent task is that the vanguards of the living forces within the Arab homeland should move on from reading the results of the research Project to the crystallization of a practical, cultural-political enterprise, whose minimum goal would be the second scenario and whose optimum goal would be the third scenario. This is the supreme challenge which faces our generation and the generation directly following, if our great homeland and our Arab nation are to remain and flourish in the twenty-first century.

Khair el-Din Haseeb
Director and Team Leader of the Project

Preface

If there is any cultural region on the face of the earth which possesses an articulate spirit, it is the Arab Peninsula and its natural extension from the Hadramawt Valley to the Euphrates Valley. By 'an articulate spirit' I mean the cultural entirety or the universal, comprehensive view of things which accumulates over the centuries, to control both visibly and invisibly the conduct and aspirations of the inhabitants.

It is these shared traits and this total intellectual complexion which bring together the scattered parts of this very ancient pageant, comprising both a settled way of life and nomadism, subservience and rebellion, passing bands of raiders, and merchant and pilgrim caravans, the clamour of markets and the silence of the desert, the intermingling of nomadism with holy war, of holy war with commerce, and of commerce with agriculture, interacting in a continuous, uninterrupted fusion.

This cultural region is the nearest and most familiar to our eyes, but it is also the most inscrutable, elusive and with the greatest buried riches of all the regions of the world. Contradictions of this sort are not necessarily a product of exaggeration and subjective generalization, for the 'Introduction' to this study includes examples of the great quantity of writings about the region which provide but little knowledge and a great deal of misunderstanding.

I have, therefore, made it one of the basic aims of this study to search for a new methodology suited to dealing with the region, a methodology which may produce a better understanding of it within the historical framework of events and phenomena, so that the present may in the end appear as the natural outgrowth of its cultural environment, and not a freak by-product of the petroleum industry. We have, therefore, presented this methodology in the second chapter to analyse the Arab-Islamic mercantile mode of production

as a starting-point for the study and a focus for the sequence of important events with which the succeeding chapters abound, endeavouring to concentrate on the phases of the evolution of political regimes, especially the systems of government.

Many matters connected with regimes of government – whatever the regimes may be – take on a sensitive character owing to the censorship which the regimes impose upon themselves and others. However, the governing systems in the Arab Peninsula have been known historically for their excessive fear of *all* criticism arising from objective research, which is often confused with that emanating from sensation-seeking journalistic criticism.

In spite of fear of the occurrence of such confusion, I have not attempted to avoid matters of a sensitive nature connected with the system of government, which are almost taboo subjects, not open to discussion. I have not hesitated or been remiss in criticizing when criticism is necessary, in my estimation, for an understanding of the political system and the social phenomena related to it.

There are a number of people to whom this work owes it existence namely: my professor and now my colleague, Khair el-Din Haseeb; my colleague and friend, Saad al-Din Ibrahim and two other persons whose names I cannot mention at all. Without the support and encouragement of these people this study would never have been completed.

Likewise, after the study was finished, the following whose names are mentioned read it in its entirety: Hisham Sharabi, al-Baqi al-Hermasi, Ghassan Salamah, ʿAli al-Din Hilal, Ibrahim Saad al-Din and ʿAli Nassar, whose criticisms and observations greatly influenced the final form which the study has taken. Other good colleagues read chapters and parts of it, from whose views and comments I have profited greatly; and though I don't mention them by name, I record my recognition of their contribution to this study. A number of people in responsible positions and scholars in the Gulf region and the Arab Peninsula provided me with information and directed me to certain sources, and in some cases supplied me with the sources needed for the research. I hereby record my indebtedness to them, without mentioning their names, in order to protect them.

Finally I express my thanks and appreciation to my respected colleagues, Shakir Mustafa and Jabir ʿAsfur, who offered me many useful ideas and comments, as well as linguistic and stylistic corrections; without them this study would not have appeared in its present form. Thanks is owed, too, to Najwa Yusuf, Huda Ahmad and Najwa Salah for typing the study in the many different stages of its development.

If there are any errors in explanation or interpretation, the responsibility lies solely with the author, and with no one else.

Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb
Kuwait
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1 Introduction
current writings about the region

1

Writings about the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula in general may be divided into two main types. The first kind is that produced by the traditional historians, travellers, explorers, colonial officials, and finally the anthropologists and ethnographers. Among the traditional historians who have written in this field are: Qutb al-Din Muhammad al-Nahrawali (1582), Hamid ibn Zurayq (1856), Ibn Bishr (1871), Ibrahim Fasih al-Baghdadi (1869), Yahya ibn al-Qasim and Amin al-Rihani in his book, *Tārīkh Najd wa-mulḥaqātih* (The History of Najd and its Dependencies), and finally ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rashid and Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi.[1] The chief concern of this type of writing centres on the succession of rulers and the development of dynastic rule (ruling families), and the monotonous chronological record of tribal events, forays, conflicts, alliances and so forth.

Another variety of this type of writing is that produced by travellers and explorers such as Niebuhr, Burkhart, Palgrave, Doughty, Philby and Hugh Scott. There are many secondary sources concerning the evolution of foreign travel in the region, for example Hogarth, Kierman, and finally Bidwell.[2]

Colonial officials have contributed an important collection of writings, such as those by Sir Arnold Wilson, Lorimer, Ingram, Lady Bell, Dickson, Sir John Glubb, and Longrigg.[3] Most of these writings were written from the standpoint of colonial interests and concentrate on attempts to understand the tribal-ethnic structure of the region's population, the way in which tribal affiliations operated and the extent of their influence upon the population. In the case of the travellers, they have attributed an exaggerated poetic dimension to the mode of tribal living, emphasizing nomadic values and traditions by transforming them in their writings from a merely verbal to an actual mode of behaviour.

2

As for the second type of writings, it has been and is still being produced by journalists, economic experts and trained historians. Examples of the writings of Arab journalists are Amin al-Rihani in his *Mulūk al-ʿArab* (Arab Kings), Fu'ad Hamza, Faysal al-ʿAzmah, Hafiz Wahba, Qadri Qalʿaji and Rasim Rushdi.[4] The production of foreign journalists, such as Carleton Coon,* Wilfred Thesiger, John Marlowe, Van der Meulen, Tom Little, Crane,† Johnston and David Holden, has greatly exceeded that of their Arab counterparts.[5] Most of this type of writing is impressionistic and superficial, lacking intimate knowledge of the area. In the case of non-Arabs, the lack of mastery of the Arabic language detracts greatly from the significance of these writings, added to the fact that generally they lack historical perspective and vision.

This last shortcoming, to be specific, is the one found in the writings of the economic experts concerned with the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf from one narrow angle: the influence of petroleum on the Peninsula's society and economies, in which history is reduced to the dualism of pre-petroleum and post-petroleum times. Examples of this kind of writing are: Muhammad Sadiq and William Snavely, Naiem Sherbiny and Mark Tessler, George Lenczowski, Benjamin Shwadran, Ragaei al-Mallakh and many others.[6] This concentration on the role of petroleum and its influences, and the preoccupation of the experts with it to the exclusion of society and state, has reached such a level that one of the citizens of the area felt compelled to publish a book under the title: *The Gulf Is Not Petroleum*, in which he tries to put matters in a reasonable, balanced perspective.[7]

The other category of this type of writing is the output being currently produced by trained historians such as Jamal Zakariya Qasim, Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakimah, and finally Badr-al-Din al-Khususi, Mustafa ʿAbd al-Qadir Najjar, Amal al-Zayyani, Fu'ad al-ʿAbid, Mahmud ʿAli al-Dawud, Futuh al-Khatrash and others.[8] It would appear that these trained historians, in order to compensate for the deficiency arising from the poverty of documentation in conventional history, depend almost solely on documents and archival material, endeavouring to substitute documents for history, owing to the fact that the majority in general lack theoretical and conceptual tools, which are the keys to unlock the riddle of the events with which the documents in their hands abound.

* The last name occurs first in the text
† Correctly cited below as Wilbur Crane Eveland.

3

On the whole the ample writings of the first type about society and state in the Gulf and the Peninsula, in spite of their abundance, do not contribute much to an understanding of the region, and in some cases add to our ignorance of the subject, as we shall see. However, we do not wish to belittle the efforts of all these people, for some of this work is rich in fresh scientific raw material and abundant in information. The conventional historians have preserved for us the most important historical events and their time sequence. The travellers and colonial administration officials have likewise given attention to a great deal of lore about aspects of social and economic life which the historians have neglected. The anthropologists, too, have provided us with copious material at the ethnographic level about bedouin life, its values and customs.[9]

Nevertheless, those we describe as conventional, documentary historians are, in fact, nothing more than chroniclers of events (to distinguish them from historians in the true meaning of the word), their accounts being loaded with incidents of raids, with their charges and retreats, along with the succession of shaykhs, emirs and sultans. A large proportion of these traditional histories are nothing more than 'scissors and paste' history as Cunningham* says – that is history as passed on from one narrator to another. Many modern writers have inherited such histories as this, or with some minor emendations,[10] for example Salah al-Din al-Mukhtar, Muhammad Yahya Haddad and Faʾiq Hamdi Tahbub. Most modern journalistic writings of the sort we have mentioned resort to these histories as general background material for modern events, producing a simplistic connection between events.[11]

The writings of the travellers and colonial administration officers, and the studies of the anthropologists follow the same course as do the conventional histories. The information extracted from these writings is useful at a limited local ethnographical level but is of little use at the social structural level. The evidence for this is the writers' restricted understanding of the tribe and tribalism at the social level. Instead of perceiving that the tribes and tribal alliances are merely units in the social and political system of the society of the Peninsula, units governed by political tribalism in a general perspective in spite of the lack of a central government, these writers' perception of tribalism is limited to the idea that tribes are aggregations of kinship units at the local level.[12]

* This expression is taken from R. G. Collingwood's *The Idea of History.*

Thus it is not at all surprising that this deficient understanding of the role of tribalism in society in the Gulf and the Peninsula should lead to the unreasonable and imprecise deduction reached by R. B. Serjeant, which he presents as follows: 'And since the tribe (which itself is divided into *afkhādh* [sing. *fakhdh*, i.e. a tribal subdivision] and households) represents an independent unit, the Arabian Peninsula must be pictured tribally as ordinarily being in a state of anarchy.'[13]

4

The final vintage of this class of writings is the manifestation of the tribal organization as the firm, clear fact, and thus the appearance of everything else as a shadow-world enveloping the distorted social, economic structure deprived of its clear historical roots. Yes, there are the coastal commercial cities on the peripheries of the Ottoman Empire, but there also are (and these are the focus of interest of these writers) the unexplored tribal regions of the Peninsula's desert and the tribal mountain areas of Oman and Yemen. There are the shaykhs, sultans and imams who appear and disappear in futile succession, and then the colonialist imperialist powers crop up in the sixteenth century to establish their authority and hegemony. This state of affairs prevails until the discovery of petroleum, when the modern states emerge under the leadership of the families of shaykhs, sultans and imams whom we have come across before. The fact that some ruling families have disappeared does not affect this picture as long as the tribal organizations themselves remain definitive and stable.[14]

As for the final harvest of the second type of writing, it is represented in the bedazzlement of the journalists and economic experts by petroleum wealth and the potentialities and tremendous forces which the income realized from petroleum can release. This type of writing is blemished by a great deal of exaggerated positive expectations, from the desert capitalism which will be born from the petroleum wealth, to the desert welfare state, in which the inhabitants will for ever remain at ease, gathering the fruit of wealth and luxury,[15] if they follow the advice of these experts as to the optimal way of investing their money.

This kind of writing neglects the fact that petroleum, from the standpoint of its being an industry, has had no effect on the economy, either in terms of employment or consumption. As for petroleum wealth arising from it, its influence has not been equal among the

various segments of the population, as will become clear later on. Political and quantitative considerations have dictated decisions regarding the relative shares which accrue to the social classes as income, and the ways in which this income is utilized for consumption purposes. These political considerations, possessing deep historical roots, play a decisive role in the present situation.

The contemporary writings of documentary historians, however, in spite of their dependence on documents (western colonial, Ottoman, and local) and on the rich archives, do not greatly assist us in understanding the organizing factors and the determinants of the tremendous changes and transformations to which the region has been subject. We are not here disputing the necessity for research to be documented and supported by facts; but historical documents of themselves are no substitute for historical analysis dependent upon theoretical and clear, specific, methodological concepts, which assist even in exposing the forgery and distortion to which official documents may be subject. Many times documentary historians take refuge in the documents, out of fear of expressing a frank opinion, so that this kind of history becomes as it were a mere commentary on the documents and a weaving of conclusions derived from them.[16]

It is clear, therefore, that these writings are of no help in trying to present an analytical understanding of the relation of the state to society in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula. Consequently, our first task must be to present a different perspective of the social and economic structure of the region, a perspective which we term: 'The "Natural state" thesis of society in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula'. Through it we reinterpret the same phenomena and events as the aforementioned sources and writings have studied or touched upon without perceiving the structural characteristics of these phenomena and events, and their hidden, not readily perceived, relationships.

2 The 'natural state' thesis of society in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

1

Despite the fact that the term 'natural state' may give rise to profound misunderstanding because of its connection, first, with evolutionary ambiguity, and, second, with ideological ambiguity, it is very useful for fixing the starting-point of this study. By 'natural state' we do not mean a specific evolutionary stage close to nature, leading to environmental determinism, as though the Arab Peninsula environment permitted only a specific kind of activity that is described as 'natural' (due to its congruence with the desert environment, for example). Nor do we mean by 'natural state' an ideological position based upon a comparison between a simple, primitive 'natural state' and another state more complicated socially, economically and culturally (as does Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example).[1]

By 'natural state' we mean the dynamic matrix of the socio-economic structure, the political forces, and the distinguishing characteristics of the social relationships prevailing in the Gulf and Peninsula society during a specific period of time, that is, the dawn of the sixteenth century, for example. It is the way in which the social forces and relationships were shaped in the division of labour at the social level, commensurate with the degree of development and maturation or backwardness of the productive forces during this period.[2]

We are speaking of the 'natural state' in the same manner in which Fernand Braudel does about 'world economy', in the sense that makes the economy of a specific geographical area revolve around a developed centre representing the dynamic sector which drives the economy and the society as a whole. This centre is surrounded by less developed marginal areas, that is, peripheral and transitional economic sectors and activities, and continues in constant interaction with its prevailing social, cultural, and political institutions and systems. The decisive issue in this theoretical formulation is that the disparities

in the degree of maturity or backwardness within a single 'world economy' and between several 'world economies' are continually appearing and this is therefore not an exceptional situation in history, nor is it special to the twentieth century.[3]

Thus, if we consider the Arab Peninsula (after the fall of Baghdad) from this standpoint as two 'world economies': Basra, Siraf, Hormuz and Muscat alternated as the centre of the first (the Gulf and the eastern part of the Arab Peninsula), while Aden, Jiddah and Idhab alternated as the centre of the second 'world' (the southern part of the Peninsula and the Red Sea area). This means that – along with the advanced commercial centre – there always existed peripheral areas representing less advanced economic regions or sectors. In addition to the commercial sector which represented the focus of activity in the developed centre,[4] there were at the same time agricultural sectors based upon 'cottage industry' production and the pastoral economy of the semi-desert, and a subsistence economy in the inland areas and the coastal villages (such as fishing).

However, 'world economy' of this sort differs in many aspects from the 'world economy' that Braudel speaks about, the most significant difference being that its centre is not occupied by an independent capitalist city ruled by merchants, as were Venice, Amsterdam and London. The centre of the 'world economy' in the Arab Peninsula milieu was under the control of the tribal aristocracy on a permanent basis, and under the awe-inspiring shadow of a paternalistic hegemony which the surrounding empires imposed on both of them: the Mamelukes, then the Ottomans on the second region, then the Persians, followed by the Ottomans on the first region, until the boundaries of this 'economic world' began to change gradually with the shift of its economic centre of gravity toward the tribal hinterland under the pressure of western imperialism from the middle of the nineteenth century.

Thus the dynamic matrix of the forces giving birth to the 'natural state' of this 'economic world' in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society reveals a completely different reality from the conclusions which may be deduced from current writings about it, namely that commerce was the most important of the means of producing the social surplus, and that it constituted a huge, centuries-old network of relations and activities, a network at varying stages of growth and maturity moving in two directions: outward, contributing to the growth of the coastal mercantile cities, and inward, generating the main tribal alliances around the strategic cities and towns of the hinterland. This network was not only the product of purely economic activities, but resulted

also from population pressures and far-reaching political activities continuing over a long period. Thus we find even purely economic commercial activities implanted or embedded in the socio-economic institutions and structures surrounding them, neither independent of them nor to be understood without them.[5]

This decisive historical fact (namely the primacy of commerce or the mercantile mode of production) greatly reduces the importance of the exaggerated claims which have been made, based on the premise that the pastoral and raiding economy of the tribal Arab Peninsula society could have been self-sufficient and viable all those centuries. The above historical reality can be deduced from the important role the coastal mercantile cities played, and the fact that the strategic tribal cities and villages sprang up in the vicinity of the commercial land communication routes. Among these cities were those which historically faced outward, like Siraf, then Hormuz, then Kuwait, since they were centres for the transit or entrepôt trade, which did not possess the usual constituent factors of a city, such as food and water resources.[6] Others were import and export cities, such as Basra, Bahrain, Qatif, Muscat, Qaryat and Suhar in the Gulf, and Qashn, Shahr, Aden, Mukha, Jiddah, Quseir, Tur, Suez, Sawakin and Musawwa on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.

This huge network of socio-economic activities and relationships cannot be understood and explained within the bounds of Gulf and Arab Peninsula society alone (or within the bounds of the two 'economic worlds' previously mentioned). Rather, they are a link in a wider network tying several 'economic worlds' together, based on a pre-capitalistic division of labour.[7] This network embraced the west coast of India, Persia and the east coast of Africa, that is the western stretches of the Indian Ocean, leading to three great trade routes and regions: the Euphrates Valley, the Syrian coastal cities (the Levant) and the Upper Nile Valley, connecting with the other link represented by the Eastern Mediterranean and the Italian trading cities, particularly Venice and Genoa.[8]

This network of activities and relationships was extremely wide-ranging. Semi-capitalistic commerce represented the axis, and the strategic position of the society of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula and the global significance of the two economies are obvious. The maritime trade routes flowed to the Arab coastal cities, and the greater part of the trade by land passed over the three main trade routes of the pre-capitalistic world. This must reflect the weakness and limitation of the claims of the writings which are based on the premise of the dominant role of a pastoral economy for tribal society. What then

are the foundations on the basis of which the economy of the 'natural state' in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society was built?

2

The predominant type of trade and commercial activities in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula coastal cities was that to which we apply the term *muḍārabah* or 'speculative trade'. In a superficial way it resembled itinerant trade or 'peddling', described by Van Leur as a sociological model, which Niels Steensgaard later on developed as a form of commercial activity to be contrasted with the entrepreneurial pattern ('jointly liable' or 'corporate') which the East India Companies represented.[9] The *muḍārabah* trade which prevailed in the Gulf and Peninsula ports was an earlier form of the 'Commenda' which developed and spread amongst the commercial cities of Italy.[10] This is a subject to which I shall return a little later on.

The origin of *muḍārabah* trade is what was known before the appearance of Islam, and afterwards, as *al-muqāraḍah* or *qirāḍ* – loaning money for a share of the profit. This type of trade may be summarized as a person – generally a leading merchant (or a wholesale merchant in the period which is under study) – paying over to the *muḍārabah* merchant or the *muḍārib* capital in the form of money or goods with which he traded on the basis of dividing the proceeds after repaying the capital.[11] The shares changed to a third of the profit for the *muḍārib* merchant and two-thirds for the owner of the capital or the goods. The underlying factor in this division was that the owner of the money or the merchandise alone bore the loss.

Al-Juzayri furnishes us with a historical incident which illustrates the extent to which this method of conducting trade was established, and its importance in the Arab Peninsula. Its essence is that ʿAbdallah and ʿUbaydallah, sons of ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab

> went forth with the Army of Iraq at the time when Abu Musa al-Ashʿari was governor of Basra, with whom they lodged. He welcomed them and treated them hospitably and told them, 'I'd like to do something for you that would bring you profit, if I can', adding, 'I have some state tax money [lit. 'God's money'] which I want to send to the Commander of the Faithful. Take it as a loan, buy goods from Iraq, sell them in Medinah, pay the capital amount to the Commander of the Faithful and keep the profit.' They agreed and did so, selling at a profit. When they had settled the account with the Commander of the Faithful, he asked them, 'Did Abu Musa lend money to everyone in the army, or did he do it for

you two alone?' 'For us alone,' they answered. 'He did this for you because you are sons of the Commander of the Faithful ...' Then he demanded of them to pay the capital amount plus the profit into the treasury. ʿAbdallah was silent, but ʿUbaydallah said to him, 'It is not fitting for you to do this, O Commander of the Faithful, because the money was under our guarantee. If it had been lost, you would have demanded it of us.' ʿUmar paid no attention to his words, repeating what he himself had just said. Then one of those present spoke up: 'What if you were to regard it as *qirāḍ* [a loan for a share in the profit] O Commander of the Faithful?' – that is, that half of the profit should go to the Treasury and half to the two concerned. 'Make it *qirāḍ*', he said, and carried it out.[12]

Muḍārabah commerce, in the sense in which we use this term, evolved a great deal in the late Abbasid era, and to it were applied many labels and terms whose exact technical meanings we do not know. It is possible that the one so engaged was the merchant to whom we have applied the term 'principal merchant' or 'wholesale merchant' – *al-mujahhiz* [lit. 'supplier' or 'outfitter'] in the usage of Ibn al-Dimashqi and other writers who directed their attention to theorizing about commerce. It is possible that a 'speculator' (*muḍārib*) for them was a 'runner' (*rakkāḍ*) or an itinerant (*ṭawwāf*).[13] There were numerous terms and possibly specializations applied to this kind of commercial activity at that time, some of which we incorporate in what follows,[14] by way of illustration, not seeking to be comprehensive.

In any case, we prefer to use '*muḍārabah* commerce' because it evolved during that period and, to a great extent, consolidated its systematic provisions and principles to the point that it became the mainstay and focus of commercial activities. As al-Juzayri remarks, the term *al-muḍārabah* is derived from *al-ḍarb*, 'meaning "travelling", because commerce generally involves travelling'.[15] It is a mistake, however, to think that the *muḍārib* was comparable to the itinerant vendor (pedlar), whom Van Leur portrayed in his sociological paradigm of itinerant commerce, or that he was like the type that you might come across in the seasonal European markets (fairs). Speculative trading (*al-muḍārabah*) likewise differed from the Italian Commenda method in several ways:

The *muḍārib* was a contractual agent, not a borrower in the simple meaning of 'borrowing'.

The *muḍārib* shared in the profit, and was not obligated to provide a share of the capital, or to pay back double the amount, as sometimes under the Commenda.

The *muḍārib* was free to sell and resell in accordance with the stipulations of the contract between him and the supplier of capital.
The *muḍārib* had the right to dispose of his share of the profit before repaying the capital and thus was free to trade on his own account.
The *muḍārib* was an itinerant merchant dealing with a variety of goods which would yield large profits in order to justify his travelling long distances. Thus *al-muḍārabah* was one of the features of 'long-distance trade'.[16]

Al-muḍārabah trade continued throughout the period under study from the sixteenth century until the coming of entrepreneurial companies to the region, represented by the East India Companies, then by organized western imperial interests. These companies, however, finally put an end to the independence of the *muḍārabah* merchant – as we shall show in detail later on – after they had succeeded in realizing their monopoly over the circulation of strategic commodities and imposing a division of labour internationally, producing a change in prevailing commercial relations in the region as a whole.[17]

3

One of the characteristics of *muḍārabah* trade prevalent in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula was the rise in the cost of fees paid by the merchants for the protection of their trade by land and sea, sometimes exceeding the cost of transportation and taxes. The cost of protection fees entered directly into the setting of final prices (especially as an unstable, unknown and unpredictable element) as indicated by the conclusions of Frederic Lane regarding Venetian trade.[18]

From the standpoint of Polanyi and his disciples, we can look at protection fees as one of the forms of redistribution (redistributive enterprises).[19] Consequently, we shall be able to bring political institutions (the ruling institution, the tribal shaykhly office, the sultanate, etc.) into the framework of economic and social activities considered as 'enterprises' – 'using organized violence to produce and sell a certain kind of services, that is protection services', to use Steensgaard's term.[20]

Protection fees might take many forms. They might sometimes be included in the customs dues (the historical form was the toll (*maks*, pl. *mukūs*) and taxes, as in the case of the Mamelukes in the Red Sea ports. Customs dues, therefore, followed an irregular pattern, varying with the citizenship of the merchants, the different commodities (especially with regard to scarcity and strategic importance) and the

Table 2.1 Names and functions of some of the occupations* associated with commerce in the early sources (the second Abbasid period)

aṣḥāb al-ʿayyinah	One who sells for future delivery and buys at a lower price to get cash – *al-ʿayn*
al-bāḍiʿ	merchant
al-baddāl	grocer
al-bawārī	function not clearly specified
al-banādirah	(pl. of *bandar*) ship's accountant
al-bayyāʿ	seller, vendor
al-jallāb	slave merchant
al-jahbadh	cashier; moneychanger
al-habbāb	grain merchant
al-khazzān	warehouseman
al-daqqāq	miller
al-dallāl	broker, commission merchant; hawker
al-rabbāʿ	one who invests another's money in return for a quarter of the proceeds
al-rakkāḍ	messenger, courier
al-rahdārī	itinerant vendor (possibly a specific type, or possibly the Rahdaniyah Jews are intended, mentioned in Ibn Khurdadhabah, *Māsalik al-mamālik* (Paths to the Kingdoms), p. 153).
al-saqṭī	junkman, ragman, offal seller
al-sammār	possibly a basket-maker or mat-maker, using rush (*samar*), function not clearly specified.
al-sayyāʿ	seller of shrouds
ṣāḥib al-khān	caravanserai owner
al-ṣaḥḥāf	metal sheet maker, function not clearly specified
al-saffāq	(pl. *ṣafaqah*) – striker of bargains, great travelling merchant
al-saʿfūq	one who is present in the market but, not having any capital, resorts to deception to acquire what he wants (possibly *ṣifāt* – 'attributes' – or *ṣaffāt*?)
al-ṣayrafī	money-changer, cashier
al-ḍuṭār	same as *al saʿfūq*
al-ṭawwāf	one who travels, peddles, etc.
al-fallās	a seller of *fulūs* (copper coins) (?)
al-kasūr	village grocer – *al-baddāl* at the village level
al-mubarṭis	one who hires out beasts
al-mutaḍammin	guarantor; one how farms out land (?)
al-mujahhiz	outfitter, leading merchant (?)
al-marakibī	boatman
al-malsī	seller of stolen goods, 'fence'
al-muqriḍah	moneylender, usually userers
al-nāqid	a coin assayer
al-wakīl	deputy, agent
yudāʾ al-māl	lender of money, function not clearly specified

* *Translator's note*: 36 occupations are listed, some annotated but some unidentifiable.

varying and changing need of the emirs and sultans for money.[21] The fees might take the form of systematized bribes which the merchants paid to the officials in charge of the ports and customs, thus becoming a source of perpetual enrichment for those in charge.[22]

The protection fees might take the form of compulsory gifts offered to the emir, the governor or his deputy in whose region the land or sea trade route fell. The books and letters written by merchants and *muḍārabah* traders, and the works of travellers, contain abundant accounts of these 'gifts' and the means for collecting them.[23] Among the forms which the protection fees might take was the collection of the alms tax (whether a year had passed or not) above the fixed limits and its disbursement for other than legally defined purposes. In such a case, it was not an alms tax but a form of '*khuwa*' [lit. 'brotherliness'] — *khuwa* in our estimation is a form of protection fee.

There are historical examples of calculating transportation costs separate from the protection fees. All of the instances point to the fact that the latter exceeded the former, but the two of them together represented only a limited percentage of the final sale price. The contract drawn up on 17 September 1789 between the representatives of nine tribes of the Najd and the Englishman, Colonel Capper, on the guarantee of a merchant (or a local personage) called Shaykh Sulayman, gives us a precise picture of a transportation charges and protection fees account. In return for $1,741.25 (the full fee), the representatives of the tribes mentioned undertook to transport Colonel Capper and his companions from Aleppo to al-Qarin (al-Kuwait) in 36 days, taking upon themselves to pay the following expenses:[24]

Transportation Cost Components	*Protection Fee Components*
Pay for 19 riding and baggage camels	Wages of guards (number not mentioned)
Pay for horses for Colonel Capper and his companions	Cost of 13 lb of gunpowder and 26 lb of lead for use by the guards
Value for food, water, etc.	Fees and taxes for the shaykhs of Timur and Thuwaini, the shaykhs of Bani Khalid, the shaykhs of Shammar 'and any other tribe'
Wages of men to serve and attend the horses	Hiring of 'a guide from each tribe' to accompany the caravan until it had passed that tribe's zone

Venice in particular undertook to develop and organize the merchant ships (in addition to placing a special guard on board the vessels, as did the Muslim ships) by arming them and sending them in flotillas, in return for the collection of fixed fees which the merchants paid to the city for this protection. Thus it was finally possible to diminish the sharp fluctuations in the cost of protection which had led directly to fluctuations in prices when the merchandise reached the local market.[25] Later on, the Portuguese undertook something similar in the Indian Ocean, as we shall see. However, the great success in lowering the cost of protection which attended the appearance of the East India Companies consequently enabled them to impose an effective economic hegemony over the region, necessarily entailing – in addition to using the military fleets of their countries – their ability to internalize these expenses by virtue of their advanced jointly liable system (as we shall later try to show).[26]

As for the protection fees which the tribes imposed on the merchant caravans and those of the pilgrims, it constituted one of the principal sources of income for them. Protection services were organized on such a wide scale that there were 'guides', who in fact were representatives of the tribes through whose regions the caravans would pass, in all of the leading riverine and inland mercantile cities of the Peninsula and the Arab East.[27] Among the important tasks of these guides was to reach an agreement about the protection 'fees' before the caravan began its journey.

Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between these protection arrangements and dues on the one hand, and, on the other, robbery and pillage in which the brigands on land and the corsairs by sea engaged. The first case, however, represents broad, organized activities resulting in the redistribution of income derived from trade. Ibn Bishr openly mentions that when Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab made his historic treaty with Muhammad ibn Saʿud, he wrote to the latter to incite his desire for Wahhabism saying: 'It may be that God will grant you conquests to compensate you for the booty (of warfare) by [giving you] what is better than *zakāt*.'[28] Booty of this kind, which in reality was levies, therefore played a large part in supporting the ruling elites financially, whether in the coastal cities or in the inland trading cities such as the towns and villages of the Najd.

If we look closely at the economic role of the political-tribal organization, we can detect a phenomenon which we may call 'the circulation of the tribal elites'. Although we do not at the present time have irrefutable evidence, still there is sufficient to support the belief that the appearance and disappearance of tribal shaykhs and sultans was

directly connected with fees (or income in general) which they obtained from trade in the first instance, secondly from the provision of protection services, and thirdly from the flourishing of raiding and the imposition of extortion (*khuwa*). The appearance of the Bū Saʿid dynasty and their wiping out of the Yaʿrūb dynasty in Oman, or the appearance of the Qasimis and the ʿAtub on the scene of action in the Gulf, or the appearance of Āl Saʿud and their displacement of the Khalidis in al-Ahsaʾ and the Āl Rashid in Northern Najd, or the appearance of the Sultans of Lahej (in Aden), or the periodic rise and decline of the Shammar and ʿAnazah (al-Muntafiq, al-Dafīr and al-Rūlah) in the Syrian Desert and Iraq, may all be phases of one phenomenon: the circulation of the tribal elites.[29]

As previously mentioned, the ruling institution (the ruling families) in the ports and other cities was always in confrontation with the organizations of the merchants, tradesmen, vendors, divers, sailors, etc. The ruling institution's power was derived from tribal militias (fighting men such as the Fadawiyah and others) and from their tribal affiliation. This institution (the ruling families) often exploited this affiliation for two contradictory purposes: providing protection for trade, resulting in its flourishing and its attachment to the tribal hinterland in a unitary form on the one hand; and the exploitation of this affiliation as a means of subjugating the inhabitants of the towns (merchants and others) to their absolute authority on the other hand. This is a subject to which we shall return later on.[30]

It is natural that trade (or the income derived from it) should not be the only factor in the circulation of the elites (or in the appearance and disappearance of ruling tribal families), just as the provision of protection and raiding was not the only tie that bound pastoral tribes to mercantile cities. There was, for instance *al-musābalah*, that is the buying by the bedouins from the city markets and thus their participation in trading activities.[31] In return for the traditional goods of the bedouins, such as horses, sheep and goats, leather and wool, the bedouin bought the goods necessary for subsistence, such as grain, household utensils and textiles. In circumstances where they had no representative, such as the residence of one of their shaykhs in the city, the nomadic tribes followed a credit procedure, embodied in the depositing of the amounts they received from the sale of their goods to their credit with one of the leading merchants, against which they might draw periodically to buy what they needed from this merchant, who would arrange to open a current account for them.[32]

The pastoral tribes participated in the urban economic activities also by the payment of taxes, fees and *zakāt*, especially those the

governors and emirs of the cities imposed on flocks. Taxes of this type formed 7 per cent of the income of the Emir of Kuwait in 1904, and 11.5 per cent of that of the Basra governorate in 1901, if we consider this an appropriate measuring stick for the previous historical period or that it represented a permanent state of affairs.[33]

4

Traditional commercial activities were distinguished by intense competition between the merchants on the one hand, and the sharp fluctuations in prices in the short run on the other. Regarding the first point, relations between seller and buyer were direct, and thus prices were fixed on the basis of the direct balance between supply and demand. This meant that any sharp variations in the supply and demand of any commodity were enough immediately to raise or lower the price of the commodity a great deal. This may explain the reason for the abstention of a large number of investors from entering *muḍārabah* trade. If they had participated, they would have permanently depressed prices and this the margin of profit in this kind of trade.[34]

To clarify this question further, we should remember that the *muḍārabah* merchant who decided to undertake a certain investment in one of the distant markets had to take into account many things of which, at the beginning, he was ignorant, even matters he could not precisely control. According to Steensgaard's perception, the things known to the *muḍārabah* trader were the purchase price of his goods, his personal compensation (or his share of the profit), the amount of interest which he might have to pay and, to a certain degree, the cost of transportation. To this he had to add his estimate of the cost of protection and of the danger of the loss of his goods, in whole or in part, because of thieves, brigands, corsairs or violent seizure (on the part of emirs or shaykhs). He had to weigh all of these facts and figures against the selling price, which he could only estimate with some uncertainty, knowing that the fluctuation in prices might reach 20 per cent in the same year (during the first third of the seventeenth century). The *muḍārabah* merchant might have been able to manage his affairs at a lower profit than it might be possible to achieve, but he would not have undertaken the trip if he had not been confident he would thus obtain a certain profit.[35]

From this description, a number of elements become clear: first, that *muḍārabah* trade depended upon a rational calculation of costs and expected profits. Thus it was governed by a 'capitalistic spirit',

according to Max Weber's term.[36] Second, the differences in price (and consequently the margin of profit) between the Indian Ocean ports and the 'trading zones' were large enough to encourage one to endure the dangers of travel and the element of risk.[37]

The third element was that 'the self-regulating market' was the dominating attribute of the Arab Peninsula society of that period,[38] although a barter 'in kind' existed within this trading pattern. This means that a widespread monetary exchange and cash-producing goods, whose prices fluctuated in accordance with supply and demand, were two of the visible characteristics of commercial city markets. These semi-capitalistic sectors, in addition to the spice and silk trade, included trade in pearls, coffee, slaves, horses and weapons, and to a certain degree the manufacturing trades, especially fabrics.[39]

Because of this monetary exchange, the markets of the mercantile cities abounded with various kinds of currencies. All of these cities established clear rates of exchange for these currencies, which must have been available and known to everyone. This applies to the Ottoman *piastre* and *lira* as compared to the Imperial Persian *tuman*, the Mameluke Ashrafi *dinar*, the Indian *rupee*, the Venetian *ducat* and the other European currencies later on, in addition to the local currencies.[40]

Parallel in form to the monetary transactions, was a wide credit network managed by authorized agents in all leading commercial cities and districts, so that the *muḍārabah* merchant was not compelled to carry large sums in cash on journeys beset by danger. Rather it sufficed him to carry a money order or several of them, which would be cashed at the destination to which he was travelling. The *fastajah* (the historical form of the cheque), the money order, the promissory note and the *bīmah* (insurance policy), each accomplished important financial functions which contributed to the broadening of the scope of commercial relations on a wide scale during this period, though we cannot go into details at this point.[41]

In order to facilitate credit activities, various groups of merchants sprang up in the trading cities in the form of associations which helped with the tasks of storage, shipping and mercantile representation, and particularly the supply of necessary information for the merchants regarding conditions in other markets, the level of prices in them and so forth. Out of these groups sprang various merchant communities in the Indian and African coastal cities, such as the Shihri, Omani, Hormuzi, Hadramawti, Bahraini, Karimi and Banian (Hindu merchant) quarters.[42] Institutions such as the inn, caravanserai,

and bazaar on the Syrian coast and in Alexandria, played a very important economic and social role in the efflorescence of *muḍārabah* trade.[43]

Just as the Venetians played an outstanding role in Mediterranean trade, so did the Hadramawtis, the Yemenis and the Omanis (that is the merchants of the southern coast of the Arab Peninsula) distinguish themselves in the Indian Ocean trade. Their communities played a part in the attempts to control buying and selling prices of certain strategic goods, just as the Karimi merchants had attempted to control the Red Sea trade and the English and Venetian merchants that of the the Syrian coast at an earlier time.[44] All of these attempts failed, however, for several reasons, the most important of which was the possibility of investing in alternative goods in the same markets.[45]

Some historical references indicate that the accumulation of capital and wealth (at both the individual and public levels) sometimes reached high levels in some mercantile cities. Historical sources describe at great length the wealth of Hormuz and Jiddah in this period, for example.[46] These sources relate the mythical extravagance of Arab and Banian merchants in Gujarat, etc.,[47] but this always clashed, immediately upon its occurrence, with the limited scope for investment in the *muḍārabah* trade, and with the interference and confiscation by the emirs and sultans, and consequently the constant struggle between the merchants and rulers.[48]

The circumscription of the markets in the Arab Peninsula's commercial cities constituted one of the important features of the *muḍārabah* trade in the economy of the 'natural state'. An increase in the number of cargoes of pepper brought by Indian Banian merchants to the Shihri markets, or the delay (and often the non-arrival) of the Quseir boats (from Egypt) at Aden, was sufficient to create an economic crisis.[49] The *muḍārabah* trade, therefore, depended on the sale or purchase of limited amounts for a uniform period, determined on the basis of a seasonal occurrence in such a way that the supply might lag or remain a little less than the demand, along with abundant opportunities of, or alternative goods for, investment in the case of shortage or a sharp rise in the prices of some goods. This 'seasonal rhythm' is what we shall turn to now.

5

What we mean by the 'seasonal rhythm' of economic life is the synchronism of economic activities with the natural rotation of the seasons and regular engagement in these activities during fixed

periods of the year. Although agriculture was limited in the Arab Peninsula during this era, being confined to the oases of Najd and the valleys of Oman and Yemen, nevertheless the pastoral economy of bedouin life was customarily entirely adapted to the rotation of the seasons: the spring season (grazing and the rearing of livestock), the raiding season, and the *musābalah* season (marketing in the cities, etc.). Some of the nomadic tribes combined nomadic life with agriculture, whose lives revolved around the two seasonal periods in succession.

The seasonal rhythm, however, which had repercussions on world trade in the whole of the Indian Ocean, was related to the blowing of the seasonal winds (the Monsoon) and the Trade Winds.[50] In the Arab Gulf the trading season was called *al-safar* or *al-sifar* (i.e. 'travel' or the 'travel season'), which began in the fall (October–November) and coincided with another season in Southern Iraq – the 'fruit' season, referring to the ripening of the dates. As a leading foodstuff, dates played an important role in the commerce of the region:[51] consequently prices were fixed in a 'Date Stock Exchange' (*burṣat al-tamr*) which met at the beginning of the season, either in Basra or Abi al-Khasib. The Date Stock Exchange consisted of a meeting of the big landowners and merchants to fix the prices of the main kinds of dates (namely the *halāwī*, the *khaḍrāwī*, the *sāyir* and the *zuhdī*), which represented the general average of date prices in Southern Iraq.[52]

The 'travel season' in the Arab Gulf and the Eastern Arab Peninsula began with the blowing of the seasonal north-easterly winds in the fall or winter. The ships laden with trading goods and *muḍārabah* merchants would head for India and the coasts of the Arab Peninsula and from thence to East Africa, using Aden as their central headquarters. The ships going to India or the coasts of the Arab Peninsula might make two or more trips per year, while the journey to East Africa was generally limited to one. As for the return trip, this coincided with the blowing of the south-westerly winds at the end of spring or the beginning of summer. The summer season was devoted to another harvest, namely pearl diving, along with internal trade and trading with the bedouins.[53]

Regarding the Indian and African trade with the Red Sea ports, it went through several stages. The first stage began with the arrival of the trading ships at the coastal cities of the western Arab Peninsula, especially Aden, Mukha, Jizan, then Jiddah. The second stage began from Jiddah (or ʿIdhab on the African coast, though I shall not deal here with this trade route), heading either by land caravan for the

coastal cities of Syria, or by other boats by sea to Quseir (and thence to the Nile River), Suez and Tur. From the two latter ports, the third stage began, with the overland merchant caravans setting out for the Syrian coastal cities or Cairo and Alexandria.[54]

We should make it clear here that this seasonal rhythm of maritime trade was not due to any deficiency in Arab seafaring or the inability of Arab trading vessels to put to sea at all seasons of the year, since the truth is the very opposite. The Arab trading vessels were designed to travel by sea at all seasons, 'and were not in need of favourable winds in the strict sense of the word in order to put out to sea',[55] to the extent that the English sailing vessels were, as Villiers tells us. Rather, they put out to sea at the proper season, during which the wind blew from one direction (the north-east), while they returned to harbour during the bad weather which accompanied the south-west winds.[56]

In any case, the arrival of the caravans at the Syrian coastal ports, and Cairo and Alexandria, was considered to be the beginning of another seasonal cycle, namely the East Mediterranean trading season. The arrival of the European trading vessels at these harbours was timed to coincide with that of the merchant caravans laden with the merchandise of the east. This generally occurred in early autumn: September–October.[57] Venice, the leading city in this commerce, had organized this seasonal trade in what was called *al-muddah* (the time) or *Muda.* By *al-muddah* was meant the time from a vessel's arrival and the length of its stay in harbour to the date of its departure. There were two schedules of this nature: those of the fall and the spring; then, after the maritime revolution in the fourteenth century, a third schedule was added during certain winter months.[58]

Without doubt, one of the most important trading seasons in the Arab Peninsula was the pilgrimage season, which involved extensive trading activities. This season was not related to the seasons of the year (since its date varies with the Hijri calendar). All of the groups participating in commercial activities included the pilgrimage season in their seasonal calculations: the big merchants in the cities through which the pilgrims passed (especially the cities of the Hijaz, of course), the *muḍārabah* merchants of all nationalities, the pedlars, the pilgrims laden with merchandise (who hoped to realize some profit from selling it, or to cover some of the costs of their pilgrimage), and finally the bedouin tribes whose areas lay on the pilgrimage caravan routes, who exacted protection money paid out liberally by the caravans.[59]

In order that we may form an idea of the economic importance of

the pilgrimage season, we draw attention to the fact that rulers from the days of the Mamelukes levied various fees upon those going on pilgrimage and those returning from it.[60] The pilgrimage 'fees' revenue remained the main source of income for the government of the Hijaz and then of the Saudis until petroleum began to flow after World War II.[61]

6

Thus, although there was no powerful central state in Gulf and Peninsula society (in the period which concerns us, especially from the sixteenth century) to bring about the assimilation and integration of the institutions with the dominant social forces of the region, nevertheless these institutions and forces were bound together by a solid network of activities and relationships related to the economy of the 'natural state'. The exaggerated role which has been given to the pastoral economy prevailing in the tribal society of the Peninsula was nothing more than the singling out of one of the links of the economy of the 'natural state'. Therefore the appearance of dynastic rule and the succession of shaykhs, emirs, sultans and imams – in what we have termed the 'tribal elites circulation' – played a clearly defined role in the economy of the 'natural state'. On the other hand, the political organizations or the 'value orientations' (*al-tawajjuhāt al-qīmīyah*) likewise played a limited role in the active, dynamic, economic activities (this is a broad and thorny subject which we cannot take up now).[62]

We can postulate that the elements and characteristics of the 'natural state' economy were dominant in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society until the end of the seventeenth century, with the recognition that the outlines of a new historical period began to emerge, coinciding with the appearance of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the loss of the Eastern Mediterranean by the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the appearance of the East India Companies at the beginning of the seventeenth century. These were tantamount to harbingers of events that led to the decline of the 'natural state economy' and direct imperial intervention in the region's affairs. It likewise led to the final termination of this period with the arrival of the petroleum era after World War II. These are events to which we will later give attention.

Before we turn to the historical evolution of the society of the Gulf and the Peninsula, however, we consider it appropriate to attempt to estimate the volume of trade which traversed the land and sea routes

in the region. Owing to the fact that this kind of information is not readily available now, we must substitute a statistical calculation of the kinds of goods (other than local) current in the region's markets. We have collected statistics regarding more than ten leading categories and the various kinds of commodities under each, which were available during three historical periods: the middle of the ninth century AD in Basra, the middle of the twelfth century in Cairo, and the first quarter of the seventeenth century (imports to Prague, in present-day Czechoslovakia), incorporating them in a second table. Fortunately, the Cairo column, derived from the Geniza documents published by Goitein, is more detailed than the other columns.[63]

The significance of the Geniza data about the Cairo market in this period is that the commodities are categorized as imports and exports. This enables us to perceive a kind of division of labour and occupational and commodity specialization in geographic terms. If we accept the general data included in Table 2.2 in spite of their weaknesses, particularly since they are derived from an impressionistic listing rather than from a comprehensive survey, the first observation regarding these data is that, based on the number of commodity categories included, the volume of commercial exchange between Egypt (and possibly the Arab East in general) and Asia in the middle of the twelfth century AD was greater than during other historical periods.

If we add spices and condiments, the number of commercial commodities exchanged in the markets of the region during this period becomes very large. This is an indication of the weakness of the hypothesis which states that pre-capitalist world trade did not play a decisive role in the 'natural state' economies, since it was confined to a limited number of isolated cities – and a limited number of people and a few expensive commodities.[64] For example, Piccoloni's list for the period AD 1310–40, translated by Evans, contains 288 kinds of condiments, spices and perfumes, of which those not regarded as commodities but at that time called 'minute spices' and sold in small quantities at high prices, constituted only 10 per cent of the commodities, or 29 out of 288 varieties.[65]

Table 2.2 shows us how the volume of economic freight in the Arab East and the Peninsula was in a stage of transition from the land trade routes between Iraq and the other parts of the Arab-Islamic state, and from the land trade routes in North Africa, to maritime trade between the Arab East and the Peninsula as the two links between the countries of the Indian Ocean (especially India and East Africa) on the one hand, and the Italian commercial cities (and from there to Europe) on the other.[66]

Table 2.2 The volume of traditional trade estimated according to the kinds of commodities in circulation in three markets in various historical periods

*Principal commodity categories**	*Middle of the ninth century (Basra imports)*	*Middle of the twelfth century (Cairo)*		*First quarter of the seventeenth century (Prague: commodities imported from Asia)*
		Imported from India and Asia	*Exported to India and Asia*	
Furnishings and utensils	23	3	7	7
Precious stones and metals/minerals	12	4	1	18
Lumber	8	1	unknown	9
Persons (transportation of travellers)	7	unknown	unknown	9
Food and edibles	35	5	10	9
Pots and pans	13	3	23	3
Clothing, fabrics and furs	21	10	36	10
Animals, fowl and fish	22	unknown	unknown	8
Perfumes, essences and scents	24	36	19	20
Metals/minerals	unknown	18	7	unknown
Miscellaneous (unclassified)	11	unknown	unknown	26
Totals	176	80	103	119

* Does not include spices and condiments or local commodities.
Sources: Abu 'Uthman 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz, *al-Tabaṣṣur bi-al-tijārah* (The Consideration of Trade), edited by Hasan Husni al-Tunisi (Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Rahmaniyah, 1935), with a supplement taken from *Kitāb al-buldān* (The Book of Nations), by the traveller Ibn al-Faqih al-Hamadhani, pp. 38–42; Solomon Dob Fritz Gaitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 339–41; and Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), vol. 2, p. 55.

This deduction clearly contradicts many claims made by authoritative economic historians like Charles Issawi, who holds that the period from the twelfth century to the fourteenth was a very dark one, owing to the collapse of economic conditions in the Arab-Islamic state.[67] The truth is that the opposite is more correct, since

this period was one of mercantile growth and effloresence on a wide scale, experienced by the Mameluke State and the coastal cities of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula.[68] That is a conclusion which must raise doubts and questions about the traditional way of dividing Arab-Islamic history into stages and periods. This is a subject to which we may be able to return in another place.[69]

The second observation regarding the data presented in the second table (Cairo column) is that trade exchange was in favour of Egypt and the Arab markets with regard to exports and that the majority of the commodities exported were goods manufactured by craftsmen, such as clothing and fabrics (36 kinds) and pots and pans (23 kinds), while most of the imported commodities were unprocessed, like perfume and essences (36 kinds), raw minerals (18 varieties), and also clothing and fabrics (10 varieties). This gives us a picture completely different from the prevailing conceptions regarding economic conditions in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society in comparison with those of the Arab East (which are a natural and cultural extension of the former).[70]

As for the Prague column, it gives us an indicator regarding the commodities imported from Asia, not exported to it. It would appear that most of these imported goods were of the unprocessed type, such as perfume and essences (20 varieties) and precious stones and minerals (18 varieties), in addition to other miscellaneous unclassified commodities, most of them luxuries (26 kinds). This, of course, is without the spices and condiments, which represented the spark that ignited the fuse of a bustling historical period of commercial exchange between the eastern and western worlds, when the world was on the verge of a capitalist mercantile revolution which would push it into an important new historical era.[71]

The key to the historical period which brought about the collapse of the 'natural state economy' in the Gulf and Peninsula society lies hidden in the events which occurred on the threshold of this great important historical era (from Diu, AD 1509 to Lepanto, 1571, to the destruction of Hormuz, 1622), specifically since the end of the sixteenth century, which is what we shall turn to now.

3 Gulf and Arab Peninsula society in 'the grand imperial design'

1

If the 'natural state' thesis describes, with what precision may be possible, conditions prevailing in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula society at the beginning of the sixteenth century, then the course of history in the evolution of this society over the three and a half centuries since that date, that is until the middle of the nineteenth century, has not been sufficiently clarified, nor have all its riddles been solved up to the present. Since it is impossible to record the historical chain of events throughout this vast historical period, we shall try to confine ourselves to an attempt to examine the important historical turning-points which governed these events.

There are actually only a few historical facts with regard to the important turning-points which lead us to recognize the elements of the historical background of the present *status quo*. Therefore the greater part of the effort to elucidate the historical dimensions of the present *status quo* in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society will appear in incomplete and fragmentary form, as we explained at the outset of this study.[1] This compels us, in an attempt to discern the important historical turning-points, to resort to presenting a number of very general propositions which require extensive studies in order to corroborate them.

Probably the professional historian may not find the boldness, or even the need to submit propositions of such a broad historical comprehensiveness, but the sociologist is forced to resort to this kind of theoretical testing, since he is called upon to organize a vast quantity of data in accordance with turning-points possessing far-ranging historical significance. These propositions may be summed up under four main heads as follows.

1. The Gulf and Arab Peninsula society witnessed a second mercantile

revolution in the period between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries, this after the failure of the first mercantile revolution in Iraq and the Mashriq from the eighth to the eleventh centuries owing to a number of factors, including the fact that the revolution fell foul of the military forces.[2] The distinguishing features of these two revolutions were:

(a) The first mercantile revolution depended upon a parallel agricultural revolution which produced a rise in the level of land tax,[3] just as it basically depended upon the long-distance land trade routes (with China and North Africa).[4] It was financed by African gold (or Sudanese gold, which was basic in business transactions involving large sums and in the amassing of wealth and accumulation of capital).[5]

(b) The second mercantile revolution, for its part, was based upon the development of the level of European demand for eastern goods, that is upon commercial relations between the east and the west, and thus upon a monopoly control of sea trade routes between the Indian Ocean and the coastal markets of Syria and Egypt.[6]

2. The decisive factor which prepared the way for the consolidation of Arab-Islamic mercantilism's monopoly of world trade between the east and the west was the transformation of the Indian Ocean from the thirteenth century into an 'Arab-Islamic lake', in whose economic development the *muḍārabah* trade played a great role,[7] as we have explained in the previous section of this study. The result was that:

(a) Arab-Islamic mercantilism succeeded in achieving a complete monopoly which it exercised over pre-capitalist world trade without the need to use force in the exercise of this monopoly. It is possible that the absence of a powerful central taxing state in the southern coasts of the Peninsula, Western India and East Africa was one of the reasons for the flourishing of commerce which these trading regions witnessed.

(b) The appearance of the crusading spirit in the west was a reaction to what was said in (a) above, that is, it was not the result merely of religious motives, but rather of clear economic commercial interests, interests which pushed Europe to repeatedly try to break the monopoly exercised by Arab-Islamic mercantilism, which occurred from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, during which the crusading spirit revealed clear imperialistic goals.[8]

3. Although the beginning of 'the grand imperial design' to gain control of world trade in the Indian Ocean began with the Portuguese, with the details being put in place after the Battle of Diu in AD 1509, nevertheless the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean and the European struggle which followed did not lead to the

collapse of the 'natural state' economy all at once or directly. The conditions of the 'natural state' continued until the middle of the nineteenth century, owing to the fact that the Portuguese used the commercial methods prevailing in the region in order to achieve their trade monopoly, especially to seize control of the profits from protection fees in the form of taxes. This brought about their adaptation to the rules governing *muḍārabah* trade and consequently their failure to achieve their strategy and the complete monopoly for which they were striving.[9]

With the arrival of the East India Companies (from the standpoint of their being an indicator of the shift of the economic centre of gravity to Protestant western and northern Europe), they were able to impose their trade monopoly on the Indian Ocean, coinciding with the loss of Arab-Muslim domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the tripartite imperialist struggle (English–Dutch–French) made it possible for the 'natural state' economy to continue in one form or another, even sometimes making an effective resistance possible until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the struggle was finally decided in Britain's favour.[10]

4. The 'natural state' economy began to collapse, upon the settlement of the question in favour of British imperial hegemony over the region, owing to its success in achieving the grand imperial design and the crystallization of its economic/industrial ascendancy. This completely altered prevailing economic relations in the region. The results were as follows.

(a) Britain succeeded in achieving its hegemony over the traditional commercial areas in the Indian Ocean and in gaining control of the strategic straits in it. She thus subjected *muḍārabah* trade to the complete control of commercial agencies, and the ruling families to protectorate treaties, thus eliminating the seasonal impact of 'natural state' trade; and in the end destroying local, long-distance mercantile fleets.

(b) Imperialist hegemony led to the transfer of the centre of gravity from the coastal commercial cities to the tribal hinterland; but imperialist penetration did not extend to the hinterland until after World War I and the appearance of the strategic, economic importance of petroleum, which finally led to fashioning the political map as it is today.

We can translate these general propositions in terms of time into historical periods marked off from each other by important transition points:

The first historical period, which was marked by Portuguese hegemony between AD 1509 and 1622.

The second historical period, which was characterized by the European imperial struggle in the region and the local-nationalist resistance to it between AD 1630 and 1839.

The third historical period, which was distinguished by British hegemony over the region between AD 1839 and 1920.

The fourth historical period, characterized by a transformation from the *rentier* state to the authoritarian state, which is the contemporary period, AD 1920–85.

2

Thus the second mercantile revolution began a little before the fall of Baghdad, but the fall of Baghdad provided a powerful spur for the removal of the commercial and economic centre of gravity in general away from Iraq, and the transfer of the land trade routes to the Arab Peninsula and its mercantile cities, in view of their constituting the principal connecting link in pre-capitalist world trade between the east and the west. Thus the second commercial revolution was founded on maximizing the level of commercial exchange between the east in general and the European west between the thirteenth and the seventeen centuries AD. The monopoly practised by Arab-Islamic mercantilism over world trade routes played a decisive role in this commercial revolution on a world scale.

This monopoly was characterized by a complete control by Muslim merchants of the Indian Ocean, as against their weak or limited control of the eastern Mediterranean.[11] The reason for this goes back to the fact that Arab-Islamic mercantile dominance over the Indian Ocean followed the spread of Islam as a religion and civilization parallel to the expansion of commercial activity. The Hadramawti and Omani merchants, as well as Muslim merchants from Persia and India, played an important part in the spread of Islam from India to Malacca and the islands of the Western Indian Ocean (Java, Sumatra and Borneo, the so-called al-juzur al Iqyanosiah).[12]

Eight important Islamic sultanates appeared along the seaboard of East Africa, and ten in the whole of the Indian subcontinent between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries – see Table 3.1.

If we recall what has been said in the first section about the network of commercial relations, it will become clear to us that the efflorescence of *muḍārabah* trade in the Indian Ocean was closely connected with the spread of Islam as a religion and civilization,

Table 3.1 Islamic sultanates and emirates in the Indian Ocean

Africa	*Historical period (AD)*	*India*	*Historical period (AD)*
Sultanate of Bata	12th cent.	Ceylon and Maldive Islands	12th cent.
Sultanate of Mogadishu	12th cent.	Sultanate of Delhi	13th cent.
Sultanate of Kalwa	12th cent.	Banu Yahman (North Dakan)	14th cent.
Sultanate of Zanzibar	12th cent.	Sultans of Kashmir	14th cent.
Sultanate of Bamba	—	Sultans of the East (in Junpore?)	14th cent.
Sultanate of Mombasa	12th cent.	the Faruqis (in Khandash)	14th cent.
Sultanate of Malindi	12th cent.	Sultans of Gujarat	14th cent.
Sultanate of Safālah	12th cent.	Sultans of Bengal	14th cent.
		Sultans of Ahmad Nājār and Nishāpūr	15th cent.
		Sultans of Malwa	15th cent.

Sources: 'The arrival of Islam to the land of Malabar, and repulsing of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century', unpublished paper, 1986 (in Arabic); Amin Tawfiq Tibi, and Shakir Mustafa, *Dawr al-Baḥrayn al-mutawassiṭ wa-al-Hindī fī al-tārīkh al-Islāmī*, ('The Mediterranean and Indian role of Bahrain in Islamic history'), a paper delivered to the Conference on Islamic Civilization from its Arab Cradle to its Worldwide Horizons, Kuwait, 17–20 December 1984, pp. 17 and 32ff.
Note: The dash (—) indicates a lack of sufficient information.

which ensured direct peaceful control over the sources of the basic commodities in east–west trade. This commerce flowed into two principal channels: first the Arab Gulf, then into the Tigris and Euphrates Valley and on to the Syrian coast, its point of articulation being Hormuz, then Muscat after the destruction of the former. As for the second channel, it went by way of Aden on which the east African trade was based, then on to Jiddah, ʿIdhab, and Suez.[13]

When we spoke about the seasonal rhythm of the *muḍārabah* trade, we saw that the coast of Syria, or the Levant, and the Egyptian coast, were the commercial regions in which the Arab-Muslim merchants exercised a monopoly over the trade of the East, and from which the European West obtained goods, particularly through the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa, and through Marseilles, and

where commercial exchange of the commodities of the east for those of the west took place on a large scale.

Just as the increase in the volume of commercial exchange in this period resulted in vast Arab-Islamic mercantile wealth, so the efforts of the European west took the form of feverish unceasing efforts, from the time of the revival of trade in the twelfth century (especially after the 'crisis of feudalism' at the end of the thirteenth century, or about AD 1300),[14] aimed at breaking the power of the Arab-Islamic mercantile monopoly of the trade in eastern commodities such as condiments, spices, silk, etc., and particularly the monopoly of the sources of African gold and silver which had financed the first Arab-Islamic commercial efflorescence (which we have characterized as the first commercial revolution).

All of these efforts poured into one channel: (a) the crusading spirit in the invasion of the east in order to subjugate it militarily and commercially; (b) the Andalusian *reconquista* to drive out the Arabs; (c) the bypassing of the Arab East completely by way of Constantinople, then on to Persia, China and India via the land trade routes, or from Persia to Hormuz, then on to India and China via the sea trade routes.[15]

The Crusades and the *reconquista* campaign are familiar parts of the region's history which we do not intend to describe here. What does concern us in this regard is to emphasize the historical fact mentioned in most of the reliable sources, namely that the crusading spirit was in direct harmony with economic commercial interests. Europe, however, was finally driven outside its own boundaries to solve the 'crisis of feudalism' by means of resources other than those of Europe. This necessitated an attempt to reach the traditional sources of gold and silver in Africa in order to finance the acquisition of these resources. The Ottoman occupation of the city of Constantinople in the year AD 1453, however, upset all the European plans and played a decisive role in inciting the Europeans to accelerate the smashing of the formidable Arab-Islamic barrier which barred Europeans from reaching the sources of eastern trade.[16]

The occupation of Constantinople was not of itself the destructive factor, but rather the appearance of the Ottomans as a naval power in the region. This meant the loss of supremacy over the eastern Mediterranean, after all European attempts to occupy the Arab East or to bypass it by way of Constantinople had met with failure. The fall of Constantinople, therefore, had a fearful and resounding impact on Europe.

It was also a powerful spur to urge Europe on to the exploration of

the world, which had begun a little prior to that. To be exact, it began in 1415 with the Portuguese occupation of Ceuta on the coast of Morocco at the Straits of Gibraltar, then their arrival later on in the Gold Coast in Africa in 1482, their opening the route to India through the instrumentality of Da Gama in 1494, and their victory over the Sultans of Gujarat and their allies, the Mamelukes of Egypt, in the Battle of Diu in 1509. All that time, Europe was making preparations to regain supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, however, for the Portuguese explorations were unable to break the Arab-Islamic monopoly of trade with the east.[17] Finally the showdown came at Lepanto in AD 1571, with the defeat of the Ottomans and the restoration of European control of the eastern Mediterranean.

Europeans like to picture their victory at Lepanto as the turning-point which prevented Europe from becoming Muslim. This incident gave rise to brisk business in Venice, which derived the greatest profit from this victory. A reporter for *The Economist* describes an exhibition which was held in Venice recently, entitled: 'Venice and the defence of the Levant' (from April to July, 1986) and the preparations made for this battle: paintings by Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese, and the music of Vivaldi's military oratorio celebrating this occasion. All the chemists and even the monks participated in the preparations for the battle: there were those who submitted their effective solutions for victory, including poison which left no traces, to be thrown in the wells of drinking water which the Turks had dug. There were others who suggested nails to pierce the feet of the warriors or the horses' hooves, that they might swell up and gradually poison the infantry and cavalry. A long debate went on regarding the importation of plague germs to sprinkle on clothing before selling it to the Turks.[18]

Although the Europeans were not unified in their interests, for the Venetians were engaged in struggle with the Portuguese in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (note particularly the Venetian alliance with the Mamelukes of Egypt), nevertheless the Portuguese were guided – outwardly at least – by the crusading spirit and the European *reconquista* mentality. In fact their presence in the Indian Ocean was the actual crowning of this spirit and mentality.[19] However, the effect of the Portuguese upon Arab-Islamic trade, as previously mentioned, was not decisive or ruinous, for reasons to which we must now give attention. The appearance of the Portuguese (*al-firanja* – 'the Franks') in the beginning was nothing more than a passing irritation, from the viewpoint of the Arab-Muslim merchants or their rulers, as mentioned by the local histories translated by

Serjeant.[20] This means that no one looked at them as the harbingers of a new historical era. Bahadur Shah, the King of Gujarat, went so far as to declare that 'the wars at sea are a matter which concern the merchants and do not touch the prestige of kings'.[21]

3

The events of this transitional stage related to this major historical period have revealed that Portuguese ambitions were not aimed – beneath the veil of the crusading spirit and the *reconquista* mentality – merely at breaking the power of the Arab-Islamic mercantile monopoly, or imposing their own monopoly upon trade with the east and reaching the sources of gold and silver, but rather also at forcing their hegemony upon the old world. This imperialist spirit became evident very early in the Indian Ocean, from the beginning of the sixteenth century. This is what we mean by 'the grand imperial design'.

When the wily leader, Albuquerque, took over control of the Portuguese 'factories' in western India, he aspired to form a Portuguese empire in the east (Estado da India), by building huge, impregnable forts at Aden, Diu, Hormuz, Goa and Malacca. By means of these forts, he would not only dominate the main junctions of the world trade routes of that time, but also establish hegemony over the local rulers, imposing his authority over them, compelling them to proclaim their loyalty to Portugal and facilitating the collection of tribute from them.[22]

From that time the 'grand imperial design' was stabilized, established on the basis that whoever wanted control over world trade in the Indian Ocean must gain control over three straits which dominate it:

(a) The Straits of Malacca, leading eastward toward China and the East Indies
(b) The Strait of Hormuz leading to the Arab Gulf and Persia on the one hand, and the Mesopotamian Valley on the other
(c) The Bab el-Mandeb Straits (i.e., Aden), leading to the Red Sea and from there to Egypt and the Levant.

This design largely explains the policy and actions of the Portuguese in the region, in spite of their failure to achieve this design (for many reasons, some of which we shall examine later on). This design was realized only after three centuries by the English, as we shall see. Portuguese supremacy in the region continued for about a century,

from their victory at Diu in AD 1509 to their loss of Hormuz and its destruction at the hands of the British and Persians in AD 1622. The Dutch, the English, the Danes and others such as European renegades and pirates of various nationalities, followed the Portuguese to Africa (the Gold Coast) at first, then to the Indian Ocean.

The attempts of the Portuguese to blockade the Arab Gulf and the Red Sea were aimed at diverting trade from them directly to Portugal by way of the Cape of Good Hope, and at imposing tribute and taxes by the traditional methods utilized in dealing with the *muḍārabah* trade which had prevailed in the area. They this entered into direct confrontation with the local powers in control of the land termini of the Indian Ocean trade routes: the Mamelukes in Egypt and the Hijaz, the Safavids in Persia, and the Ottomans in the Arab Gulf and the Hijaz. No sooner had the situation become stabilized for the Portuguese than the European struggle began with the Dutch, then the English and the French, as we have mentioned, especially with the appearance of the East India Companies – first the Dutch, then the English with the dawn of the seventeenth century.[23]

When the Portuguese established their state in the east (Estado da India) their purpose was to blockade the Red Sea and monopolize trade via the Cape of Good Hope, and to control the Indian Ocean by force and violence by means of their vessels armed with cannons. But their methods of achieving this – as Van Leur has mentioned – did not differ from those previously followed in the region: (1) small-scale trading in comparison with the *muḍārabah* trade; (2) the Portuguese local government's engagement in trading, as though it were private enterprise; (3) using the methods of the imposition of control with the purpose of economic exploitation and the use of the fiscal year for trade, such as the imposition of customs dues upon loading and unloading activities and storage in port; (4) all of this was under the supervision of high officials and an upper level of clerics from the Portuguese aristocracy. Van Leur therefore concluded that the Portuguese did not introduce any new element into the Indian Ocean trade.[24]

The Portuguese were nothing more than tax-collectors and the Estado da India was nothing more than an institution for the redistribution of wealth of the sort that sells organized violence in return for protection fees, exactly resembling the role of the traditional shaykhly office or the sultanate in the commercial cities in the Indian Ocean. The *cartaze* ('paper' or often 'cupon', girṭas, in the local sources) was the means by which the Estado collected the taxes, by selling them to the merchants and ship owners. They represented

compensation for protection which the Estado provided for trading in the Indian Ocean. Thus no ship was permitted to leave port without it – otherwise it would be exposed to plundering and looting on the part of the Portuguese themselves. In addition to the *cartaze*, the Portuguese authorities practised the collection of customs dues of not less than 10 per cent on goods, and for this purpose forced the ships to pass by Hormuz or Muscat.[25]

The Portuguese justified the institution of the *cartaze* as a means of propagating the Christian faith, disrupting the supply routes for Islam in the east and weakening the military power of the Ottomans and their threat against Christian Europe. However, the direct connection between the *cartaze* system and the local rulers is clear, since it imposed customs dues and also dues connected with the organization of maritime loading and its volume among the region's ports.

To what extent did the Portuguese succeed in realizing their imperial design to control the Indian Ocean? To what extent did they succeed in blockading the Red Sea and in diverting trade in the strategic eastern commodities from the Arab Peninsula and the Arab East, and accordingly breaking the Arab-Islamic mercantile monopoly? All historical evidence indicates that the Portuguese – in spite of their domination of Hormuz (the main base of their commercial activity), the western coast of India and the Arab Gulf ports in the sixteenth century – failed to occupy Aden and Jiddah and consequently failed miserably in blockading the Red Sea or its trade. Then they lost control of Malacca to the Dutch a little after that, and therefore Arab trade in the Peninsula and the Arab East was only partially affected by the Portuguese activities.[26] The failure of the Portuguese was due to many factors, the most important of which were the following.

(a) Portuguese policy, based on the crusading spirit and the *reconquista* mentality, was marked by a great deal of bigotry and greed in fleecing the local merchants and emirs, and cruelty in their treatment of the inhabitants. This prompted the local rulers to rebel and to ally themselves with the other European powers to drive out the Portuguese from many places and ports which they had occupied at the beginning of their hegemony over the region. This afterwards contributed to kindling the European struggle.[27] We must not forget that the Portuguese weapon in their maritime expansion was their vessels armed with cannons, not their trade relations as a peaceful commercial activity.

(b) There was a shortage of the Portuguese nationals in the colonized regions, and this pushed the Portuguese to resort to European

renegades and Indian mercenaries (or 'rice Christians', that is those who adopted Christianity out of hunger) to join their garrisons or work in their forts. This was one of the causes contributing to the disruption of discipline in the Portuguese navy, the repeated instances of rebellion among senior Portuguese officers and the spread of bribery and corruption among them to the point where bribery became a semi-official institution and the highest offices in the Estado da India were sold officially by the Portuguese crown.[28]

(c) The struggle between Portugal and the Spaniards lasted from 1580, when Philip II united the two countries, to 1640, when Portugal became independent once more under the rule of the Braganza family. This struggle weakened the colonial administration and at the same time changed little in its methods, which depended mainly on the government's bureaucratic monopoly of profitable commodities in the form of the traditional government monopoly. This prevented the mobilization of the economy and the Portuguese merchants in a way that would contribute to the imposition of imperial hegemony and produce a capitalist accumulation which would reconcile commerce with the imperial (aristocratic) administration, as later occurred with the Dutch and English.

(d) The Portuguese colonial expansion, which spread through the *reconquista* mentality to the two Americas and the Indian Ocean, was founded in the way we have stated: sailing ships armed with cannons, the *cartaze* system, the collection of land tax in the form of levies, the sale of protection in the form of poll tax and customs dues, and the monopoly of trade in profitable commodities by the government. All this made the Portuguese tax-collectors of the first order; but the wealth from these taxes – along with the silver and gold which began to pour into Portugal and Spain from America, in addition to the profits coming from the spices monopoly – went to buy European goods from their Genoese allies (who were the merchants of Genoa), the traditional competitors of the Venetian merchants, and from the merchants of Bavaria and the states of the United Provinces of Holland. This was due to the lack of the development of the mercantile system in both Portugal and Spain; for the truth is that these two states were nothing more than conduits to finance west European capitalist expansion in the three areas previously mentioned.[29]

Thus the Portuguese–Spanish imperial expansion in the two Americas and the Indian Ocean brought the resultant world system, in the early part of the sixteenth century (by means of these first two states which had surmounted the crisis of feudalism through external expansion), to a mercantile crisis prior to the great capitalist mercantile

crisis which reached its climax during the price revolution in the middle of the seventeenth century (the crisis of AD 1650).[30] This later led to a widespread depression in the Ottoman Empire and the east in general, owing to their being flooded by American silver.[31]

In the Indian Ocean, however, we can call this 'the structural crisis of traditional mercantilism', represented by the *muḍārabah* trade. This crisis was represented, in the historic confrontation at Hormuz in the year AD 1622, between the local traditional Portuguese mercantile methods (so-called because they conformed to them), which had reached the limits of their possible expansion, on the one hand; and on the other, by the advanced imperial capitalist mercantilism, represented by the two East India Companies of Holland and England. Hormuz – the way station of traditional mercantilism during its expansion and the fortress of traditional, pre-capitalist imperialism – was not prepared for this confrontation, for it was, with all its wealth and splendour, an eloquent expression of the structural crisis that had been fermenting for a long time. Thus, in this confrontation it fell irretrievably, its destruction so complete that it disappeared from history as though it had been a singularly curious exception (or a mere shadow of reality).[32]

4

If the Portuguese were the biggest tax-collectors in the Indian Ocean, the two East India Companies, the Dutch and the English, were the two largest smuggling institutions in the pre-capitalist world.[33] If the fall of Hormuz was an expression of the structural crisis of traditional mercantilism and *muḍārabah* trade, the two East India Companies were the means which introduced Gulf and Arab Peninsula society to the world economic system controlled by emerging European capitalism. However, traditional mercantilism, which characterized the 'natural state', would not at once disintegrate, but would continue for a long time, possibly until the middle of the nineteenth century. This was due to various factors including the imperial Portuguese–Dutch, then the Dutch–English, then the English–French struggles.

What concerns us here is the interpretation of the secret of the ascendancy of the Dutch and English East India Companies over the Portuguese India Company and the Estado da India which succeeded it. The reasons we shall present to explain this ascendancy may be objected to from several angles, especially that they are vitiated by over-simplification and abbreviation; but what mainly concerns us here is to learn the effect of these specific developments pertaining to

the Indian Ocean on the reasons for the collapse of the 'natural state economy' in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society.

My conviction is that one of the main reasons for the ascendancy of the two East India Companies (by which I always mean the Dutch and English Companies) was the meticulous co-ordination between the activities of the imperial state and those of the merchants and 'factors' who were tantamount to forerunners of capitalist commerce,[34] something which the Portuguese lacked, as we have mentioned. This fact, however, hides more than it reveals, since most of the writers and historians who have written about this period have confused imperialism as a manifestation of military expansion, colonial settlement and political hegemony, on the one hand, and capitalism as an economic activity aimed at profit-making by rational means and by high efficiency in the utilization of labour and economic and material resources to produce this profit and create an accumulation of capital, on the other hand.

Imperialism is an ancient, world-wide phenomenon not tied to capitalism or a distinguishing feature of it,[35] just as capitalism was not confined to Europe after the fifteenth century; for *muḍārabah* trade, whose bases we explained in Chapter 2, which flourished, or rather was the mainstay of the first Islamic commercial revolution between the eighth and the eleventh centuries, was based on clear capitalist foundations.[36] Similarly, the state which was victorious and settled the European imperial and economic struggle in her favour (namely England) was an area which was under the hegemony of the traditional aristocracy. Merchants did not form any significant part of the ruling class or the military bureaucracy, which was in charge of decision-making.[37] However, the marriage between imperialism and capitalism, in the circumstances of the seventeenth century, had a profound influence upon the victory of capitalism and its bringing both the old and the new worlds into its embrace.

Thus the merchant fleets of the Dutch and English East India Companies (and the merchant agents under their banners) enjoyed the complete protection of the military fleets of these two countries. In fact, these companies undertook to finance the military fleets which had succeeded in destroying the Portuguese hegemony over the trade routes in the Indian Ocean after the fall of Hormuz and in occupying the coasts of India.[38] What did this mean from the viewpoint of *muḍārabah* trade? It meant that the two East India Companies – and hence the merchant agents dependent upon them – were able to internalize the costs of protection levies, since they were able to obtain protection at cost price, by financing the military fleets,

rather than at the price of a third party, such as a sultan, a shaykh or a king (as in the case of the Portuguese). This was in the period in which the *muḍārabah* merchant – as we have seen – was compelled to pay this levy in the form of fees and taxes in every port and stopping-place, subject to the fluctuation of circumstances and the greed of the rulers. The Portuguese did not themselves engage in trade, but were content to ship the goods (to Lisbon over the Lisbon–Goa route)[39] by means of government companies and to collect tribute and fees from the local ports and rulers.

The saving possible through the internalization of the cost of the protection levies under the protection of sailing ships armed with cannons must have been large, according to what appears in Van Leur's and Steensgaard's calculations. However, it was not of itself enough, for these two companies, through their institutional structure and their appointment of agents over a wide area, were able to obtain a monopolistic or semi-monopolistic control of prices world-wide, a goal which no one in traditional *muḍārabah* trade had been able to achieve. This came to pass through stock formation over a long period, not through seeking quick, direct profits. Likewise, the participation of the agents and their local Banian partners guaranteed a high level of competence in setting the purchase price, delivery and distribution. This meant that, in addition to the savings resulting from these companies protecting themselves by obtaining this protection at cost price, they were able, through the acquisition of the strategic, high-profit goods, and their storage on a large scale and for an extended period, to protect themselves from the sharp fluctuations in price which were an outstanding characteristic of traditional *muḍārabah* trade.[40]

These two features: the internalization of protection* costs and the achievement of monopolistic control of strategic commodities by means of stock formation in world trade represent two organizational innovations at the institutional level, which contributed to a decisive economic triumph synchronous with the appearance of the military superiority of the north European countries, Holland first, then England. The direct result of this victory was the transfer of the economic centre of gravity from the ports of the Arab Peninsula and the Arab East to the trade routes passing around the Cape of Good Hope, and the transfer of the economic centre of gravity in world trade in the eighteenth century from the whole of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean.[41]

* The text has *ḥimalīyah*, apparently a printing mistake for *ḥimāyah*.

In order that the picture may be completely clear, we must mention that the strategic commodities during this period – from the angle of traditional trade in the Arab ports – were as follows: spices (especially nutmeg, saffron, ginger, cinnamon, cloves, etc.), condiments (especially pepper of various kinds), silk, indigo dyes, incense, clothing and textiles, horses, camels, traditional weapons (especially Yemeni swords and spears), foodstuffs (wheat, rice, dates and gum arabic), slaves, and later on woollen and cotton goods, which played a big role in capitalist industrial development (on account of the manufacture of textiles being the first area of industrialization), oils (particularly coconut oil), stimulants (coffee, sugar, and then tea), and finally precious stones (especially pearls).[42]

One who examines this list closely will perceive that these strategic commodities differed with respect to the amounts of profit they yielded, to the quantities in circulation in world markets, and to the degree to which they were influenced by the monopolistic practices of the East India Companies. Chinese and Persian silks were less influential than spices, particularly after the entry of Syrian silk into the world exchange arena at the end of the eighteenth century. However, the merchants who gained control of the purchase of Syrian silk were the English and French, instead of the Italians.[43] The degree to which the Gulf and Arab Peninsula trade was or was not influenced by these monopolistic activities gives us an idea or an indicator of the amount of traffic which the traditional *muḍārabah* trade retained in the region, although these companies finally succeeded in obtaining the lion's share of buying and selling operations in the strategic commodities.

The high profit commodities, however, which were influenced to a great degree by the monopolistic practices of the East India Companies, were the condiments and spices trade, and this influence in general came at an early date. Bernard Lewis quotes from ʿUmar Talib, one of the Turkish elite, who complained in AD 1625 that:

> The Europeans have become acquainted with the whole world, sending their ships everywhere and seizing the harbours. The goods from India, Sind and China previously came to Suez and were distributed by the Muslims to the whole world. Now, however, these goods are transported by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English to the Frankish countries, from whence they distribute them to the world. The goods that they don't need, they bring to Istanbul and the Islamic countries, selling them at five times their value, thus reaping great profit. For this reason both gold and silver have become scarce in Islamic countries.[44]

This seemingly sudden shift in the economic scales to the advantage of Holland and England, without doubt led to great financial loss to Arab mercantile harbours and consequently to the whole 'natural state' economy. However, we do not know the exact size of this loss, especially for the eighteenth century. Steensgaard, for example, estimates the size of the loss in the condiments and spices trade (to the Syrian coastal ports which had begun to purchase these commodities of which they monopolized the sale) at not less than four million gold pounds annually.[45] The important question which will concern us below, however, is that these two states (Holland and England), followed by France, had gained control, through colonial occupation, of the main commercial regions in the Indian Ocean which were the sources of the commodities of which the Arab *muḍārabah* merchants had been the chief middlemen. This is the more important question.

The political and military scales followed another logic and therefore took a long time before reaching stability. This is attributable primarily to the imperial struggle following the fall of Hormuz in AD 1622. The Dutch (who came to the region shortly after the Portuguese, that is before the English) settled in Bandar ʿAbbas (which became the successor to Hormuz), while the English turned to Jask. The position of the Dutch was thus better than that of the English in their ability to control trade with the Arab Gulf, and therefore a struggle flared up between them, especially after AD 1652. The loss of the war of AD 1676 by the Dutch–Spanish Alliance to the French in the Mediterranean weakened their position in the Indian Ocean to such an extent that it drove them to transfer their commercial centre from Bandar ʿAbbas to Basra, which the Ottomans won from them, then to the fortified island of Kharj.

As for the English, they founded branches of the East India Company in the ports of the Gulf and the south of the Peninsula, especially in Muscat, Basra, Bahrain and Bu Shahr, while the Red Sea remained open owing to the inability of any maritime power to impose decisive control over it. English expansion in the region began after they had firmly established their control and their colonial occupation of India between AD 1630 and 1690. Their expansion thus proceeded from a stronger position and the balance of power began to favour them over Holland from the beginning of the eighteenth century.[46]

France, meanwhile, began to threaten England's colonial position in India by way of Egypt, Baghdad, Basra and Muscat. This tripartite imperial struggle was decided in favour of England (or 'Britain', beginning with the year AD 1771), when the Dutch were compelled to

vacate Kharj Island in 1765, upon which all their influence in the region came to an end. France's loss occurred at the same time, in the Seven Years War between AD 1756 and 1763, which had been aimed at securing a foothold in India, thus resulting in strengthening England's imperial hegemony.[47] However, the struggle with France was not to end in this period, since it was renewed when Napoleon I revived French imperial ambitions in the last decade of the eighteenth century. It was to continue throughout the nineteenth century, though it played only a marginal role from the economic and military standpoint in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, being centred on the control of Muscat.[48] This struggle openly came to an end only when France entered into a treaty with England and Czarist Russia, known as the Tripartite Entente Cordiale in AD 1904.

Although we can say with some confidence that the continuation of the *muḍārabah* trade was relegated to the periphery of the action left by the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic practices of the East India Companies, yet by the same logic we can say that the imperial struggle throughout the eighteenth century left comparatively wide scope for the era of the tribal elites in the 'natural state' economy. Not only so, but the local political and economic forces undertook serious effective action to meet European imperial hegemony, after it had been regarded (throughout the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries) as a mere annoyance which might go away after a time. We can therefore correctly say that the era of the tribal elites took on a new dimension, that of local resistance to European imperialism and its economic hegemony, although only a minority of historians so regarded it.[49]

This indigenous national resistance took the form of three great movements, from the agricultural-pastoral tribal hinterland to the commercial coastal cities, to meet the piratical penetration of the 'infidel Franks':

1 The change in the Zaidi movement in Yemen from 'mountain emigrations' towards the plain and the commercial Shafiite coastlands, and their occupation of Zabid, Mukha, al-Hudeida and Aden, beginning from AD 1676 (during the reign of the Imam al-Mutawakkil).
2 The Ibadi movement from their tribal lands toward Muscat and its emergence as a regional force during the era of the Bū Saʿidiyah Imamate in spite of the Ghafiri–Hinnawi struggle, beginning in AD 1718.
3 The Wahhabi–Saudi movement from the heart of the Arabian

> Peninsula in Najd toward the coasts of al-Ahsa᾿ and Oman in a unification movement which rejected foreign influence, beginning AD 1744.[50]

It is truly noteworthy that the indigenous nationalist resistance movement was tied to the ancient sectarian question going back to antiquity in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society. The writer Amin al-Rihani became aware of this characteristic at a comparatively early date, namely the dominance of sectarian loyalty over religion in the Arab Peninsula, apparent in his scheme of divisions along sectarian lines, which he suggested as early as AD 1924.[51] The first movement was represented by the Arab Qahtani tribes (southerners) in Yemen, which in early times had adopted an opposing attitude toward the Arab ʿAdnani tribes (northerners), possibly before the rise of Islam. Thus the adoption by some of them of the Zaidi sect in the fourteenth century represented an extension of this historic position.

The competition between Qahtan and Adnan did not stop at this point, however; for the tribes which adopted the Wahhabi sect in Najd belonged to Rabiʿah, a part of ʿAdnan. They in turn, took up a hostile position toward the ʿAdnani-Madari tribes in the Hijaz, where power was in the hands of the Hashemite *sharifs* (under Ottoman rule). Moreover, the majority of the Omani tribes which embraced the Ibadi sect belonged to Azd and Qadaʿah (which were southern tribes), in alliance with elements of Kindah. The adoption by these groups of the Ibadi (Kharijite) sect goes back to the first Hijri century in Basra when these elements shared the same fifth (*khums*) among the tribal quarters of Basra.[52]

In any case, the mercantile revival on the margin of the movement which the imperialist struggle begot, and which accompanied these great sectarian movements of resistance against western imperial penetration, resulted in speeding up the emergence of the cycle of the tribal elites throughout the eighteenth century. We shall give as historical proof some of the most important events which were an expression of this:

The emergence of Muscat as a regional commercial power from AD 1719.

The separation of Lahej and Aden, and before that Hadramawt, from Zaidi Yemen as of AD 1728.

The efforts of Nadir Shah to unify Persia against foreign influence about AD 1747.

The founding of Kuwait as a commercial centre under the leadership of Āl Sabah, of the ʿAtub, about AD 1752.

The emergence of the Qasimis as a local resistance power dating from AD 1777.
The founding of Bahrain as a commercial centre under the leadership of Āl Khalifah, of the ʿAtub, about AD 1783.
The appearance of the Wahhabi movement on a regional basis under the leadership of Āl Saʿud, dating from AD 1792.
The emergence of the economic role of Kuwait as a mercantile port-of-call, instead of Basra, about AD 1792, as a result of the sectarian wars between the Persians and the Ottomans in Iraq.

As a sequel of these events, the indigenous nationalist forces in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula found themselves in confrontation with the traditional imperial paternalistic powers – the Persians in the east and the Ottomans in the north and west (in the Hijaz and to some extent in the Yemen) – in addition to the economic danger from European imperialism facing them in the Indian Ocean, represented by Britain and France, and their transference of the economic centre of gravity to the Cape of Good Hope route. All of this made the Omani resurgence under the leadership of the Yaʿaribah in the beginning, and then of the Bū Saʿid, an exceptionally positive matter in proportion to the obstacles which this uprising faced from the outset.

During the latter days of the Yaʿaribah Ibadi imamate and after the blow which the Portuguese received with the destruction of Hormuz, Sultan ibn Sayf (AD 1649–68) led a widespread military and economic uprising against their influence in India and Africa, after he had wrested Matrah and Muscat from them. He pursued the remnants of the Portuguese forces to their strongholds in India, until he reached Bombay. Then he turned to East Africa, besieging Mombasa for five years, going on to free Bamba and Kalwa from their grasp. It was Sayf ibn Sultan (AD 1692–1711) who carried this uprising to its completion by his seizure of Mombasa (in the year 1698) and Kalwa, Batt, Bamba and Zanzibar in East Africa. He mounted several attacks on Diu and the coast of Gujarat in general, occupying the ports of Barcelore and Mangalore, both near Bombay, extending his control over them. Sultan ibn Sayf II (AD 1711–18) followed the same course by annexing Bahrain, the Qishm Islands, Larak and Hormuz to Oman.[53]

It is clear that the Ibadi imamate aimed at trying to regain control of the main traditional, commercial areas in the Indian Ocean. It appears that the struggle that raged between the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English had opened the way to relative success for this

attempt, which continued throughout the eighteenth century, since Muscat entered into an alliance on one occasion with the Dutch and on another with the British against the Portuguese. Owing to the economic revival, this state of affairs continued even after the Bū Saʿid had overthrown the Yaʿaribah and taken over the Ibadi Imamate about AD 1753.[54] However, sectarian strife soon raised its head between the Sunni ʿAdnani tribes of the Bani Ghafir (such as the Bani Jabir, the Bani Riyam in the Jabal Akhdar, the Bani Bū ʿAli in Jaʿlan and the Āl Naʿim in al-Zahirah), and the Qahtani Ibadi tribes of Yemeni origin, some of whom (such as Āl Saʿd, the Harth and the Azd Hajiris under the leadership of Āl Bū Saʿid, who would seize the imamate and the government) swore allegiance to Ibn Sultan al-Yaʿrubi.[55]

Kelly does not exaggerate when he says that two forces dominated political life in Oman from the dawn of the eighteenth century: sectarian division between the Ibadis and the Sunnis, which had divided the inhabitants from the second century AH, and the Hinnawi–Ghafiri factionalism among the tribes, which to a great degree paralleled the first division.[56] We have previously drawn attention to this sectarian aspect which characterized indigenous national resistance to foreign penetration in the whole of the Arab Peninsula. In the case of Oman, however, this tribal factionalism of sectarian origin contributed greatly to the weakening of the national uprising by forcing the rival factions to seek aid from the foreign forces themselves – the Persians at the beginning (AD 1737–42) in the era of the Yaʿaribah, then the English (AD 1791–8) in the time of the Bū Saʿid.

In fact, this limited period between the years 1791 and 1798 witnessed momentous events which represented a principal turning-point in the history of the region, since it was an area of encounter and confrontation among the active political powers at that time. The activities of the 'Muṭāwiʿah', or the fanatical Ibadi men of religion, led to rebellion against Imam Saʿid ibn Ahmad, which encouraged his son Hamad to rebel and seize sole power in Muscat. Upon the death of Hamad in AD 1792, his paternal uncle, Sultan ibn Ahmad, and his two brothers, Saʿid and Qays, consummated an agreement called the 'Barqa Agreement', according to which power was divided among them, with Sultan governing Muscat, while Saʿid remained in Rustaq and Qays kept Sahar. This was, in fact, the formal beginning of Oman's division into a coastal area ruled by a sultan and a tribal hinterland which was governed by an *imam*, that is the beginning of the separation of the sultanate from the imamate.[57] This division also indicates the increasing role of the 'Mutawiʿah' men of religion, who

would play a prominent part in the factional strife of the following era.[58]

This period saw the emergence of the Qasimis in the Trucial Coast of Oman, now known as the United Arab Emirates, as a local maritime power, when Saqr ibn Rashid took over the leadership in AD 1777. The Qasimis entered upon an unceasing struggle with Āl Bū Saʿid, which continued throughout this period until the dawn of the nineteenth century. At about the same time the Wahhabi movement came on the scene under the leadership of Āl Saʿud as a land power in opposition to Bū Saʿid rule, when the Wahhabis extended their influence as far as the Buraimi Oasis in AD 1795. This moved Sultan ibn Admad to seek help from the Persians, the Ottomans, and the French. Although the Sultan signed an armistice with the Saudis in AD 1803, according to which he promised to pay the yearly *zakāt* to the Saudis, nevertheless this oasis would remain one of the political flash-points until the 1960s.[59]

As for the English, they renewed their attempts throughout this period to dominate Muscat, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the French with their Revolution. In 1798 they succeeded in signing a treaty with Muscat, which was the first foothold for the British colonial administration in the Arab Peninsula. While the Omanis were occupied with the struggle between the imamate and the sultanate and in warding off the danger from the Qasimis and the Wahhabis, England had consolidated its colonial control over India and begun to extend its influence over East Africa. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, England had established her control over the principal commercial ports of the coast south of Aden in general.

Thus the Omani renaissance as an expression of national indigenous resistance to imperial penetration and foreign colonial presence disappeared into the sands of sectarian divisions, tribal partisanship and the struggle for power. It was the last serious naval attempt at the regional level to restore control of the *muḍārabah* trade to traditional Arab mercantilism. It was essentially a losing proposition, for foreign imperial superiority was not merely a military superiority based on sailing ships armed with cannons in the Portuguese fashion, but was, rather, an economic, organizational and political superiority, built upon institutional innovations (represented by the two East India Companies) which opened the door wide to the global forces of rising capitalism, which the indigenous forces were unable to face with the old traditional methods. As for the secret of the relative success of the Omani naval revival – aside from the preoccupation of the imperialist

forces with other things – it remains a question which deserves to be thoroughly investigated.[60]

Thus when the Qasimis appeared as a naval power, they had only limited scope to manoeuvre. They were able to seize possession of the island of Qishm and succeeded in redirecting a considerable portion of the Arab Gulf trade to it, which hurt the position of the English East India Company in Bandar ʿAbbas. With the occupation of al-Ahsaʾ by the Wahhabis in AD 1795 and their expulsion of the Khalidis from its coastline, the Qasimis proclaimed their loyalty to the former, thus weakening their own influence. But they, like most of the inhabitants of the Arabian Gulf, turned to the activities of robbing and plundering foreign commercial trading vessels in the Arab Gulf under the influence of Wahhabi tenets which rejected foreign influence, or merely to obtain easy booty. This invited a confrontation between them and the British, who had begun to impose their authority over the whole of the Indian Ocean, a matter to which we shall shortly return.

Nevertheless, the Red Sea remained accessible, in spite of attempts to blockade it and the occupation of its mercantile cities by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English down to the end of the first third of the nineteenth century. However, the efforts of the Zaidi Imamate to retain the possessions which it had acquired during the Mutawakkil heyday ended in failure, for the Hadramawt seceded at the beginning of the eighteenth century, followed by the secession of Lahej and Aden from the Imamate as of AD 1728 and that of the Idrisids in the Tuhamah and ʿAsir in North Yemen. Moreover, the Imamate embarked upon a continuous struggle with the Ottomans, who first renewed their military activity in the Yemen, then in Najd and al-Ahsaʾ, at the beginning of the nineteenth century through the agency of Muhammad ʿAli of Egypt.[61]

4 The 'Pax Britannica' era and the decline of the 'natural state' economy

1

Between AD 1688 and 1839, Britain succeeded in implementing the grand imperial design of which the Portuguese had originated the first conception without being able to achieve it. Thus, in 1688, the English were successful in wresting control of the Straits of Malacca from the Dutch, by which they became masters of the eastern trade with China and the East Indies. Then after they had firmly established their rule over India from 1690 onwards, and expelled the Dutch from their bases in the Arab Gulf in 1765, they were able to establish their first foothold in Muscat in 1798, as we have mentioned, thus gaining control of trade throughout the Straits of Hormuz. The only remaining link was Aden, which they succeeded in occupying in 1839, the very key to the Red Sea trade and beyond it to that of Egypt and the Syrian coast, and the primary base for trade with East Africa. These were the links in this grand imperial design, of which Albuquerque produced the first conception in AD 1513, to be realized later on.

Britain began the establishment of her control over the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula by weakening their commercial and economic capacities and by subjecting them ultimately to the colonial administration, of which they made India the headquarters. In order to achieve her goals, Britain resorted to various tactics and excuses with which to hide her true aims, of which we shall mention the following:[1]

1 The pretext of trying to put an end to piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf after the 1798 treaty with Muscat.
2 The pretext of trying to put an end to the slave trade after her decision to stop participating in this trade.
3 The pretext of trying to stop the arms trade.

As for the matter of piracy, it was a flimsy excuse. Nevertheless, all of the British colonial sources and documents highlight it, recounting the battles, to the point that they have entered local histories as though they were historical facts. In truth, no one can deny the occurrence of acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean and other seas, but we must differentiate between the local acts of piracy limited by the capabilities of their frail ships and in confrontation with large European ships guarded by ships armed with cannons on the one hand, and, on the other, European piracy which utilized bigger ships with greater capabilities setting out from islands or fortified hideouts. The European corsairs followed in the footsteps of their merchants to the region. They belonged to various nationalities, such as the famous Captain Kidd, an Englishman, and others like him, including Danes, French, and Dutch.

Prior to this, the English themselves had been top-rank smugglers, in order to escape the payment of taxes and tribute under the hegemony of the Portuguese. The ships of the British companies practised organized piracy against the Portuguese over a long period. The charge of piracy, however, was regularly levelled at the Arabs, especially at the Arab Gulf coast, which they termed 'the Pirate Coast', the same attribute that British colonial sources applied to the previously mentioned Omani resurgence.[2] One of the naval officers of the East India Company at Bandar ʿAbbas prophesied about the end of the seventeenth century that the Arab corsairs 'would prove to be as great a plague in India as the Algerians [in the western Mediterranean] were to Europe'.[3] Another officer by the name of Captain Hamilton mentions that the corsairs (without giving their nationalities) continued to wreak havoc at the mouth of the Red Sea and that when they found that it was possible for them 'to obtain much booty from the merchants in return for little risk in the Red Sea, their plan of action was to entrench themselves in the Island of Perim, which was only a gunshot from Bab al-Mandib, making it into a bay in which their ships might find shelter and protection'.[4]

The major accusation, however, was levelled at Muscat upon her resurgence in the eighteenth century and her attempt to regain control of the main commercial areas in the Indian Ocean. Thus Bruce, quoted by Arnold Wilson, asserts: 'The shipping capability of the Arabs of Muscat and their tremendous human potential was such that it aroused fear of their seizing control of the entire Gulf ...' In another place he says: 'However, the Arab pirates of Muscat were the worst offenders. They had become so strong that they were able to drive the Portuguese from Mombasa ...' etc.[5] The warring European

nations therefore resorted to signing an agreement in AD 1700 which allotted the protection of shipping in the Red Sea to the French, and in the Arab Gulf to the Dutch, while it assigned the surveillance and defence of what was called the Southern Indian Sea to England.

The direction of the accusation of piracy against the local Arab resistance is not limited to the older sources, for the British colonialist writers reiterate it even to this day. Sir Arnold Wilson, who was writing in the 1920s, mentions that 'It would not have been possible for lawlessness to reach its peak in the Gulf without the unification of the Arab tribes at the end of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth, and their incitement to robbing, plundering and raiding by the emissaries of the Wahhabis, who had extended their influence from the central parts of the Arab Peninsula to the coast'.[6] Bathurst, who wrote in 1972, repeats the same charge, but in a more cautious form, saying that the wars between the Europeans 'and the use of the Omanis as allies in those wars had led to the development of piracy'.[7]

However, Bathurst himself – in another place – deviously states that the international commercial struggle and the competition between the European nations and the local Arab, Indian and Persian merchants and their middlemen, may have been one of the sources of the piracy, adding that among the matters which contributed to the complication of the situation was the demand that the local trading vessels should carry passes issued by the European Powers who were in control of the harbours, which exposed them [i.e. local trading vessels] to confiscation by the enemies of the jurisdiction which issued their passes. Since there was continuous war and struggle between the European Powers, 'the question of what pass should be carried or what flag flown was a matter of diplomacy rather than alliance or allegiance'.[8]

Thus, lawful resistance to foreign influence was intentionally confused with acts of piracy, which must always have existed. It was a confusion aimed at camouflaging imperialist designs and in making resistance appear as piracy and thereby giving the colonial powers an excuse for suppressing local Arab resistance. This is what actually happened directly after the European struggle was decided in Britain's favour, as we have mentioned. Beneath the slogan of the suppression of acts of piracy, Britain, after neutralizing Oman, began to mount attacks on the coasts of Arabia in the Arab Gulf, and against Aden and the Yemeni ports. Between 1810 and 1820 she raided Ra's al-Khaymah (the stronghold of the Qasimis) and burned it, and likewise al-Fujayrah and Khurfakan repeatedly, which

culminated in the agreement of 1820 in Ra's al-Khaymah, called 'A General Treaty of Peace for the Suppression of Piracy'.[9]

After less than a quarter of a century, namely in 1853, the Emirates of the Arab coast signed a treaty of 'Perpetual Truce' with Britain, a treaty which brought an effective end to indigenous resistance against foreign penetration represented by Britain. The most humiliating of its articles were those which compelled the signatories not to resist any attacks they might suffer at sea but to content themselves with making a complaint to the British authorities.[10] After only a few years all the Arab Emirates had entered into a more humiliating and restricting treaty with Britain:

1871, a Protectorate Agreement with Bahrain.
1891, the drawing up of a Protectorate Treaty with Muscat.*
1892, a Protectorate Treaty with Bahrain.†
1899, a Protectorate Treaty with Kuwait.‡

We can therefore say that the era of the 'Pax Britannica' in the region started after the fall of Aden, though strictly speaking after the signing of the 1853 treaty. In this period Britain began to weaken the commercial capabilities of the Emirates or the region under a new slogan, the extirpation of the slave trade. Britain in fact succeeded in signing two agreements with Muscat and Bahrain (1847–60), but she failed to control the Ottoman slave trade through Yemen and the Hijaz.[11] Under the pretext, especially in accordance with the clauses of the Agreements with Muscat and Bahrain giving British warships the right to stop and search local national trading vessels on the high seas, Britain started the systematic sinking of these trading vessels merely on suspicion, instead of taking them to the nearest port, as the Agreement stipulated. Sir Arnold Wilson mentions that Britain sank or destroyed thirteen *būms* (medium-sized *dhows*) in less than one month in 1870.[12]

Only a few years had passed when Britain undertook a new campaign to restrict Arab commercial activities, this time on the pretext of preventing trading in arms. She was eventually able to force the Emirates in the area to sign an agreement in 1898, forbidding this type of trade, so that it became the most important component in the

* Proper title: 'Masqati non-alienation bond given to the United Kingdom, 20 March 1891', in J. C. Hurewitz, (see n.10), doc. 96, p. 208.

† 'Exclusive agreement: the Bahrayni Shaykh and Britain, 13 March 1982', ibid., doc. 97, p. 209.

‡ 'Exclusive agreement: the Kuwayti Shaykh and Britain, 23 January 1899', ibid., doc. 100, pp. 218ff.

smuggling trade until the end of World War II. As a matter of fact, the smuggling trade began to flourish on a wide scale from the beginning of the Pax Britannica era. This was natural, for the merchants wanted to avoid the list of forbidden and restricted items and the customs dues in the ports with which they did business in the Arab Peninsula, India and East Africa, after they had all come under British control.

What was the significance of these developments which accompanied the imposition of the Pax Britannica upon the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society in the second half of the nineteenth century? Quite simply it meant the complete collapse of the 'natural state' and its economy based on traditional *muḍārabah* trade. It also meant the incorporation of the region on an unequal footing (that is, as one of the parties subsidiary to the imperial centre) in the new international economic order represented by Western Europe. It also meant the transfer of the political centre of gravity in the region from the commercial ports to the tribal interior, and consequently the appearance of the sectarian-tribal structure of society which accompanied the emergence of the new states after World War I and the division of the Arab East on that basis.[13]

With relation to the collapse of the 'natural state' economy which depended upon the traditional *muḍārabah* trade, the British and the European world powers succeeded in achieving a complete monopoly of the trade in high-profit commodities, the ones we have termed 'strategic commodities'. There was no alternative for local merchants other than to do business with the monopolistic British companies, or else with a small fraction of local trade among the ports of the traditional commercial areas in the Indian Ocean. The Arab-Muslim merchants lost their role as middlemen in world trade a short time after the destruction of Hormuz. The temporary economic revival due to the Omani resurgence in the early part of the eighteenth century did not last long, as we have mentioned. The efforts of the Ottomans in Yemen and al-Ahsa' in the last quarter of the nineteenth century likewise failed. European ascendancy was thus not only a military ascendancy, but also basically economic and organizational-institutional, as we have indicated.[14]

The participation of the local native merchants in world trade was confined, from the fall of Aden and the signing of the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity, to being agents or distributors of European manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and the strategic commodities, the trading of which was monopolized by the imperialist companies, leading to the total collapse of artisan production in this period.[15] The

general procedure in commercial relations under these new circumstances took the form of the merchant (the importer) requesting the goods from the local agent of the imperialist company within a certain period, in return for paying down one-tenth or more of the price. After the arrival of the goods, the agent would receive the rest of the sum from the merchant in exchange for a letter authorizing the handing over of the goods in the harbour. The merchant would carry out the customs regulations and the payment of dues and taxes, some or most of which went to the emir or the governor for the purpose of defraying the cost of the local administration, thus forming an important part of the national income.[16]

During this period, the European commercial shipping companies took over the greater proportion of world trade in the region. Mirza Hasan Khan, who wrote in 1905, records the foreign shipping agencies which operated out of Basra, as follows:[17]

> The agency of the English Currie Mackenzie Company, to which the postal boats belonged (whose offices were located above the British consular offices).
> The English Lench Company Agency whose vessels operated in the Shatt al-Arab.
> The agency of the English Streek Company.
> The agency of the English Mews (?) Company.
> The agency of the American company known as H—(?).
> The German company well-known as Hamburg-America.
> The Russian Trading Company Agency.
> The Greek Company.
> The agency of the Persian Company known by the name 'Persian Gulf' (under British management).
> The Ottoman Riverine Administration.

As for the merchant engaged in exporting, he was obliged to deal with the monopolistic European and British companies which were in control of the traditional commercial ports of the regions of India and East Africa, in addition to all of the Arab coasts, including those of the Red Sea following the fall of Aden and the opening of the Suez Canal in the year 1869.

During this period, the old trading ports dwindled away and new ones appeared, although the importance of some of the old ports remained, not on commercial or economic grounds, but because of political or strategic considerations. Goa, Calicut, Surat and Daibul in Western India disappeared, while ports like Bombay, Madras and Calcutta appeared; Muscat and the ports along the Trucial Coast of

Oman in the Gulf faded away, while Bahrain and Bushahr emerged; Jiddah, Jizan, Musawwa and Idhab in the Red Sea decayed, while Suez and Aden gained additional importance, and the same thing happened to Mombasa at the expense of the old East African ports.[18]

The beginning of regular service for the steamboat lines to the ports of the Arab Peninsula from the 1840s played a significant role in the commercial decline which overtook these ports, in addition to their ceasing to participate in world trade as they had formerly done. This impact was greatly strengthened by the opening of the Suez Canal and the connecting of the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean.[19] This, however, did not prevent the continuance of the *muḍārabah* trade in its backward, traditional form in local and re-exported commodities until a little after World War II.[20] This afforded Villiers the opportunity for his famous journey on one of Kuwait's *dhows* in 1938 to give us a brief glimpse of what seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean was like in bygone years.[21]

2

This, in addition to the other factors which accompanied British imperial hegemony, led to a total transformation of prevailing economic relations in the region, which eliminated the efficacy of the exceptional role of the seasonal impact of trade (except for pilgrimage trade, of course, although pilgrimage trade is not a natural season in any case), by its influence on the organization of economic and political life. The availability of goods in large quantities upon request, and the subjection of the process of price formation to other fundamental principles and forces outside the control and bounds of the traditional markets, completely changed the balance of economic and political power operating in the region.

Under the impact of these imperialistic economic forces, a form of commodity specialization began to appear in the region in response to the demands basically of the world capitalist market, dependent upon the production of a certain commodity or a limited number of commodities earmarked for export.[22] Thus the decline of the economic role of the Hijaz made the major part of its economic life dependent upon the pilgrimage trade and likewise that of Yemen upon the export of coffee through Mukha and Jiddah. For the same reasons, economic life in the Gulf was based upon the pearl trade. We could also cite other examples from the Arab East, such as the emergence in Syria of the role of silk production and the transformation of Egypt

into a cotton plantation around the middle of the nineteenth century.[23]

When we talk about commodity specialization, we do not mean the confinement of trade to these commodities alone, for there was always the smuggling trade, the transit trade, the re-export trade, and the slave trade (until the middle of the twentieth century). What we do mean is that a large proportion of the social surplus arose from this type of commodity and that its production represented an influential sector in the local 'native' economy.

In order to throw light on this question, we can pause at the pilgrimage trade as an example. During the thirty-year period between AD 1841 and 1871, the local revenue of the Hijaz did not exceed 97,000 Ottoman liras (the highest revenue occurring in 1860, when it reached 96,275 liras), while expenditure exceeded revenue every year – the deficit was no less than 76,000 liras annually (the highest deficit being in 1855, when it reached 230,000 liras). For the last year for which we have information, namely 1871, revenue reached 55,095 liras, while expenditures were 241,110 liras, with a deficit of 186,015 liras. In comparison, the pilgrims brought in 1,100,000,000 liras in 1885 and 2,600,000,000 liras in 1901 to pay for pilgrimage expenses.[24]

The importance of the pilgrimage to economic life in the Hijaz is therefore clear. If we consider the effect the initiation of regular service by steamships in increasing the numbers of pilgrims, it becomes evident to us that, owing to Jiddah's loss of her economic role as an entrepôt, it came to depend more and more on the income derived from the pilgrimage trade. Most of this income was realized by exploiting the pilgrims by trumped-up means, the most important of which were:

(a) Artificially raising prices during the pilgrimage season to the extent that they were often multiplied several times.
(b) Hiring out camels and the means of transportation between Mecca, Jiddah and Medina, by land or sea.
(c) The protection of caravans and gifts given to the bedouin as protection fees.
(d) The manipulation of the price of sea transportation and the monopolization of some of the shipping lines, such as happened between 1883 and 1888 to the advantage of the emir, the Ottoman governor and certain agents and merchants.[25]

Among the other reasons for the decline of Jiddah's economic role was the shrinkage which overtook the trade in Yemeni coffee, of

which Jiddah was one of the most important international distribution and marketing centres. This decline was due to two main causes in this period, the first being the political disturbances which accompanied Ottoman attempts to re-impose their direct rule over Yemen, and the stubborn resistance of the Yemenis to these attempts. The second cause was the competition of Java coffee (under Dutch administration) against Yemeni coffee.

The Dutch had introduced the cultivation of the Yemeni coffee tree into Java early in the eighteenth century. By 1833 the number of coffee trees there had reached one million and increased by mid-century to 300 millions. After the damage which coffee trees in Java suffered in the 1880s owing to fungi, there was a shift from the Yemeni (Arabica) tree to the variety called 'Robusta'. At this particular time Brazil entered the coffee production field to flood world markets in the twentieth century.[26] Ochsenwald states that the value of Yemeni coffee imported to Jiddah and re-exported began to drop in 1875. 'In 1892 three-fourths of the coffee in the Hijaz was from [Java by way of] India and the remainder from Yemen.'[27]

Conditions were similar with regard to the pearl trade. It had existed from of old, with an ancient history in the Arab Gulf, and had been one of the economic activities that were based (during the first commercial revolution) upon clear capitalistic principles (or quasi-capitalistic, according to Maxine Rodinson's terminology).[28] However, the economic decline represented by the collapse of the economy of the 'natural state', together with the increasing world demand for pearls, led to the emergence of the strategic value of this commodity. In order that the magnitude of this trade for the local economies in the Gulf may become clear, we have recorded the available data about it at the beginning of the twentieth century in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, assuming that this information also represents the second half of the nineteenth century. Table 4.1 comprises data about the workforce engaged in the pearl trade, while Table 4.2 contains data on the volume of monetary transactions in this trade.

Although we do not possess information about the levels of local 'national' income or the total for these emirates in this period, nevertheless the amounts entered in the two tables must represent a high proportion of this income, by the standards of the end of the last century. The reason for calculating income in Indian rupees is that the Gulf pearl trade was oriented towards India (especially Bombay). We must take into account, too, that the numbers of residents employed in the pearl trade mentioned in Table 4.1 do not represent only the local workforce, but include the participation of a migrant

Table 4.1 An estimate of the workforce in the Arab Gulf employed in pearl fishing, and the income from it, 1906–7

Country	*Total population*	*Number of pearl fishing boats*	*Number of people engaged in pearl fishing*	*Percentage of population engaged in pearl fishing*	*Income from pearl trade in rupees*
Bahrain	99,075	917	17,633	18	12,603,000
Trucial Oman	72,000	1,215	22,045	31	8,000,000
Qatar	27,000	817	12,890	48	—
Kuwait	37,000	461	9,200*	20	1,347,000

Source: John Gordon Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, completed and edited by R. L. Birdwood, 6 vols (Calcutta: Superintendent Govt Printing, 1908–15; republished by Gregg International Pub., London, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 2252–9, 3107.
General comment: the sign (—) indicates insufficient data.
* There are about 2,000 Iranians included in this number who came to Kuwait to participate in pearl fishing.

Table 4.2 Statistics on the value of pearls exported from the fishing centres in the Arab Gulf (various years)

	Trucial Oman (rupees)	*Bahrain (rupees)*	*Ligneh (rupees)*	*Muscat (American dollars)*	*Gross annual estimate for the Gulf region (pounds sterling)*
1893–4	5,000,000	3,693,750	4,205,000	50,000	483,767
1896–7	10,000,000	5,167,000	3,865,000	30,000	545,520
1899–1900	7,749,990	6,824,430	3,399,900	50,000	689,533
1903–4	9,000,000	10,275,300	4,905,000	22,000	1,439,975
1904–5	5,000,000	10,488,000	623,800	30,000	1,076,310
Average[a] over the eleven years	4,150,398	3,837,359	3,512,448	45,093	561,353

Source: The table was taken, with adjustment, from: Tim Niblock, 'Social structure and the development of the Saudi Arabian political system', in Tim Niblock (ed), *State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 80.
Note: [a] as in the original.

workforce (especially the bedouin and Iranian) in this seasonal activity; nor does it embrace all those who earned their living from this trade, since they do not include the boat-builders, the stevedores or the merchants and pearl buyers in the city markets.

Trade in general, and the pearl-fishing trade in particular, played a very important political and economic role. This was due to the fact that the pearl-fishing trade was based upon the structural organizational principle called 'patronage' (*zabānah*), namely the relationship of the 'patron' (in the local gulf dialect the *muʿazzib* = the boss or owner of the business) to the client.[29] The source of the difficulty of finding local or Arabic terms to describe this kind of relationship is that the intention was to keep it secret, not open to public view. This practice may be summarized in that the relationship of the crewmen (who were very meticulously classified in sequence, beginning with the diver, then the *sayyib* [the man who held the rope for him], then his assistant and finally the servant boy) to the captain and pearl merchant (*ṭawwāsh*) was a relationship of perpetual indebtedness in the form of loans which the crewmen received from the merchants.

As for the manner in which this system worked in most cases, it began – as Muhammad al-Rumaihi and others have described it – with a 'loan', that is a cash advance in the form of debt, which the merchant (or the captain, if he was the owner of the vessel) paid to the crewmen at the beginning of the diving season in order to provide for the needs of their families during their absence, which might last throughout the season (from June to October). At the end of the season the crew received their share from the sale of the pearls, called *tiskām.* Since most of the divers' work was seasonal, they were unemployed throughout the winter and spring, and therefore received from the merchant himself or the captain another sum as a loan, called 'living expenses' or 'pocket money', in return for working for the same merchant or the captain in the following season. All of these debts were registered in the merchant's account book.[30]

Most of the historical sources are agreed that in 90% of the cases the crew members did not make enough from their participation in pearl fishing to pay off these debts to the merchant or the captain, so it was as though they were destined to work for the merchant himself or the captain all the rest of their professional lives, or until there was enough to pay off these debts.[31] This kind of debt was not cancelled with the death of the crewman; rather, he passed it on, along with any interest which had accrued from delay in its payment, to his sons. Rumaihi mentions that some merchants falsified their account books in order to keep good crewmen in perpetual debt to them. Likewise,

some of the captains insisted on marrying a diver's widow in payment of the debt, thus procuring her sons as crewmen in his boat, but it seems that this was not the general practice.[32]

The outcome of this type of structural arrangement of the pearl trade was that a patron–client relationship was established between the crew members and the merchant, characterized by a kind of political allegiance to the merchant's family, in return for the patronage of the merchant's family for the crewmen who worked for it and for their families. In fact, this allegiance was tantamount to the hegemonic character (a willing acceptance of the merchants' authority) which marked the relationship between merchants and crewmen, in spite of the clear conflict of class interests between them. Later on we shall see how this hegemonic allegiance of the crewmen to the merchants, like the patron–client [relationship], would play an important role in the mercantile setting, even after the arrival of the modern state.[33]

3

One of the most important results of the collapse of the natural state economy in the Gulf and Peninsula society was the bringing of the era of the tribal elites to an end and the crystallization of the system of dynastic rule in the region. This was the inevitable, natural result of foreign influence, especially of the treaty of 'Perpetual Truce' of AD 1853, since the effect of this treaty was not limited to the preservation of peace between the shaykhs, emirs and sultans, but led, rather, to the consolidation of their authority and the recognition of the legitimacy of their control as ruling families over their areas and peoples. The appearance and disappearance of rulers or ruling families was no longer connected with the dynastic cycle of which Ibn Khaldun spoke, in which, according to what he said, the rule of a dynasty would extend for four or five generations. Neither was it tied to the expansion or contraction of trade and economic conditions, or even to the ability of these rulers to sell protection services to the commercial or pilgrimage caravans, for the 1853 Treaty prohibited them from doing that. It did, rather, provide full protection for them and their families from their peoples and their competitors among other rulers.

The protectorate treaties with all of the emirates of the region previously mentioned (other than the Hijaz and northern Najd, owing to their falling under Ottoman control or protection) thus functioned to perpetuate this situation and bring the tribal elites circulation to an end. However (with the dawn of the twentieth century) the number of

treaties increased: the treaties of 1913 to give Kuwait 'protectorate' status and that of 1916 to give Qatar the same. Britain also created 26 sultanates and shaykhdoms on the Aden and Hadramawt coast, with which she signed more than 200 protectorate treaties and agreements between the years 1802 and 1928. In 1937 she finally turned Aden officially into a colony, while Muscat, from the collapse of the Omani uprising in 1798, was a British colony without Britain officially acknowledging the actuality.[34] In this manner, as Tom Little relates, in the case of Democratic Yemen, the British authorities in Yemen 'froze' the tribal leaderships in the hands of those who happened to be in authority (at the signing of the treaty), as long as they continued loyal to the obligations which Britain imposed upon them.[35]

Britain more than once interfered to protect the rulers in the region, to demonstrate which we shall mention only some of the more striking interventions. Thus in the year 1861, Britain intervened in Muscat to bring back the deposed Sultan to his throne and provided protection for him from the Imam's army. She likewise rescued the Āl Khalifah regime in Bahrain three times (in 1871, 1895 and 1905). In 1913 she intervened to save the ruler of Muscat from the Saudis, and in 1932 to protect the Sultanate of Lahej and Aden and to force the Imam of Yemen to recognize the secession of Arab Yemen from Democratic Yemen. There was another side to the British treaties of protection (especially after 1828), namely to force the local rulers to prevent, or to undertake the punishment of actions which Britain considered piracy, this as the price for official recognition of their rulership and the provision of protection for them.

The essence of the matter was not confined to the fact that the imperial influence and treaties of protection had 'frozen' tribal leadership or rule in the hands of those who had signed the treaties, but it extended to another matter of the utmost importance, namely the broadening of the authority of the ruler himself and his successors in the ruling family which, under the 'natural state' system, was limited owing to the special significance of political allegiance in that environment. In view of the weakness of agricultural bond which ties the farmer to the land, political allegiance to the ruler was not dependent upon attachment to the land but on people, that is upon nomadic pastoral tribes, or upon merchants who could 'liquidate' their wealth and transfer it to other places, or upon seamen who could sell their labour in other ports. The environment thus – under the 'natural state' – placed two restrictions on the rulers' authority: (a) there was always the possibility of the relocation or withdrawal of a large part of the

inhabitants from the area when a quarrel broke out; (b) there was the possibility of rebellion against the ruler, his deposition or assassination, through an alliance between members of the family of the ruler and certain politically or financially powerful segments of the population.[36]

The migration of the ʿAtub offers a clear example of case (a). The appearance of the ʿAtub on the scene depicts events in the Gulf in the middle of the eighteenth century regarding a tribal withdrawal of this kind, which led to the Āl Khalifah establishing their rule in Bahrain in AD 1782, in alliance with Āl b. ʿAli. A similar example was the withdrawal of Āl b. ʿAli from Bahrain to Abu Dhabi in 1835 because of a quarrel with Āl Khalifah. Among other examples were the withdrawal of the Sudan tribe from al-Shariqah (Sharjah) in 1824 and the Āl Bū Flasah from Abu Dhabi in 1883. Although the treaties of protection after 1853 made the application of this sort of limitations to the authority of the ruler extremely difficult, nevertheless the tribal principle pertaining to seeking refuge and the protection of another ruler continued. An example of this was the dispute which arose between the merchants and Shaykh Mubarak in 1910, inducing them to take refuge with the Emir of Bahrain.[37] As for case (b), the examples are innumerable – in fact it was the rule, as long as we distinguish between continuing allegiance to the ruling family and loyalty to the ruler alone; for the oath of allegiance or homage to the ruler, in this environment, was not a sacred, inviolable oath, as was the case in Europe.

Table 4.3 provides a summary of the methods of seizing power in the coastal region of Oman throughout the past century. It is a sample illustrating restriction (b) on the ruler's authority in the traditional political system.

However, the colonial protection arrangements made the implementation of these two restrictions an extremely difficult matter, for a variety of factors intervened to broaden the power of the shaykh or the ruler. The limitation of the scope of population movement (that is the weakening of the first restriction) enabled the rulers to levy higher taxes on the artisans and local products, particularly upon trade and pearl fishing (what was called *al-kalāṭah* in Kuwait and *ṭirāz* in Oman).[38] This was in addition to their participation in certain other economic activities, in fact even in trade itself. Likewise, the possibility of changing the ruler in the traditional way previously mentioned in restriction (b), remained theoretically available (especially because in this environment rule was not passed on by inheritance, giving rise to perpetual competition). However, the improvement of the

Table 4.3 The recurrence of the seizure of power by traditional methods in Oman and the Trucial Coast in the nineteenth century

Date	*Event*	*Comment*
12/4/1804	Assassination by Shayk Sultan b. Saqr of his uncle ʿAbdallah b. Rashid b. Matar	His seizure of the emirate of Raʾs al-Khaymah
1/4/1805	The invasion of Bahrain by al-Sayyid Sultan b. Ahmad b. Saʿid (Sultan of Oman)	The Āl Khalifah appeal for help to the Wahhabis (the Imam of Najd), who defeated him
21/3/1806	The assassination of al-Sayyid Sultan b. Hamd b. Saʿid at the hands of some men from the Qasimis	His brother Badr succeeds him in the emirate
11/3/1807	Al-Sayyid Saʿid b. Sultan's assassination of his uncle Badr (Sultan of Oman)	Becomes the ruler of the emirate
28/2/1808	Shayk Sultan b. Saqr's imprisonment of al-Sayyid Saʿid b. Sultan in Khur Fakkan	Al-Sayyid Saʿid released through English mediation
26/1/1811	Shayk Sultan b. Saqr taken prisoner to Najd	After the Wahhabi invasion under the Najdi leader Mutlaq al-Mutairi
24/12/1814	The deposition of Ahmad b. Rashid al-Muʿalla from the rulership of the emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain	The accession of his brother ʿAbdallah b. Rashid
21/11/1816	The seizure of power by Rashid b. Hamid al-Qirtasi over the emirate of ʿAjman	After his treachery against their party, the Al Būdhnain
5/8/1826	The treachery of Khalifah b. Shakhbut against his brother, Tahnun b. Shakhbut	Maktum b. Bati al-Falasi takes the opportunity to seize control of the emirate of Dubai
5/3/1840	Shaykh Sultan b. Saqr's seizure of the emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain	Taking advantage of the absence of its emir, Shaykh ʿAbdallah b. Rashid, in Iran
10/1/1845	Ibn Khalid al-Falahi's assassination of Khalifah b. Shakhbut and his brother Sultan	His seizure of the Abu Dhabi emirate

Table 4.3 continued

Date	*Event*	*Comment*
4/10/1853	Shaykh Zayid b. Khalifah al-Falahi's assassination of Shaykh Saʿid b. Tahnun	His seizure of the Abu Dhabi emirate
20/7/1860	Khalid b. Sultan's assassination of his nephew, Muhammad b. Saqr b. Sultan	His assumption of the emirate of al-Shariqah (Sharja)
27/5/1865	Al-Sayyid Salim b. Thuwayni's treachery against his father, Thuwayni b. Saʿid in the Suhar citadel	His loss of Sahar after the Bani Ghafir tribes forsook him because of his evil deed
16/5/1866	Shaykh Ahman b. ʿAbdallah al-Muʿalla's assassination of his brother, ʿAli b. ʿAbdallah	His assumption of power in the emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain
13/4/1869	The assassination of Khalid b. Sultan at the hand of Zayid b. Khalifah al-Falahi	The battle of Umm al-Tarafah between the Qasimis and the Bani Yas
3/4/1870	The assassination of ʿAzzan b. Qais (Sultan of Muscat)	During his struggle with Turki b. Saʿid over the sultanate of Muscat
1/5/1900	ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. Hamid's assault upon the sons of Rashid b. Hamid and his slaughter of them	His seizure of power in the emirate of ʿAjman

Source: Hamid b. Sultan b. Hamid al-Shami, *Communicating News about Deaths and Events of These Lands*, Abu-Dhabi: Dar Al-Fikr Ad-Jadifah, 1976 (in Arabic), pp. 28–63, from a manuscript dated 1360 AH/AD 1941.

financial and economic position of the ruler strengthened his political position and extended his authority, even in comparison with the local shaykhs.

Thus the provision of outside protection for the rulers and the consolidation of authority in the hands of the ruling families brought down the tribal elites and thus obstructed the structural restrictions and pressures as forces opposed to the general trend in the political system of the 'natural state' which worked to restrict the authority of the ruler. It likewise created for rulers alternate sources of income instead of the booty which they customarily obtained by raiding,

robbing and pillaging; for the taxes and dues levied on artisan crafts, flocks, trade and especially customs dues, which represented fixed sources of income, could continually be increased. In some instances when the ruler could not find sufficient alternative income, the colonial administration participated in financing him, even though partially, as did Britain with the sultans and shaykhs of Hadramawt or with the third Saudi state in its early years.[39]

Concerning the distortion of the traditional concept of political allegiance linked to people and the attempt to tie it to fixed boundaries on the ground, it was one of the objectives of British colonial policy which was put into execution after World War I. It had destructive negative effects upon the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society from two angles: the futile dispute about boundaries which had no historical basis; and the insoluble debate about the question of citizenship and its conditions among entities which were not separated by national, racial or cultural boundaries. We shall see that in the period between 1853 and 1899 the physical foundations were laid down for the fragmentation of Gulf and Arab Peninsula society, not by means of foreign armies of occupation, but by the weapon of national independence. Figure 4.1 sets forth the distribution of the bedouin tribes of the Peninsula and their locales at the beginning of the twentieth century.

It is important for us to remember that these bedouin tribes, after the drawing of the boundaries between the countries of the region and the appearance of petroleum and flourishing economic conditions, turned toward the cities to settle in quarters in the suburbs and form tribal clusters which did not fit into the old urban, demographic structure. We shall see how these tribal clusters would play important political roles in these emerging states, and likewise how they were gradually transformed into clearly organized interest groups or corporations.

The outcome of all this was that the political and social centre of gravity was transferred from the commercial coast to the tribal interior, with this historic turning-point having disparate effects upon the regions of the Arab Peninsula. Its influence upon the Yemen and Hadramawt was very great, turning them into areas which pushed their workforces out, resulting in an increase in emigration levels from the Yemen to the Hijaz, the Sudan and East Africa, while the Hadramawti emigration made for East Africa and East Asia.[40] In the Arab Gulf, the pearl trade and transit trade attracted Iranian workers, especially the Arab tribes which had become Shi'ite, some of which settled in the Arab coastal cities and Basra.[41]

Figure 4.1 Tribal Arabia. The location of the bedouin tribes in Arabia at the beginning of the twentieth century



Source: Zahra Freeth and Victor Winstone, *Kuwait: Prospects and Reality* (1972) London: Allen & Unwin, p. 55.

Thus, no sooner had World War I come to an end than the outlines of the new political system and the tribal-sectarian social structure became visible, constituting the basic background of the present set-up in which we live in the mid-1980s. This is the topic which will become the focus of our attention in the last part of this study of ours.

5 From *rentier* to authoritarian state

1

When the first links of the grand imperial design were completed with the fall of Aden in 1839, events had already overtaken it so that it ceased to have any significance, because the region was on the verge of a great new historical era. The region, in fact, had lost its economic and historical importance from the beginning of the nineteenth century, as we have mentioned, and matters had reached such a state during the second half of the nineteenth century that Britain granted the Sultans of Muscat regular financial aid and the Sultans of Hadramawt yearly emoluments (not exceeding 500 rupees in any instance). It had also buttressed the economic position of the shaykhs of Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Trucial Coast of Oman by organizing the maritime customs duties. The Hijaz depended for its subsistence basically upon Ottoman and Egyptian subsidies from the beginning of Muhammad ʿAli's rule.

At this level, there was no clear general British policy or imperial strategy in the region, other than the wide umbrella represented by the security of the route to India which dictated the limited tactical policies. This applied to the measures which Britain took to confront the French in general and to block Napoleon I's expansionist ambitions. From the time of Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, Britain increased her efforts to occupy Aden until they were successful, although matters did not exceed taking measures in accordance with the exigencies of the situation and the developments of the war.

No fixed general imperial policy was put into operation to meet the new conditions in the region other than as a reaction to the Egyptian resurgence under the leadership of Muhammad ʿAli, especially after his occupation of Syria in the 1830s. This event sounded an alarm as to what might happen in the region if it were possible for a resurgence

of this kind to succeed and the harm that would overtake imperial European interests. There was a vast difference between the Omani revival at the end of the seventeenth century and the Egyptian revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century; for the Omani revival tried to restore the past by the methods of the past, while the Egyptian revival looked to the future and aimed at realization by the methods of the future.

Thus the new imperial design laid down a general policy towards the Ottoman State, aimed in the beginning at preventing (under the umbrella of guaranteeing the independence and unity of the territory of the Ottoman State (Empire)) the rise of a revivalist movement of the Egyptian type.[2] At the same time, the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula were regarded as a region of established British influence entirely separate from the Ottoman State, over which the Government of India exercised oversight until World War I. However, the final features of this British imperial policy were not completely delineated until during World War I and the years immediately following, that is between 1914 and 1920 to be exact. We should point out here that this policy was in reality devised, from the last decade of the nineteenth century, to mean the right of Britain to fall heir to the Ottoman State when European competition for the partition of its dominions began.[3]

It is useful here to mention in passing that the shift from the phase of guaranteeing the independence and unity of the territories of the Ottoman State to that of the partition of its territories and the breaking of their ties was linked with the shift of the imperial view from the old liberalism of Palmerston and Stratford Canning, then under the influence of the utilitarian school, to the new liberalism of Lord Stanley and David Urquhart, under the influence of German idealism which Wilfrid Scawen Blunt has so aptly described.[4] The old liberal imperialist school aimed (through forcing the Ottomans to introduce modern European reforms – called *tanzimat*) at transforming the Ottoman State into a European protectorate. However, after these reforms had failed, the new imperialist liberal school proclaimed their ineffectiveness and consequently the inability of this State to continue in existence.[5]

The old imperialist view called upon the Ottomans to follow European methods and ways of thinking if they wanted to catch up with Europe. This view likewise proclaimed that the responsibility for protecting the progress of the Ottoman State had fallen upon the shoulders of Europe. Naturally, it was not possible in such a short time to implant systems and ideas foreign to the environment of the

Ottoman State, especially the idea of nationalism, modern systems of financial administration, military organization, etc. However, the new liberal imperialist school did not attribute the reasons for the failure to existing economic circumstances, but to the fact that the Ottoman State had contravened and violated the bases of its existence, asserting that if this State returned to the fundamentals of its religion and the principles of the Qurʾan, everything would revert to its proper place. Thus, the introduction of European systems and ideas into incompatible cultures would lead to their destruction, so it was better to leave these cultures as they were, though under the guidance of Europe.[6]

From this premise, Blunt called for the return of the Ottoman territories to their original inhabitants, demanding the independence of Armenia, the secession of the Turkish Greek colonies and their restoration to Greece and the transfer of the Arabs from Ottoman law to Arab customary practices. Blunt asserted that Najd was the only country in the world of those he had visited where he found freedom, equality and brotherhood as a living reality: 'Here was a community living as our idealists have dreamed, without taxes, without police, without conscription, without compulsion of any kind, whose only law was public opinion, and whose only order a principle of honour.'[7] According to this premise, it would therefore be possible for communities to be set up on principles similar to those found in the Arab Peninsula, that is in Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Syria, because the process of transfer would be easy and natural.

This imperialist logic was strengthened in keeping with the evolution of events by the signing of the Tripartite Entente Cordiale between Britain, France and Russia in 1904, the discovery of petroleum in Iran in 1905 and the assurance that it existed in the region in commercial quantities, as may be inferred from the first Baghdad Railroad Agreement of 1903, the D'Arcy Company contract of 1901, the changeover of the British navy to the use of internal combustion engines using petroleum, instead of steam engines, in 1913, the signing of the Berlin–Baghdad Railway Agreement in 1914, and the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company Reorganization Agreement the same year. This logic persisted until the outbreak of World War I, during the four years of which (and the years immediately following) the complete and final features of the new imperial strategy in the region became clear.[8] However, it was one of the anomalies of time that the strategy which the British had laid down was carried out only by the Americans after World War II. Thus what the Portuguese had conceived, the British achieved, and what the British

had designed, the Americans executed, with some differences of course.

2

What were the features of this British imperial design and how was it carried out in the region?

One of the basic features of this 'grand imperialist design', whose conception the imperialist school under the leadership of Lord Curzon produced, was that the region from the Nile Valley on through the Near East and the Arab Peninsula to Iran must constitute continuous links for the British Empire in western and central Asia and, like India, be tied to Britain by a series of treaties and agreements which guaranteed and regulated the presence and oversight by Britain of the 'security and stability' of the region (the Pax Britannica).[9] This was an expedient to prevent the interference of other European countries, particularly France, and a protective barrier against Russian expansion (and later on the Bolshevik threat) to prevent the danger from reaching India and Africa.

The purpose of the grand imperial design was not at all to give the area self-rule or constitutional government or unification in any form as political structures to be treated on an equal footing as independent states. This naturally weakens the significance of the claim that Britain's policy in the region was the result of misunderstanding between the Arab Office in Cairo (subject to the Ministry of External Affairs), which advocated giving the Arabs a unitary or confederated kingdom under the leadership of Sharif Husayn b. ʿAli, as recorded in the McMahon promise to the Sharif,[10] on the one hand, and on the other the Government of India, which gave no consideration to Arab national aspirations but focused its attention upon the occupation of Iraq and binding it to the Shaykhdoms of the Arab Gulf and Southern Arabia, and their governance in the same manner as India, resembling the way in which the Maharajas were tied to the Government of India. These pretensions had no value, as a matter of fact, except as a 'justificatory commodity' to be sold to the Arabs. The significant element was that the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which divided the Arab East and the Arab Peninsula into areas of influence, was only one of the reflections (and not the most important) of this grand imperial design and an historical benchmark of the growth of the nationalist trend in the region.

The final outcome of this strategy, then, was to guarantee the division of the Arabs and prevent their unification, not merely as a result

of what appeared in the Sykes–Picot Agreement, but as a general policy. The Sykes–Picot Agreement provided for the partitioning of Iraq and Greater Syria, in addition to the Hijaz, without the least mention of the rest of the Arab Peninsula or the Gulf. The McMahon promise given to the Sharif of Mecca concerning the creation of an independent, united or confederated Arab kingdom did not in fact spring from the Agreement, but was more like an 'option' which could be submitted or withdrawn according to developments in the military and political situation, and to the nature of imperialist alliances and bargaining which issue worthless promises.[11] At the level of imperialist strategy, other alternatives were prepared at that time, one of which was the establishment and support of Ibn Saʿud's rule in Najd and Central Arabia in accordance with the Darin Pact of December, 1915 – this at the same time as the Entente Cordiale states were negotiating the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agreement.[12] The Darin Pact actually made Najd into another British protectorate exactly similar to her other protectorates in the Gulf shaykhdoms. The terms of this Pact prevented Ibn Saʿud from, among other things, attacking these shaykhdoms, but they did not demand any undertaking that he should not attack the Sharif of Mecca in the Hijaz.

The grand imperial design embraced three other elements: first, the neutralization of Iran and her containment by means of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, according to which the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 was abrogated and Britain would undertake the reorganization and training of the Persian army, and finally the establishment of a complete British protectorate over Iran. This treaty, which was considered the crowning achievement of the Lord Curzon school, completed the links of the design and made Iran a defensive curtain against Bolshevist Russia. Although this treaty was never ratified, it would nevertheless be carried out in the future by Riza Khan, the commander of the Cossack regiment.[13]

The design also included a second element by means of the al-Sīb Treaty of 1920 concerning the institution and organization of relations between the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imamate of Oman, and a guarantee of non-aggression by Ibn Saʿud against them. The purpose of this treaty was to strengthen the *de facto* division of Oman between the sultanate and imamate institutions mentioned in the previous section of this study.[14] A new political entity was thus created – one of the design's alternatives, in addition to the Iranian link and the Saudi alternative.

The third element was the entrenchment of the partition of Yemen between the Saudi occupation of ʿAsir in North Yemen, Arab Yemen

which was given to Imam Yahya after the withdrawal of the Ottomans from Yemen in 1918, and Democratic Yemen and Hadramawt, which was divided into the Eastern and Western Protectorates.

Thus, if we try to tie together the threads of the grand imperial design, the importance of the Sykes–Picot Agreement appears limited as regards the partition and fragmentation of the Arab lands as one of the basic aims of the design. The Agreement itself was no more than one of the choices or alternatives to which recourse could be had under this design or which could be discarded when conflict between the fixed interests of the imperial powers occurred, as was the case in what happened to the Province of Mosul. As a matter of fact, the Sykes–Picot Agreement died a few years after the end of World War I; but this 'death' must not be interpreted so much as the failure of the imperial design pertaining to the Lord Curzon school, as a shift towards adopting some of the design's alternatives in the light of new considerations which began to take shape in the region at that time.

The first consideration was the appearance of Bolshevist Russia, which exposed the Sykes–Picot Agreement publicly, along with Britain's participation in the Civil War against her in order to prevent the penetration of the Bolshevik threat into the region. The second consideration was the emergence of a powerful imperialist competitor represented by the United States, which was calling for an open-door policy as a means of securing part of the spoils of war. The third consideration was Arab nationalist resistance to imperialist policies and its demand for an Arab confederation and constitutional monarchy, which were the two demands that would guide the struggle for independence from shortly before World War I to the end of World War II, to which we apply the term 'the Arab nationalist alternative'. The fourth consideration was the emergence of the importance of petroleum in the region during the last decade of the previous century and especially from the beginning of this century – a consideration which channelled the entire British military strategy during World War I and which returned the province of Mosul to Iraq (because of its petroleum), instead of to Turkey or France, as the Sykes–Picot Agreement had stipulated.

We shall deal later on with all these points in some detail, but before doing so we must pause to consider the general outlines of the manner of the partitioning of the Arab countries and the entrenchment of their fragmentation. The reason for this is that the matter is still unclear in spite of the great quantity of writing about it, particularly because this massive literature does not treat the question in its entirety, but rather concentrates on its separate details as a reflection

of its geographical fragmentation, giving birth to a superficial, fragmented, partial perception.

The essential links in the Sykes–Picot Agreement, then, are: the Darin Treaty with Ibn Saʿud in 1915; the al-Sīb Treaty of 1920 which established the partition of Oman into a Sultanate and an Imamate; the partition of Yemen into northern and southern sectors after the Turkish withdrawal from the region in 1918, and the events of 1920: the placing of Iraq under Mandate, the handing over of Syria and Lebanon to the French, and the placing of Palestine under Mandate (events which we have mentioned elsewhere as constituting a dividing line in our modern history).[15] The crowning peak or the most important link, represented by the ʿUqair Conference of 1922, came along to fasten the yoke and to proclaim a new era, owing to the fact that the Agreement which the ʿUqair Conference produced was the demarcation of boundaries on the ground between Iraq, Kuwait and Najd in a manner unparalleled in the history of the region. Why?

The reason is that the ʿUqair Agreement introduced the demarcation of boundaries on the ground and tied this to the concept of national sovereignty, a matter previously unknown in the Arab East and the Arab Peninsula throughout the course of history. In addition, this Agreement contained the seed of the destructive element which would demolish Arab unity, the foundation upon which all the Arab nationalist demands have been based, from that time to the present day.

Let us first review what we said in the previous section about the particularism of the concept of political allegiance in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society, namely that it is a concept connected with human beings and not a geographical region. This Agreement came along in order to finally complete the consolidation of the era of the tribal elites begun by the Treaty of Perpetual Peace of 1853. Thus the purpose of the demarcation of the boundaries between the three countries (Iraq, Kuwait and Najd) was basically to prevent the tribes (in this case the Ikhwan in Najd) or other persons, from moving between these countries with relative freedom, or from fleeing to take refuge with one ruler from the injustice of another. As we know, this was one of the two limiting factors on authority and its exercise in the traditional political system. Thus this Agreement, with what it did to limit the freedom of political movement, not grazing movement or migration, was a destructive instrument used to undermine the traditional system.

However, an element of far greater destructive power than the previous one was that none of these three countries had at any time

throughout their history been anything more than provinces nor had they by themselves constituted independent peoples according to the modern understanding of a people upon which a nation-state has been built. Likewise, the boundaries of none of them had ever been demarcated on the ground, because there had never been any necessity for that, as we have explained. Moreover, there are no ethnic, geographical or historical-linguistic bases for these boundaries. Along comes the ʿUqair Conference to draw the boundaries, not according to any of these bases – since they did not exist – but to impose new bases upon these three countries in accordance with the demands of international politics and the whims of the Imperial Powers, quite arbitrarily and with disdain for the history of the region and its nationalist aspirations, as John Marlowe puts it.[16]

This shocking arbitrariness in the drawing of the boundaries between these countries on the map, which was nothing more than a pen stroke by Sir Percy Cox, now appears from the standpoint of history as one of the greatest tragi-comedies of our modern history. I do not know to what extent the participants in the ʿUqair Conference were aware of the historical gravity of their actions or the consequences that would result from them. Nevertheless this Conference was the foundation on which another element or feature of this new grand imperial design was based, namely the establishment of 'peace and security' in the region through axes of support for systems of absolutist rule, but loyal to the western colonial administration. Thus, if we put the ʿUqair Conference in the historical frame of events, it becomes clear to us that it was not at all random (even though it drew the boundaries in a random fashion).[17]

If we pause at the Darin Treaty of 1915, according to which Najd was transformed into a British protectorate, we find that the purpose of it was clear, namely to use Ibn Saʿud as a card, or as an alternative to the rule of Sharif Husayn ibn ʿAli in the Hijaz and a counterweight to the promises of the Allies to set up a united Arab Kingdom in the liberated Ottoman provinces, as clearly stated in the McMahon Pledge and included in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. During the period 1915–27, Ibn Saʿud was able to occupy al-Ahsaʾ or the eastern region overlooking the Arab Gulf in 1913, to occupy Haʾil in 1921, thus terminating the rule of the Āl Rashid and imposing his suzerainty upon Northern Najd, to enter the Hijaz after the lifting of British protection and to bring the rule of Sharif Husdayn ibn ʿAli to an end in 1924–5, thus imposing his control from the Gulf of ʿAqaba to Jiddah. He then occupied ʿAsir and brought the Emirate of the Idrisids to an end in 1926. The Treaty of Jiddah with Britain in 1927

abolished the form of the protectorate which had resulted from the Darin Pact, so that Ibn Saʿud was treated as head of an independent sovereign state, with boundaries and international recognition guaranteed for him by the same international political considerations as had governed the ʿUqair Conference and were its original framework.[18]

Thus was this grand imperial design able to set up an axis firmly loyal to the west in the Arab Peninsula, at odds with another axis of an exceptional nature, namely Iraq, which was one of the participants in the ʿUqair Conference. The proclamation of the British Mandate and the installation of Faisal as king were contemporaneous events of 1920, just as the Protectorate Treaty and the demarcation of Iraq's boundaries at the ʿUqair Conference were contemporaneous events of 1922. Faisal could not but be loyal to Britain to whom he owed his throne, which he had lost in Syria when the French had driven him out in keeping with the Sykes–Picot Agreement. This was the second axis or the second pillar of British imperialism, which the Treaty of 1930 between Iraq and Britain confirmed, according to which Iraq was granted independence (!) under British protection.[19]

As for the third axis, it was represented by the regime of Riza Khan who came to power by a coup in February 1921, concealed behind Sayyid Diyaʾ al-Din Tabatabaʾi, whom Riza Khan would remove after a few months to seize the reins of government himself. Then he displaced Ahmad Shah, the last of the Qajar rulers, and proclaimed himself Riza Shah Pahlavi in 1923.[20] In addition to being a support for the imperialist policy and a defence against the Bolshevik threat which had appeared in Russia, the policy of the Riza Shah regime which aimed at establishing a centralized administration in Teheran led to the collapse of Shaykh Khazaʿal's government in Arabistan and the expulsion of the Arabs of Iran (also causing an Iranian emigration) which resulted in wide areas of Southern Iraq (especially Basra), Kuwait, Bahrain and al-Ahsaʾ turning Shiʿi. This, of course, introduced a sectarian element into the structure of the population in the Arabian Gulf, which was to have lasting effects down to the present.[21]

Imperial policy in the region was based on building up these three axes, which established 'security and stability' in the region in the inter-war period and prepared a favourable climate for extensive western capitalist exploitation experienced by the region in petroleum exploration. Although the policy of local axes did not enter as an authentic element into the imperial design as Lord Curzon and his school had conceived it, nevertheless the execution of the design in

fact was subject to great pressures from the Americans, who appeared in the region after World War I to demand a share in the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, although they had not been in a state of war with her. This was due to the great debt that had piled up on the British and the French because of that war.

The American companies reaped great profit from the 'open-door policy' which the American government demanded in order to secure petroleum exploration concessions. They also benefited from President Wilson's principles of encouraging colonies to demand the right of self-determination and the end of colonization.[22] The more advanced American monopolistic capital had no need for colonies or mandates in the European fashion – rather, it worked to demolish them in order to create, instead, independent states in appearance, but subject to and dependent upon it in a more comprehensive and flexible manner. This indicated that North America had begun to expand from her back garden in South America to transform the whole world into a plantation for American economic and strategic interests, although all of this did not materialize until after World War II.

However, this grand imperial design was not achieved without resistance, serious resistance, some occurrences of which we have described as a struggle for independence. In this struggle, the Arab nationalist alternative to religious schism made its appearance (the activity of the Mutawiʿah) and to sectarian division (the Wahhabis, the Ibadis and the Zaidis). These sectarian divisions facilitated the partitioning of Arab lands or entrenched this fragmentation. The socialist alternative appeared at the same time and the two alternatives – the Arab nationalist and the socialist – shared (though they differed in many other things) in the demand for secular constitutional government and complete independence in a confederated, unified state. These demands would direct all of the liberationist, reformist or revolutionary efforts in the region and would epitomize Arab nationalist aspirations and the shape of the future for a modern state which would reunify the Arabs.[23]

Under the influence of this Arab nationalist current which had not yet gained momentum, the first reformist movements arose in embryonic form in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula. It was in the year 1921 that there emerged in Kuwait the first movement demanding that the notables of the population should share in the government of the country with the emir. The first demand of this movement was that the principle of consultation should be followed in choosing the emir from among the members of the ruling family. This demand evolved

into 'the election of a fixed number from the Sabah family and the people to adminster the affairs of the country on the basis of justice and equity'. However, this movement ended in failure after a few months, owing to the lack of co-operation from the new emir, Al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir and to 'serious disagreements' among the members of the Consultative Assembly.[24]

Turning to Bahrain, a reform movement arose which tried in the period of 1921 to 1923 to develop the municipal council election gain and to transform it, or to convince the emir, Shaykh ʿIsa al-Khalifah, to recognize it as a legislative council and to grant it the following prerogatives: (a) the right to choose the Muslim canon law judges and the government department heads; (b) the right to dismiss non-national department heads; (c) the right to set limits to British interference in internal affairs; (d) the right to form a national police force. When Shaykh ʿIsa manifested sympathy towards these demands, the English sent him into retirement and exiled the nationalist leaders of this movement to India.[25]

However, the Arab nationalist alternative, or current, did not mature in the Arab East and take organized political form until 1936 and during the years of the bitter Palestinian strike concerning the Palestinian issue, which would continue, from then on, to be at the centre of the struggle for independence and Arab unity. Under the influence of this question, the reformist movements in Bahrain, Dubai and Kuwait sprang up in 1938.[26] As Table 5.1 shows, the demands of the three movements were largely similar, and likewise the results. Most of the demands were directed at the creation of democratic government, the organization of the country on modern foundations, and the provision of basic services. Kuwait, however, was distinguished by bringing forward clear Arab nationalist demands, that is the last two demands concerning the necessity of opening the country to Arabs, and co-operating with Iraq, which was pursuing an Arab nationalist course under King Ghazi's rule. The result, however, was the failure of the three attempts and the suppression of the reform movements by force. However, no sooner had World War II come to an end than these movements again burst forth, but this time under the influence of Nasserist Egypt in the mid-1950s.

Thus did the imperialist policy of 'divide and rule' take its toll in the region, splitting the Arab provinces and countries into contending states, tribes and sects, and demarcating their boundaries. Unfortunately, these provinces and countries forgot – after they had been liberated – that it was the foreigner who had set up these boundaries and that they were nothing more than 'boundaries of solitary

Table 5.1 The demands of the reformist movements in Bahrain, Dubai, and Kuwait and the results achieved in 1938

	Demands	
Bahrain	*Dubai*	*Kuwait*
Creation of a Legislative Assembly	Creation of a Legislative Assembly	Creation of a Legislative Assembly
Classification and co-ordination of the statutes and laws of Bahrain	Reorganization of the Customs	Organization of economic conditions in the country
Reform of the police administration	Setting up market guards	Creation of a regular department of police and public security
The ruler's obligation to appoint an heir apparent	Fixing the civil list for the ruler and the members of his family	Necessity of the ruler being in touch with all classes of people and hearing their complaints
Dismissal of the Inspector of Education	Creation of fixed public budget for the emirate	Abolition of the harmful monopolies of the emir and the members of his entourage
Dismissal of the two Jaʿfari [Shiʿite] Muslim canon law judges	Abolition of the private monopolies of the emir and the members of his immediate family	Necessity of opening schools on as wide a scale as possible
Priority for the appointment of Bahraini citizens in the Petroleum Company	Creation of health care facilities in the city of Dubai	Shutting Kuwait's doors to foreign immigrants (most of whom are from Iran)
		Unrestricted permission for Arabs to visit Kuwait, with no restriction upon any Arab entering the country
		Necessity for co-operation between Kuwait and Iraq for the implementation of reform projects

Table 5.1 continued

	Outcomes	
Bahrain	*Dubai*	*Kuwait*
Refusal of all of these demands	Failure of the Legislative Assembly owing to the opposition of the ruler and Britain	Success of the Assembly during a period of six months in issuing the first constitutional document (fundamental law)
Suppression of the reform movement by force	Impoverishment of the Assembly's financial resources	Assembly's success in setting up a civilian administration in the country
	Incitement of the bedouins to occupy the city of Dubai, leading to the slaughter of some of the Islamic movement's leaders and the surrender of others to the ruler	Dissolution of the Assembly after this, the suppression of its supporters, the banishment of its leaders and the execution of some of them for political reasons for the first time in Kuwait

confinement and compulsory domicile' which the colonialists had imposed upon them, as Satiʿ al-Husari has expressed it.[27] The three axes which the colonialist administrations had established and adopted (namely Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran) have played a basic role in preparing a favourable climate for foreign investments in oil exploration and the organized plundering of the resources of the Arab countries and for making the idea of Arab unity seem impractical and in the final analysis impossible.

This outcome was the end-product as delineated in the report of Sir George W. Rendel, written on 13 June 1933 concerning the position of His Majesty regarding the question of Arab unity, which may be summarized as claiming that Arab unity is impractical and impossible owing to the following considerations as given in the text of this report:[28]

> Familial rivalry between the Hashemites [King Faisal in Iraq and Abdallah in Jordan], and the Saudis makes a cordial or organic harmony between the areas which each occupies almost impossible ... [Likewise] the policy of His Majesty's Government is to

> preserve an equitable balance between the Hashemites on the one hand and the Saudis on the other ... Besides this great obstacle, there are other factors which could not be reconciled in any one system. The most important of these elements is the independent Kingdom of Yemen, which is ruled by the Imam Yahya, a short-sighted and irascible man, whose relationship with Ibn Saud and King Faisal is unclear ... The case is similar with the various small Arab rulers such as the Shaykhs of Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial Coast, who are most jealous of one another. All of them are very jealous of their independence and show no ability to co-operate. There is no need to raise the matter of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Protectorate of Aden in this regard at the present time ... It is a basic principle in the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Middle East that these states must remain separate units, as far as possible under effective British control ... [Likewise,] His Majesty's Government cannot agree* to the absorption of Palestine in any way into any kind of union in which the Arabs form an overwhelming majority, if for no other reason than her deep commitment to the policy of a national home for the Jews, in addition to her commitments to the non-Arab or non-Muslim communities[!].

It is rather absurd that Britain should create obstacles in the way of an action and then claim regret that this action is impossible because of these obstacles. In my view, what is recorded in this report is nothing more than an enumeration of the accomplishments and gains which the grand imperial design had until then achieved.

3

The petroleum era began in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula in the 1930s, but the era of the *rentier* state did not arrive until after World War II – after 1950, to be more exact. In order to clarify this, let us point out that most of the petroleum discoveries occurred in the 1930s, and likewise that the oil companies had arrived at definite estimates of the extent of the oil reserves in the region at about the same period. The oil companies of Iraq and Bahrain began production and exporting by way of sea terminals and pipelines for carrying some petroleum via Syria and Palestine at the beginning of the 1930s, as Table 5.2 shows. However, the circumstances of World War II, which

* The Arabic, *lā yasaʿuha illā an tuwāfiq* ... would mean 'cannot but agree'; therefore *illā* (but) must be omitted to give the sense obviously intended.

Table 5.2 Dates of the discovery and production of petroleum in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula

Country	*Date of discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities*	*Date of beginning of export*
Iran	1905	1908
Iraq	1928	1931
Bahrain	1932	1934
Kuwait	1938	1948
Saudi Arabia	1938	1950[a]
Qatar	1939	1949
Abu Dhabi	1966	—[b]
Dubai	1966	—[b]
Oman	—[b]	1967

Note: [a]Date is not reliable.
[b]No official date is given.

broke out in the summer of 1939, and especially the shortage of iron and steel throughout the war, resulted in the stoppage of exploration, then of production.

We do not wish to enter here into the details of the start of petroleum production and industry, or the circumstances and conditions that led to the creation of the oil companies and the way in which they divided up the shares, for that is a long, sad story whose chapters the reader can find in many documents and sources. References also abound in the stories of authors and journalists who are fascinated by talk about the tremendous oil riches and the limitless power which they produce.[29] What concerns us here is that petroleum production resulted in a large increase in the 'national' income in the form of royalties which the ruling families received from the oil companies. The size of these royalties rose from 16 per cent of the net profit of the companies, which prevailed in 1933, to four gold shillings per ton, which occurred in the case of Iran, spreading from there to the rest of the countries in the region, as is shown in Table 5.3. It should be clear that the transition between these various stages (in spite of the unfairness in the share of the producing countries until 1974) was attended by controversy, struggle, and long, exhausting negotiations. Likewise, the governments of the countries of the region didn't achieve complete nationalization of the petroleum companies without powerful popular pressure extending over a quarter of a century. The

Table 5.3 Stages in the evolution of pricing policy for petroleum in the region

First stage:	1930–50	Four gold shillings per ton collected from the companies which owned the exploration rights plus (under some circumstances) a minimum share of the profit, along with its allotted percentage of the profits distributed to the shareholders.*
Second stage:	1950–60	Equal distribution of the net income between the government and the producing companies.
Third stage:	1960–73	Sharing in the downstream operations (agreements for the distribution of royalties under the aegis of OPEC).
Fourth stage:	1974–86	Full nationalization and a pricing revolution until 1982, then the collapse of OPEC price-fixing and pricing crises from 1982–1986.

*To get tons per year, multiply barrels per day by fifty, and conversely to get barrels per day, divide tons per year by fifty.

consolidation of OPEC, during its early years at least, was an expression of the struggle of producing countries to achieve a just share of the petroleum revenue and industry.[30]

Table 5.4 shows the effect of the evolution of pricing policy upon the growth of petroleum revenue, which constitutes more than 90 per cent (on average), of the national income of these countries over the last 43 years. We can see clearly that the years 1960, 1974 and 1982 represent principal turning points in this field. During the second stage, which in 1960 saw the initiation of profit-sharing on an equal basis, which ARAMCO started in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 1950s, compelling the British and other western companies to follow suit later on, the average represents a quantum leap in petroleum revenue.[31] In 1974, which witnessed the beginning of the effect of the new pricing policy and the oil boycott of America in 1973, the average constitutes a true pricing revolution if compared with the preceding years. In the last stage since 1982, the average represents the beginning of declining oil prices owing to the collapse of OPEC price-fixing and the flooding of world markets with Saudi oil, which led to the pricing crises that the world has witnessed down to the writing of these lines.[32]

What is the significance of this large revenue realized from petroleum production for the region's countries? One of the useful and

Table 5.4 The growth of petroleum revenue in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries for selected years (in millions of US dollars)

Year	*United Arab Emirates*	*Bahrain*	*Saudi Arabia*	*Qatar*	*Kuwait*
1940	—	1.0	2.5	—	—
1950	—	3.3	57.0	1.0	11.0
1960	3.0	15.0	355.0	54.0	465.0
1965	33.0	22.0	655.0	69.0	671.0
1970	233.0	35.0	1,200.0	122.4	895.0
1974	6,306.0	169.8	31,163.0	1,979.0	4,765.0
1977	9,237.0	226.5	41,114.0	1,975.0	8,819.0
1980	19,456.0	253.6	102,372.0	5,387.0	17,246.0
1982	16,000.0	—	76,000.0	3,145.0	9,477.0
1983	12,800.0	—	46,100.0	3,000.0	9,900.0

Sources: OPEC, *Annual Statistical Bulletin* (1982), in comparison with: ʿAli Musa, 'Al-Siyāsah al-sukkānīyah wa-mustaqbal al-tanmīyah fī al-Khalīj wa-al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah' (Population Policy and the Future of Development in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula) (unpublished paper), p. 129.
General comment: the sign '—' indicates lack of sufficient data.

fruitful ways of understanding this revenue theoretically is the one suggested by Mahdavy, which looks at oil revenue as external proceeds, that is as rent which these countries receive from leasing their lands to the oil companies. It is an external unearned income not generated by the productive operations of the national economy. It logically follows that the state which lives or depends for its subsistence upon external rent is a *rentier* state. A *rentier* state is not necessarily connected with oil. Spain (at the end of the sixteenth century) is a historical example of a *rentier* state that depended for its subsistence upon American gold and silver, which we have come across in a previous section of this study.[33]

It is of considerable importance for us to understand the external aspect of this rent from petroleum revenue, for it is like a foreign, external gift, though an ongoing gift on an orderly basis. We can therefore understand why the ruling families did not want to put urgent pressure on the petroleum companies to increase the share of their countries. There was no connection between oil production as an economic activity and the sectors of the national economy, either from the standpoint of wages and employment, or from that of the local consumption of petroleum, or its influence on indigenous

manufacturing, or the reinvestment of the surplus revenue domestically, until the beginning of the 1980s, when certain processing industries emerged.[34]

This kind of *rentier* state possesses certain characteristics which we shall summarize as follows: the national economy of this kind of state does not depend directly upon petroleum but in an indirect way, namely state or public expenditures which become a conduit for pumping in oil revenue. This brings out the central role which the state plays (from the standpoint of its being the receiver of the oil revenue) in the economic and social life of the inhabitants, but which is different from the role of other states which depend upon taxes and the productive service sectors of the national economy.[35] Oil revenue makes the *rentier* state relatively independent of the customary sources of power and authority in other states, and the *rentier* state therefore enjoys a flexibility of action and a freedom of manoeuvre which to a large extent surpass situations in which the state gets its revenue from taxes and productive activity. Naturally, this does not mean that the *rentier* state is entirely free from restrictions, some of which we shall mention in the next section.

If we pause a little to investigate the mechanics of public expenditure and the exceptional role which this expenditure plays in the *rentier* state, we find that there are generally three categories of state expenditures in the public budget, namely: state capital outlay, public transfers and public consumption.[36] As for capital outlay, it embraces all aspects of expenditure for labour and materials necessary for the production of goods and services sold to the people, for example public works projects. Most of these goods and services are offered free or at nominal prices in the *rentier*–petroleum state. Regarding exceptions, such as government airlines or electricity, water, the post office, telegraph companies, etc., they are self-financing or depend upon state support. In the latter case, we must differentiate between capital outlay and public consumption. As for the services which are not self-supporting, like medical services, education and municipal services, we must consider them to be in the realm of public consumption, which is the channel through which the programmes of the so-called great welfare state are financed.

The category possessing supreme importance in the *rentier* state's budget is the second category: public transfers. In general, public transfers consist of an aggregate of large sums paid from the public budget in the form of interest on the public debt, social insurance, food price support, and various other forms of subsidy. This category has been used under the aegis of the *rentier* state to create an

immensely rich financial landed oligarchy and to transform the import–export sector into the most dynamic sector of the economy – all of this from the state budget. This ordinarily comes about through what is called the state's assessment or its expropriation of real estate on the pretext of establishing public projects or roads. Broad classes of the inhabitants have profited from this kind of transfer, but it is a benefit more like 'crumbs from the table'; for those who profit most are the members of the ruling family and the great merchant families who possess extensive real estate holdings, enabling them to gain possession of the lion's share of public subsidy.[37]

The sums allocated yearly in the state budget for this purpose have reached hundreds of millions of dinars in the case of Kuwait. This naturally encouraged speculation in land, raising its price astronomically at the beginning of the public transfer programme. It likewise induced the members of the ruling family and of the oligarchy surrounding it to claim ownership of large areas of land. The government initiated a programme of state expropriation for these lands, then fixed the price, that is assessed their value at several times their market value. It was in this way that the pricing scandal occurred in most of the petroleum *rentier* states.[38]

The pumping in of these large amounts of capital and their circulation in the national economy gave the impression of well-being and prosperity, without the occurrence of any expansion of the productive base of the economy through industrialization and the diversification of the sources of income. This is a common characteristic of the *rentier* state. The possession by the state of large surpluses of capital leads, in the case of the *rentier* state, to more interference in the economy through monopolizing the financing, establishment and guaranteeing of all or most industrial and commercial enterprises. It is enough for the reader to glance at the largest common stock companies in the petroleum-producing countries and the government's share in them to realize to what an extent the state interferes in the economy.[39] Similarly, most of the dynamic sectors of the economy, such as importing and exporting, construction and contracting, depend principally upon state contracts. Thus no sooner does the level of public spending go down than the wheels of the economy begin to stop turning.

The prominence of the central role of the state in this environment inevitably means the prominence of the traditional ruling families and elites, which the colonialist protectorate treaties had 'frozen' in positions of authority. The ruling families thus appeared as though they were political institutions with a proprietary right to the state. They

did not come by way of selection or election, but by virtue of their previous position. This meant the fashioning of the modern capitalistic state apparatus in accordance with tribal–sectarian requirements and an attempt by the ruling elites to preserve the old, traditional relationships under the aegis of the new political system and economic conditions, as we shall see later on.

It was natural that the ruling structures were unable to achieve true economic and political progress, owing to the unsuitability of the existing institutional organizations which were founded in accordance with these pragmatic arrangements, together with the incompatibility of their constituent elements. Paul Villeire holds the view that we can picture the elites or the ruling groups in these systems as a functional class whose purpose is to tie the system to the surrounding local political forces on the one hand, and on the other to achieve and implement the interest of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the states of the western centre.[40] These ruling structures work to preserve the existing state of things in spite of the fact that the new economic conditions naturally lead to the disruption of the traditional balance between the social and political forces, because of social mobility and the new division of labour. This impels these systems to give extraordinary importance to the apparatus of repression and political terrorism in a manner which in the end leads to the deepening of their dependence upon the good intentions of the Great Powers to defend them – internally and externally.

In these circumstances the methods of public expenditure ordinarily lead to opposite results, hindering the path of progress and the development of the economic and social system. There are several reasons for this: prosperity and the apparent economic well-being are not an indicator of the productive efficiency of the national economy or the level of development of society or the extent of its industrialization; rather, the superficial prosperity leads to the stifling of growth by drugging people and encouraging them to be content with the distribution of the immediate benefits of government expenditure derived from petroleum, and to make additional demands that cannot be justified on any basis other than that petroleum wealth costs no one any effort, since it exists as a bounty that rains down upon everyone.[41]

In addition to this, the currencies of the *rentier* states are overvalued, just as the market wage rate does not reflect the social costs of production. This tends to encourage importation instead of adopting a policy of substitution, owing first of all to high wages in the petroleum sector, which lead to a rise in wages in the other economic

sectors. This inevitably contributes to the destruction of the traditional economic sectors, which cannot compete with the petroleum or the construction sectors. An imbalance thus occurs in the structure of the labour force, resulting in the expansion of employment in the government sectors and creating disguised unemployment represented in government jobs (see Table 5.5). Under these conditions, a number of abnormal social symptoms and parasitical activities are fostered, such as the role of the guarantor,[42] or trading in the labour force,[43] or the policy of the distribution of benefits, or enrichment at the expense of the state, etc.

4

The flourishing of the importing and exporting sectors and the construction industry, together with the expansion of the services

Table 5.5 The rise in the numbers of employees in government service and the public sector in certain countries of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, and the percentage of citizens, for selected years, 1971–81

Year	*United Arab Emirates*	*Bahrain*	*Saudi Arabia*	*Oman*	*Qatar*	*Kuwait*
1971	—	—	134,082 (Saudis: 82.4%)	3,112 (Omanis: 91.8%)	—	87,032 (Kuwaitis: 40.3%)
1975	—	—	184,741 (Saudis: 77%)	19,000 (Omanis: 78.9%)	10,820 (Qataris: 64%)	113,274 (Kuwaitis: 40.1%)
1981	197,935 (Citizens: 36%)	37,758 —	252,898* (Saudis: 72.6%)	38,840 (Omanis: 60.4%)	37,587 (Qataris: 48.5%)	167,616 (Kuwaitis: 34.6%)

Sources Al-Musa, 'Demographic policy and the future of development in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula' (unpublished paper), pp. 136–42; United Arab Emirates, *Annual Statistical Yearbook*, 1984, p. 64; Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Dirāsah ʿan al-bīrūqrātīyah al-ḥukūmīyah fī al-Kuwait' (A Study of Government Bureaucracy in Kuwait), *Al-Qabas*, 12/2/1985; Hasan al-Khayyat, *Al-Rasīd al-sukkānī li-duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabīyah* (Population stock in the Arabian Gulf States) (Doha: Jamiʿat Qatar, Documents and Humanity Studies Centre, 1982), *passim*; and James A. Socknat, 'Progress and problems in the development and utilization of human resources in the Arab Gulf States', *Al-Abhāth* 30 (1982): 146.
General note: The sign '—' indicates a lack of sufficient data.
*For the year 1980.

sector and the big increase in wage levels, were all factors attracting expatriate labour to both the public and private sectors. However, the influx of this migrant labour – especially in the 1970s – reached such a state of bungling and planning void that it made a majority of the peoples of the *rentier* petroleum states minorities in their countries,[44] in addition to the noticeable weakening of the participation of the local workforce in economic activity, as is made clear by Tables 5.6 and 5.8.

In fact the data included in these three tables – 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, in spite of the difficulty of ensuring their reliability, give us negative indicators concerning the characteristics of the structure of the workforce under the shadow of the *rentier* state in the Arab Gulf countries. We can conclude from the data in Table 5.5 that the majority of the national workforces are employed in government service and the public sector. Although the ratio of these to the total of the workforce employed by the government varies between one-third in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, to three-quarters in Saudi Arabia, the average ratio of nationals in the public sector is more than two-thirds in all the countries of the region. Does the remaining third then work in the private sector?

Table 5.6 Evolution of the workforce according to nationality in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries (percentages)

	1975			*1981*		
Country	*Citizen*	*Arab*	*Non-Arab*	*Citizen*	*Arab*	*Non-Arab*
United Arab Emirates	15.2	84.8[a]		14*	17.8	68.2*
Bahrain	—[b]	15.9		35.4	14.8	49.8
Saudi Arabia	71.7	28.3		57*	42.8[a]	
Oman	—[b]	—		45.7	—[b]	
Qatar	17.6	82.4		17	18	50
Kuwait	30.2	69.8		22.4*	49	28.6

Sources: Ali Al-Musa, 'Demographic policy and the future of development in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula' (unpublished paper in Arabic), pp. 57–61; Hasan Al-Khayat, *Population Stock of Arab Gulf Countries*, Doha: Qatar University, 1982: pp. 236, 285 (in Arabic).
Notes: *For 1980; [a]include Arab and non-Arab; [b]information not available.

Table 5.7 Development of immigration to the Gulf countries

	1970		*1975*		*1980*	
	Total population	*Percentage of expatriates*	*Total population*	*Percentage of expatriates*	*Total population*	*Percentage of expatriates*
United Arab Emirates	220,000	54	656,000	70	1,043,225	75
Bahrain	216,078	17.5	282,000	24.2	358,857*	32.4
Oman	600,000[a]	7	811,000	20	900,000	30
Qatar	111,000	58.8	180,000	63.9	260,000	67.3
Kuwait	738,662	53	994,837	52.5	1,355,827	58.6

Source: Hasan Al-Khayyat, *Population Stock of Arab Gulf Countries*, Doha: Qatar University, 1982: pp. 183 ff.
Notes: *1981; [a]information is not reliable.

The data available to us indicate that a very small part of this third works in the private sector as owners of businesses. However, Table 5.8 tells us that the average ratio of those economically active to the total number of nationals in the Gulf countries does not exceed 22 per cent – that is less than half of that for the First and Second Worlds, which is 46 per cent. This means that less than one-quarter of the inhabitants of working age do work, while the other three-quarters are not in the labour market. It we subtract students from 15 years old and up, and women, the rest either live off the ownership of real estate or are economically self-sufficient, but in all cases they are not engaged in productive work.

Who then are those that form the backbone of the workforce in these states? They are the Arab and Asian expatriates, as we have tried to show in Table 5.6. The data upon which this table is based and given here for reasons of space reveal a general trend in the Arab Gulf countries, in which the number of local and Arab workers is declining in favour of foreign workers, most of whom are Asians, to the extent that the percentage of foreign workers has reached its highest level in the Emirates (68.2 per cent of the total labour force), followed by Qatar (65 per cent), then Oman (50.6 per cent). The only country in the Arab Gulf in which Arab expatriate workers exceed foreign workers is Kuwait (49 per cent to about 29 per cent),

Table 5.8 The ratio of economic participation to the total economically active population (1980, percentages)

Country	*Total population*	*Nationals*	*Expatriates*
United Arab Emirates	52.8	29.3	67[a]
Bahrain	36.8	19.3	59
Saudi Arabia	—	22.3	—
Oman	28.1	18.4	—
Qatar	45.7	23.7	61[a]
Kuwait	36	19.3	40.7
Democratic Yemen	—	—	—
Arab Yemen	—	36.2	—
Japan	51		
USSR	47.5		
Sweden	44.4		
USA	41.8		
Average of the First and Second Worlds	46		

Source: Mansur al-Rawi, 'Tanmiyat al-mawārid al-basharīyah' (The Development of Human Resources), in *Naḥw istikhdām amthāl li-al-qūwā al-ʿāmilah-al-watanīyah bi-al-duwal al-ʿArabīyah al-Khalījīyah* (Towards a more ideal utilization of the national workforces in the Arab Gulf States), Implementation Office of the Council of Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs of the Arab Gulf States), Social and Labour Studies, series 4 (January 1985), p. 30.
Notes: The sign '—' indicates insufficient data; [a]data is not reliable.

which is beginning to decrease along with the general trend in the region.

The data recorded in Table 5.6, if they are combined with the data regarding the increase in the ratio of the expatriate population in relation to the population in general, give us a more exact picture of the composition of the population in the region. The expatriate flow into the Gulf countries has increased in the manner portrayed in Table 5.7, and here too, another population trend is revealed, namely that the ratio of the expatriates to the total population is less than a third in Oman and Bahrain, rising to more than a half in Kuwait, reaching two-thirds in Qatar and three-quarters in the United Arab Emirates.

The substance of these data is that the participation of the inhabitants of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries in economic activity under the *rentier* state is very limited. Most of this participation, if it exists, is in the government and public sector in the form of a

disguised structural unemployment, that is, it indicates a structural defect in the economy as a whole. Furthermore, expatriate labour is on the increase in the private consumer sector which depends upon supplying the government sector. In this situation, government expenditure (or public consumption) plays a central role in the economic system of the *rentier* state.

Government expenditure under the auspices of the *rentier* state gives an impression of economic prosperity, when the fact is that sharp income differences between the classes of inhabitants are continually increasing, with the gap between the excessively rich and the comparatively poor widening. This is occurring at a time when the gap between the petroleum states and the advanced capitalist states is increasing from the standpoint of the possibilities and opportunities for true growth, which are being wasted day by day in the petroleum states.[45] However, government expenditure, the abundance of imported consumer goods and the measures taken by the welfare state alleviate the severity of the situation and camouflage the truth. This obstructs or postpones political change and the necessity of remedying the deficiency of the existing social structures and institutional patterns.

This brings us to a matter of the most crucial importance, but the revolutionary Arab nationalist reform movements in the region have unfortunately not been aware of it. It is that the grave differences in income arising from government expenditure policies may – or, rather, they actually do – lead to political friction between social groups, even though it may be less critical in the *rentier* state when compared with other states. This must be due to the fact that the differences of income are not primarily a product of the exploitation of people, but of natural resources. It is easy for governments to give the impression that everyone can obtain a larger share by government fiat.[46] This naturally gives the state a tremendous weapon in manoeuvring, and ability to contain opposition movements and to seduce its leaders. However, if this situation is combined with the deficiency of the political system, and of the economic and technological structure in the *rentier* state, it will lead to the stagnation of the political, social and cultural order in general. However, when petroleum income begins to decline, it will be another story.

We can only agree with Mahdavy's conclusion that existing economic and social indicators are meaningless in a *rentier* state of this kind. It is possible for Kuwait or the Emirates or Saudi Arabia to have the highest per capita incomes, or the highest expenditure on health and education, or the highest per capita production of electricity,

etc. However, if such countries want to enter upon a stage of true long-term development they must change their social and political systems and achieve a serious, radical transformation of existing economic relationships.[47]

6 The authoritarian state in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

1

The historical outcome of the *rentier* state experience in the 1950s and 1960s was the appearance of what we term the phenomenon of 'the authoritarian state', which has embraced the whole region and possibly the whole of the Third World during the present period.[1] However, before we undertake the study of this phenomenon and its local manifestation, we must mention that the policies of the *rentier* state have unleashed widespread opposition and resistance movements from both traditional and non-traditional power groups. These movements began to appear as a result of the policies of the *rentier* state itself, since these policies changed some of the foundations upon which the opposition and insurgent movements in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries relied.

Among the traditional social forces were the bedouin tribes and the religious sects, which began to lose their effective traditional positions with the rise of the ruling families and the groups which surrounded them in the structure of the *rentier* state. We shall see that these traditional forces would be transformed into something resembling a decrepit lumpen proletariat in air-conditioned ghettos on the fringes of the 'metropolitan petroleum cities'.[2] Similarly, the influence of petroleum on the social structure, an influence which led to the destruction of sectors of the national economy and the traditional economic activities, generated broad groups of people uprooted from their traditional places on the social ladder, such as the seamen, divers, boat captains, the artisans and craftsmen in the Gulf States, and the peasants and artisans in Oman, Democratic Yemen and Arab Yemen. This is particularly true of the last-mentioned regions, since they are the ones primarily sending forth labourers, and on account of the increasing authority and oppression

of the shaykhs and sultans in the Arab south and the crisis condition of agricultural relations in Northern Yemen.

The nucleus of the new middle classes was formed from these uprooted groups simultaneously with the beginning of the influence of petroleum wealth, especially with the spread of modern education and the increase in the levels of social mobility. In spite of the fact that the prominent role of the liberal and nationalist members of the merchant class remains obvious to the present time; and although the patron–client relationship continues to play an important part in modifying political relations until now, nevertheless these middle classes and some working-class groups (particularly those working in the petroleum sector, banks and commerce) have gradually assumed, since the 1960s, an active presence on the stage of political and social conflict in these countries.[3]

As for the bases and sources of opposition and protest they took – following the tragedy of the partition of Palestine – a clear nationalist character which evolved into an organized, revolutionary current threatening, for the first time, the apparatus of *de facto* rule in the region. This movement was strengthened by the momentous appearance of ʿAbd al-Nasser on the stage of political struggle in the Arab countries during the tripartite aggression (of the Suez crisis of 1956) especially by his emergence as a national leader of the Arabs following the announcement of the Egyptian–Syrian union and Egypt's decisive plunge into the general stream of eastern political events, along with the termination of the isolation imposed upon her after the collapse of the experiment of Muhammad ʿAli and his son Ibrahim in the 1840s. This revolutionary explosion of opposition and protest movements was attended by relative success, owing to the victory of Arab nationalist and radical socialist ideology over the tribal sectarian forces, which were the bases upon which the ruling regimes relied for the perpetuation and protection of the status quo. This very fact was, in my opinion, the greatest accomplishment of the opposition and resistance movements in this period, and its greatest loss was to be the return of tribal sectarian-regionalism after the defeat of June 1967.

We can distinguish two stages in the development of opposition and protest movements in the modern history of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, the first covering the period from 1948 to 1958, when the new social forces in the region were in a stage of fermentation. Thus most of their demands were aimed at constitutional government, universal freedoms, matters pertaining to administrative reform (or the introduction of a modern administration), the

improvement of material conditions and insistence upon support for the Palestinian cause. In the second stage from 1959 to 1967, the demands evolved to raising the question of full, effective independence for the countries which had not achieved it, the issue of the complete nationalization of petroleum and the demand that the states of the region should adopt an Arab nationalist unionist goal hostile to colonialism and imperialism. In the first half of the 1960s these demands adopted the daring position of calling, for the first time, for a reconsideration of the structures of government, nay even for changing them.

We all know well – to our bitter sorrow – that this stage ended in the defeat of June 1967, which was a complete defeat for ʿAbd al-Nasser and his leadership, and for the opposition and resistance movements in the whole of the Arab East, and consequently his humiliation in the civil war in Arab Yemen.[4] Only a few years would pass before the region was inundated with petroleum income surpluses after the 1973 price revolution, thus luring whole populations to forsake the field of opposition and resistance to become an empty wasteland of nothing more than the memories of demonstrations, placards, prison cells, proclamations (following successive coups) and fine speeches one after the other without any conceivable, let alone happy, ending. The tribal, sectarian, regionalist forces are coming back with ferocious violence once more.

On the basis of this sequential viewpoint of the opposition and resistance movements and the forces and bases of the opposition, we can mention examples from the first stage: the experiment with the Higher Executive Committee in Bahrain, the politicization of athletic and social clubs in Kuwait, the utilization by the workers of the petroleum companies in Bahrain and al-Ahsaʾ of the right to strike for the first time in the history of the region, the civil war between the Sultan and the Imam of Oman, and the beginning of the War of Liberation against the English in Aden. Concerning the second stage, we can mention the crystallization of the opposition forces in Kuwait in the form of the nationalist deputies in the National Assembly and the constitutional crises which their activities produced, the repeated unsuccessful attempts at a military coup in Saudi Arabia, the successful military coup in Arab Yemen, the beginning of guerrilla warfare under the leadership of the Zofar Liberation Front, then the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, and finally the abortive experiment of the Bahraini National Assembly.

We cannot here enter into the details of these momentous events which occupied the countries and peoples of the region for nearly

thirty years, nor all the accompanying circumstances and results issuing from them. Suffice it to mention some of the especially important events which occurred following the defeat of June 1967, realizing that we still lack a systematic written history of the nationalist movement in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula as a phenomenon which emerged following World War I.[5] In any case, we shall take the experiment of the Higher Executive Committee in Bahrain and the Civil War in Oman as two examples of the first stage, and the experiment of the nationalist representatives in Kuwait and Aden's Liberation War as two examples of the second stage.

In Bahrain, the Higher Executive Committee came into being as a spontaneous popular organization in October, 1954, following the sectarian disturbances between the Shi'is and the Sunnis in 1953–4. Since political organizations were forbidden in Bahrain, the Committee depended for the appointment of its members upon the social and athletic clubs: the Bahrain, the 'Urubah and the Ahli. In its work it concentrated from the beginning on a basis of joint nationalist activity within a framework of the National Front, composed of Shi'is, Sunnis, merchants, workers, and members of the middle class. Throughout the years 1954–6 it methodically and successfully used in its struggle the weapons of secret political organization, strikes, and the press (*Ṣawt al-Bahrain* – 'The Voice of Bahrain'). These weapons created a truly effective threat to the system of rule in Bahrain.[6]

The drawing of the Shi'is of Bahrain into joint political activity with the Sunnis can be considered one of the most important accomplishments of the Higher Executive Committee in its struggle against sectarianism and one of the most serious threats to the system of government enjoying the direct protection of the British. The demands which guided this popular action may be summed up as follows: the founding of an elected legislative assembly, the restriction of the interference of the British in the internal affairs of Bahrain, the improvement of living conditions for the people, the right of the workers to union organization, and the granting of their professional demands.

During the negotiations, manoeuvring and bargaining with the British administration at one time and with the ruler of Bahrain the next, it is clear that it was possible for the demands of the Higher Executive Committee to have been met, with the exclusion of two which absolutely could not be granted, namely the right of popular representation and consequently the recognition of the Executive Committee as the lawful representatives of the people of Bahrain on the one hand, and on the other the right of the workers of Bahrain to

union activity. These two demands embodied implications of the utmost gravity in the long run for the ruling system in that country, especially in the electrically-charged climate of the 1950s after the nationalist movement in Bahrain began to attract the attention of Arab journalism in Beirut and Cairo, and after the movement had gained supporters in the Arab countries, particularly in Nasserist Egypt.

In the wake of the tripartite aggression against Egypt in October 1956, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, there occurred violent, disorderly disturbances directed against British interests and companies, with their properties being attacked and their buildings destroyed, burned or plundered in an outburst of rage. These deeds were not the work of the Higher Executive Committee; on the contrary, it tried to stop them and prevent them from spreading, but without success. This outburst, however, provided a good opportunity to do away with the Committee's resistance movement at the embryonic stage, which is what happened. The members of the Committee were imprisoned, given a sham trial and exiled from Bahrain, while many of their supporters were imprisoned and scattered.[7]

The Civil War in Oman between the Imamate in Nizwa and the Sultanate in Muscat broke out in entirely different circumstances from that in Bahrain. It will be recalled that we encountered this division upon its occurrence in 1793, and also that the Sib Treaty of 1920 came into being to stabilize this division, with Britain's blessing. Until the early 1950s there was a tripartite protectorate over the Omani hinterland: the Imam in Nizwa, Sulayman ibn Himyar in the Jabal Akhdar and ʿIsa al-Harithi, Governor of Sharqiyya in the south-east. Upon the death of the Imam in 1954, allegiance was sworn to the Imam Ghalib ibn ʿAli, while his brother, Talib ibn ʿAli, became commander of the Imam's forces, with his centre in Rustaq.[8]

During the summer of 1954, the British company Petroleum Development (Oman) – PDO – sent petroleum exploration units into the Omani hinterland. This provoked a protest from the representative of the Imam in Ibri, on the basis that these units constituted a violation of the autonomy of the Imamate which the Sib Treaty had guaranteed. At this point Britain decided to put an end to the *modus vivendi* which had regulated relations between the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imamate of Oman, by a military occupation of Oman. Between September and December 1955, the British forces occupied Ibri and Rustaq, and entered Nizwa, driving the Imam before them. The British believed that this was the end of the matter, but they were mistaken, for the disturbances presently broke out anew.

The Saudis adopted the cause of the deposed Imam because they still aspired to reoccupy the Buraimi oasis, which we have previously come across.[9] The relative independence from British influence (which had previously imposed restrictions on them) through their dependence on the American oil companies had opened the way for their offering effective help to the Imam. With Saudi aid, the Imam was actually able to form an army from exiled Omanis which he named 'the Omani Liberation Army'. He obtained the recognition of the Arab League at this time and opened offices in Cairo and Baghdad, with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc likewise adopting his cause.

In the year 1957 the Omani people took up arms again under the leadership of the Imam's forces. However, lack of co-ordination led to the eastern region rising in revolt prematurely in April 1957. It was thus quickly suppressed, leaving the Imam's forces in Jabal Akhdar to fight on alone after their reoccupation of Nizwa and Rustaq. In spite of their disproportionate strength, the Imam's forces were able to resist the British–Omani forces from April 1957 to January 1959, when they were decisively defeated.[10] However, their defeat was nothing more than a preface to a new stage of the struggle in the form of a guerrilla war which lasted intermittently from 1965 to 1974.

The Civil War in Oman was not in reality a true war of liberation, but was, rather, a power struggle between two ancient, decrepit institutions. The Imamate was able, nevertheless, to attract broad segments of the population and supporters in the Arab countries, because it painted its struggle as a liberation of Oman from the yoke of British colonialism, thus actually enabling it to draw the attention of Arab public opinion for several years. But the movements which this war produced were ideological ones, hostile to both of these institutions and antagonistic to tribalism/sectarianism which had provided those institutions with historical legitimacy. I refer to the Zofar Liberation Front or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. The final defeat came in 1974, resulting in the suppression of opposition and resistance movements in that country until the present day.[11]

The opposition and resistance movements which arose after 1959 were more radical, cast in an Arab nationalist mould with a balanced ideology. This will become clear from the discussion of the two examples which I have chosen to illustrate this aspect. In the first example, a bloc of representatives appeared in the Kuwaiti National Assembly (created in 1961) who were called 'the nationalist representatives' by the Tali'ah Magazine group, the Arab Nationalist Movement and

their allies. This bloc played an outstanding part in the political life of Kuwait, offering a number of demands which are to be considered a real advance on the demands of the 1938 movement for an Assembly. This advance reflects, in our view, a qualitative transition in the political struggle in the region.

The Kuwaiti constitution came as a crowning achievement to the 1938 movement, even though the direct factor which made it possible was Iraq's demand on 25 June 1961 for the incorporation of Kuwait.[12] This had been preceded by the bloc's undertaking the mobilization of the population in support of Syria and Egypt, by means of the organization of celebrations and demonstrations for this purpose in 1959, which spurred the Emir to close the clubs, ban newspapers and magazines and declare something resembling martial law in the country, which continued until the proclamation of the constitution in November 1962. This bloc thus brought about the second political crisis witnessed by the country in the 1950s.[13]

In the year 1965 the bloc of nationalist representatives was able to prevent the cabinet from taking the oath, objecting that its members were from the merchant class. This forced the government to reconstitute the cabinet to avoid a second constitutional crisis, following the first one of 1938. It also succeeded in impelling the National Assembly to reject the agreement with the oil companies for the disposal or distribution of the royalties, and in embarrassing the Government by offering their resignations on account of the passage by the Assembly (in which the Government possessed a majority) of laws infringing upon public freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The Government found itself compelled to falsify the elections of 1967 in order to pass the agreement regarding the distribution of the petroleum royalties, forcing the country into a new (third) constitutional crisis. This bloc raised the banner of the nationalization of the oil companies, demanding radical administrative reforms and the creation of an administrative court and a constitutional court, to a point unacceptable to the Government, which dissolved the fourth National Assembly on 29 August 1976, suspending some of the articles of the constitution. This was the second dissolution of the Assembly by the nation (following the 1938 Assembly) and the fourth constitutional crisis in the country.[14]

No sooner did 1986 arrive than the Government dissolved parliament for the third time, this time over the bounds of the Assembly's supervisory prerogatives, its right to call the Government to account and to interrogate its members. This was the fifth constitutional crisis experienced by the country. These constitutional crises are in reality a

reliable indicator of the increasing severity of the political struggle and its relation to vital questions regarding the present system of government. This is in spite of the fact that this bloc, and the opposition in general, have not demanded a change in the system of government – on the contrary they have called for adherence to it through adhering to the constitution and constitutional government. It appears, however, that the ruling family is unable to accept anyone's sharing in governing, even though it be in a lawful constitutional manner.

The other example concerns the radicalization of the National Front in South Yemen's War of Liberation in the 1960s. The actual beginning of the nationalist revolution in Democratic Yemen against the British occupation can be fixed in the Radfan district in October 1963, for the revolution's spark burst forth from Radfan on the border of Arab Yemen, then moved south. It is true that the struggle for independence had started in 1954, but it had remained disorganized, as well as intermittent and confined to Aden. In addition, the National Front leadership in the 1960s clearly realized the points of weakness in the previous Arab nationalist movement.

For this reason, all of the efforts of the British to contain the spreading of the resistance movement failed. Thus the elections of October 1964 did not succeed in imparting legitimacy to the leadership in a trucial relationship with the British. Similarly, the attempt to unite the Eastern and Western Protectorates in a federal government in Aden under the leadership of ʿAbd al-Qawi Makkawi in March 1965 did not succeed. The government collapsed in September of the same year owing to political paralysis. In February of 1966, the British were forced to announce their intention to grant South Yemen independence at the beginning of 1968. The British tried to delay their withdrawal as long as they could in order to preserve the unity of Yemen, by turning over authority 'to a responsible government', but to no avail.[15] The National Front had, however, launched its final attack, concentrated around the Crater Quarter of Aden, which was to be crowned with success and the proclamation of the Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen on 29 November 1967. This was a further defeat for Britain, following a chain of defeats ending with Cyprus and Kenya.

The radicalization of the National Front Movement began with its affiliation to the Arab Nationalist Movement and its participation in the 1964 conference in Beirut at the side of the Nasserists. The Front soon disagreed with ʿAbd al-Nasser, however, when it sensed that he was trying to use the Aden card in his negotiations with King Faisal.

The defeat of June 1967 contributed to the strengthening of the National Front's position and the consolidation of the leftist trend in it. This gave rise to a chain of measures, including the expulsion of the shaykhs and tribal elements which had joined the Revolution in 1963, and likewise the 'corrective movement' during the first year of the Revolution which expelled Qahtan al-Shaʿbi and a group of the Front's leaders.

Thus did the process of radicalization and the radicalist transformation hostile to tribalism and class distinctions succeed in Aden (at least as far as the claims of the National Front go, to be followed by the events of January 1986, revealing the weakness of this claim and exposing the tribal foundations of the conflicting loyalties to the President of the Republic and the members of the Politbureau), while this process failed in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. In the absence of field studies, we can initially postulate that the policies of the *rentier* state prevented the process of radicalization from maturing and bearing fruit in these states. However, the opposition and resistance movements throughout the 1950s and 1960s left their deep impress on the form of the governments which would come in the era of independence.

2

The status quo in whose grip we now live, appeared in the context of this historical background: (a) the experiment of the *rentier* state; (b) the intensification of the resistance and opposition movements; and (c) the 'grand imperial design' to fragment the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society. Thus did the entry of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries into the authoritarian state stage in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s come about directly, without passing through the transitional stage of the nationalist state under the shadow of the struggle for independence, as happened in most of the countries of the Arab East in the period between 1920 and 1958. The responsibility now falls on us to prove this assumption, but before we do so we must define with some precision what we mean by the 'authoritarian state'.

Elsewhere we shall undertake a study of the 'authoritarian state' in the Arab East in some detail, but we shall be content here with mentioning that the authoritarian state is the modern, contemporary form of the despotic state. Like all historical forms of the despotic state (feudal, sultanate, bureaucratic, etc.),[16] it seeks to achieve an effective monopoly of the sources of power and authority in society for the benefit of the ruling class or elite. The authoritarian state,

however, in contrast to all other forms of the despotic state, achieves this monopoly by penetrating civil society and transforming its institutions into corporate organizations which act as an extension of the state apparatus. This is the prime characteristic of the authoritarian state, although it differs from one country to another and from one culture to another.[17]

As for the second characteristic of the authoritarian state, in contrast to all other forms of the despotic state, it penetrates the economic system and attaches it to the state, either by nationalization (as in the other countries of the Arab East) or by extending the public sectors to complete state bureaucratic control of economic life. This does not lead to socialism (that is, public ownership of the means of production) as some think, but rather to dependent state capitalism. We shall later deal in some detail with this question, contenting ourselves here by saying that what is intended by 'dependent state capitalism' is that the state, instead of individual capitalists, takes possession of the social surplus and the surplus value.[18] It is dependent because it enters into unequal economic and political relations with other states, which exposes it to the fluctuations of the capitalist world market, even in the essentials of its existence.[19]

The third characteristic of the authoritarian state is that the legitimacy of the system of government in it depends on the use of force (or naked power) and organized terror more than upon traditional legitimacy, and therefore its political system is characterized by the following features in the environment of Third World states in general.[20]

The absence of governments which represent the interests of the inhabitants.
The absence of meaningful elections.
The absence of any social organizations independent of the state, such as parties, unions and professional organizations.
The attainment of power by means of coups or by other means than elections.
The legitimacy of the ruling regime based on military force or on violence and intimidation.
Constitutions annulled or suspended either temporarily or not put into force.
Civil rights annulled or arbitrarily frozen.
A high proportion of the expenditures monopolized by the army and the apparatus of repression and intimidation.

The use of the army for purposes of internal security, that is at times other than the emergencies specified in constitutions or appropriate codes.

States differ according to the extent to which these characteristics may be present in their political systems *in toto* or in part, something to which we shall return later on.

Let us take up these characteristics one at a time in the experience of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula. Owing to the operation of basic factors in the historical background of the status quo, independent ruling family entities under the protection of imperialist states (Britain and the United States) were created in the region. When they were granted political independence in the 1960s and the early 1970s, these modern states gained a formal legitimacy and international recognition. However, the historical incongruity was that this weakened the traditional legitimacy of the ruling families, which had been eroded by the mounting resistance and opposition movements following World War II. Thus the greatest deterrent possessed by these ruling families, especially after the influx of petroleum wealth, was the monopoly of authority and wealth, which we translate in the context of this investigation as the effective monopoly of the sources of authority and power in society. We shall see how the loss of traditional legitimacy and the weakening of hegemonic control by the ruling elite over the inhabitants must lead to the use of force, intimidation, and organized terror.[21]

Who would take control of the petroleum revenue? This was a question often raised during the period of the revolutionary, Arab nationalist tide which inundated the Gulf and Arab Peninsula region in the 1950s.[22] If what is intended by the query is the attempt by the political opposition movements to broach the question of an alternative, the matter had already been decided by the foreign oil companies and their imperialist states. The oil revenue (which was in the form of royalties) was presented to the ruling families which the imperialist protection treaties had frozen in places of authority between 1820 and 1900, as is set forth in Table 6.1. There were no states in the modern sense, no fixed boundaries on the ground to mark out the territory of this state or that, nor any basic factors for the formation of an independent state in any territory – all of which was created afterwards, as we have seen. The matter was raised in the following manner: is the oil revenue to be considered national income for the inhabitants as a whole or the private revenue of the ruler and the members of his family? This is how the question was posed.

Table 6.1 The ruling families in the countries of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula and their tribal affiliations as of the year 1985

	*The United Arab Emirates**						
	Abu Dhabi	*Umm al-Qaiwain*	*Dubai*	*Al-Shariqa (Al-Sharja)*	*ʿAjman*	*Al-Fujaira*	
Ruling family	Āl-Nahyan	Al-Muʿalla	Al-Maktum	Al-Qawasim	Al-Qawasim	Al-Sharqi	
Tribal affiliation	Bani Yas	Al-Muʿalla	Bani Yas	Al-Qawasim	Al-Qawasim	Al-Sharqiyun	
Beginning of rule	1855	1820	1894	1790	1820	1892	
	Bahrain	*Saudi Arabia*	*Oman*	*Qatar*	*Kuwait*	*Democratic Yemen*	*Arab Yemen*
Ruling family	Āl Khalifah	Al-Saʿud	Al Bū Saʿid	Āl-Thani	Āl Sabah	Political party	Military rule
Tribal affiliation	ʿAnazah	ʿAnazah		Bani Tamin	ʿAnazah	Various blocs within the political institution	Various blocs within the military institution
Beginning of rule	1783	1902 1792†	1755	1878	1754	1968	1962

Sources: Lubna Ahmad al-Qadi, *Al-Tatawwur al-sarīʿ fī baʿḍ duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabīyah al-naftīyāh* (Swift development in some of the Arab Gulf petroleum states), (Kuwait: Muʾassasat al-Kuwait li-al-Taqaddum al-ʿIlmi, 1985), p. 25 and Muhammad Sadiq and William P. Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past and Future Prospects* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 121–7.

*See Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 of this book.

†1792 was the year of the death of Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhab, the mentor of Muhammad b. Saud, who founded the Saudi dynasty in 1745. The first Saudi kingdom reached its peak in the quarter-century following 1790.

Kuwait was the first Gulf country in which this question was settled directly after independence in 1962. Petroleum income was considered national revenue which the government received, and the budget items were fixed by law, according to which the Emir received a yearly salary to the amount of 12,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars. In the other Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, the matter has not yet been decided. According to Edith Penrose's account, if the British administration (through its political residents and advisers with the ruling families) had not intervened to convince the rulers of the Gulf countries that they should share the petroleum income with their peoples, the rulers would have taken possession of the petroleum revenue *in toto*. Nevertheless, in spite of the pressure of the British administration and its direct intervention, the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates would not accept less than one-third of the petroleum revenue as their personal income.[23] In Oman and Saudi Arabia, it appears that the matter has not yet been publicly settled.

The distribution of petroleum revenue entails the creation of state machinery and institutions to distribute it among the inhabitants in the form of government expenditures, as previously noted. However, the first step always was the consolidation of the ruling families and their transformation into political institutions which owned the state. The real meaning of the consolidation of the family was the entrenchment of central decision-making at the highest bureaucratic level in the ruling elite. We can therefore easily perceive that these states were created around the ruling families as central political institutions, and that the other state institutions were functional extensions of the ruling families to the point that loyalty to the state was in the final analysis translated as personal loyalty to the ruling family. Table 6.2 gives us an idea of one of the indicators of the transformation of the ruling families into political institutions at the heart of the modern bureaucratic state organizations.

Since this was the state of affairs, the ruling families in the Gulf evinced an increasing opposition to the idea of sharing authority with any other group or social force among the populace. With the exception of Kuwait, which has a National Assembly, two-thirds of which are elected (but which is prorogued every ten years for varying periods), there are two other states which possess appointed Advisory Councils without having any legislative or supervisory prerogatives, namely Qatar (since 1964) and the United Arab Emirates (a United National Assembly since 1971).[24] Bahrain experimented with a concept similar to the Kuwaiti National Assembly (that is, a partially elected assembly, but it lasted no more than two years, from 1973 to

Table 6.2 Distribution of ministerial posts (in dominant ministries) among the members of the ruling families in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries (relationship to the head of state)

Country	*Prime Ministership*	*Ministry of Foreign Affairs*	*Ministry of the Interior*	*Ministry of Defence*
United Arab Emirates	Head of state himself	From members of the family	From members of the family	Son of the head of state
Bahrain	Brother of the head of state	Paternal cousin of the head of state	Paternal cousin of the head of state	Son of the head of state
Saudi Arabia	Head of state himself	Paternal nephew of the head of state	Brother of the head of state	Brother of the head of state
Oman	Head of state himself	Head of state himself	Head of state himself	Head of state himself
Qatar	Head of state himself	Paternal cousin of the head of state	Paternal cousin of the head of state	Son of the head of state
Kuwait	Paternal cousin of the head of state	Brother of the head of state	Brother of the head of state	Paternal cousin of the head of state

Source: Ghassan Salamé, 'Institutionalisation du pouvoir et affinités tribales dans les pays arabes du Golfe', *Al-Abhath* 30 (1982): 98.

1975 and was buried in its infancy, without any repetition of the experiment since that time.[25] As for Saudi Arabia, the idea of creating a Consultative Assembly was broached in the wake of the unsuccessful revolt movement led by Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi in 1979. A decree to create it was actually issued without it being formed until now, and even if formed, it would be appointed, not elected, and also without legislative or supervisory jurisdiction.[26]

Thus, in all the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, no other organization competes with the government and no contestant contends with it for power. Even in the rest of the countries, as in Arab Yemen, which is ruled by the army, or in Democratic Yemen, in which civilians seized control after independence (in an ideological party system), there is no contender for the reins of government, which in the former is an extension of the military–tribal system, and of the central party organization in the latter.[27]

The efforts of the ruling families extended, through the monopolization of government and wealth, to the prevention of the rise of social and political forces independent of the state, expressing the interests and ambitions of various groups of the population. Thus they prevented the rise of political parties, proscribed the establishment of social and political movements which are not loyal to them, suppressed trade unions and similar organizations and imposed direct supervision over professional organizations, recognizing them only as public service associations. These efforts extended to the penetration of all the institutions of civil society: an iron grip was imposed upon school curricula, a suffocating censorship was imposed upon the information media and mass communications, especially upon newspapers, along with the penetration of the religious institution and its subjugation to the direct control of the Minister of Awqaf (or religious endowments).

3

Then how do these ruling families govern? They govern by means of unofficial corporations and by manipulating with the social forces under a new division of labour. What is meant by 'corporations' is the corporate social forces which are allowed to express themselves within the ruling establishment, through appointed or assigned head of tribes and families recognized by the state, as such.[28] There are six unofficial corporations of this sort (aside from the ruling family), namely:

1 The tribal establishment: the tribal shaykhs with whom the government deals at the local level.
2 The merchants: the big merchants and the heads of mercantile families, along with their ordinarily being represented by the chambers of commerce and industry.
3 The sectarian establishment: the heads of the religious sects, such as the Shiʿah, the Ibadites, the Sunnis and the Zaidis.
4 The religious establishment: the leaders of the religious movements, the *mutawiʿah* [lit. 'obedient ones', a puritanical vigilante organization used in the enforcement of religious observances], and others.
5 The middle classes: in view of the prevention of professional organizations from having union offices, the government deals with these classes on a family basis.
6 The workers in those countries where there are workers from among the citizens, and those who have union organizations.

(We should note the substitution of the military establishment for a ruling family in Arab Yemen and a party establishment for a ruling family in Democratic Yemen.)

These corporations are semi-official, and thus there is no chamber or council for the corporations in the traditional fashion. They are represented, however, in the institutions of the state, either in the government, or in the municipal councils, or else at the governorate or provincial level in the various local councils, or in the army and police.[29] If we take Kuwait as an example, the fifth National Assembly, 1981–4 – the last Assembly which finished its legal term – gives a clear picture of a nearly complete collection of these corporations. The six corporations controlled the following numbers of representatives:

(a) The tribal establishment: 27 representatives (al-ʿAwazim, al-Mutran, al-ʿAjman, al-Rashayidah, al-ʿUnuz, al-ʿUtban, al-Zafir, al-Fudul, in that order – see Figure 4.1.
(b) The merchants: 14 representatives (both conservative and reform currents).
(c) The sectarian establishment: 5 representatives (of the Shiʿah, both the moderate and the puritanical).
(d) The religious establishment: 4 representatives (half Muslim Brotherhood and half Salafis).
(e) The middle classes: no members won outside the other establishments, that is beside members of the middle class in their capacity as tribal or religious partisans.

There were six middle-class candidates who received percentages ranging from 18 to 27 per cent of the votes in their divisions.

(f) Workers: none.[30]

In the other Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries there are additional clear examples of the way the tribal corporations work and the role they play in the political stability of these countries. The general shared characteristic of the tribal corporations is that they represent the chief human reservoir for recruitment into the army, the police, and the armed militias termed the 'National Guard'. However, the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries differ in the degree to which the tribal corporations have been institutionalized in the ruling system. On one side stands Kuwait, in which the tribal corporations are unofficial, working through the other political structures (the National Assembly, the Municipal Council, Jam'iyat al Işlah or Reform Association, the opposition forces, etc.), while Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain represent (in a form parallel to the sectarian organization) a situation in which the tribal corporations are semi-official at the local level – they are semi-official for the lack of any positive legislation, except in Bahrain. On the opposite side stand the United Arab Emirates and Arab (Northern) Yemen, in which the tribal organization is considered to be one of the state institutions whose legal and political position has been defined by recent legislation.[31]

Since Arab Yemen provides a probable future alternative for most of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, it is fitting that we should briefly turn our attention to the legislative measures relative to this situation. Elena Julupofaskaya mentions that Saudi Arabia's espousal of the forces of the Imam hostile to the revolution prompted the revolutionary officers to create a Supreme Council for National Defence in October 1962, that is one month after the coup. This Council was composed of 180 shaykhs who were entrusted with guarding the frontiers with Saudi Arabia. The Council took on an official status from the beginning, that is the fact that it was a government institution, so that each shaykh who was a member was deemed to have ministerial rank and received a salary equivalent to that of a minister.[32]

The consolidation of this situation became the next objective, so on 31 November 1963 an edict of the Republic was issued creating a Supreme Council for Tribal Affairs, headed by the President of the Republic, embracing in its membership the leading shaykhs, in addition to certain ministers. The promulgation of the edict for the creation of the Supreme Council was preceded by the publication of another edict for the formation of councils of the tribal shaykhs in each tribe and governorate. These councils were entrusted with

constitutional powers, in exercising which they are subject only to the authority of the Supreme Council for Tribal Affairs. Periodic elections are held among the tribal shaykhs on a proportional basis (in relation to the size and standing of the tribe) in which the local shaykhs elect the members of the governorate's Council of Shaykhs. These in turn choose the members of the Supreme Council.[33]

The corporate tribal forces have therefore been transformed into one of the institutions of the modern state and adapted to recent political and economic conditions. Thus the tribal establishment presents itself (and the sectarian establishment in a parallel manner) as an alternative to elected democratic constitutional institutions, as a primitive underdeveloped form of the myth of tribal democracy. The truth of the matter is that there is no democracy in the tribal organization but rather an asymmetrical relationship between the family of the shaykh and the rich members of the tribe on the one hand, and the members of the tribe in general on the other, like an embryonic model of exploitative class relations in the process of crystallization.[34] The tribal organization, in the resemblance of its relationships to those of the ruling families with the population, provides these families with ideological, hegemonic and repressive instruments for the imposition of their ruling system and its stability.

The dependence of the authoritarian state upon the corporations in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula environment, and in the absence of parties representing the populace and of social systems facilitating national fusion, necessarily leads to the institutionalization of tribalism and sectarianism, just as the attainment of political independence led to the institutionalization of regionalism as opposed to pan-Arab integration. From the course of the authoritarian state, it appears that the attempt to achieve an effective monopoly of the sources of power and control in society necessitated new divisions of labour among the political and social forces represented in the corporations, so that the ruling families might be able to manipulate them to preserve the status quo as well as the various backward social arrangements in the tribal, sectarian and religious establishments. This is the element which makes the monopoly of the sources of power and authority in society effective.

Some of the most important of these methods of manipulation are: (a) the choice and appointment of the various leaders to the strategic ruling elite and the specification of their qualifications. Although the higher ranks in the strategic elite tend to relative permanence and stability, just as in the case of ministers and deputy ministers, there is nevertheless a continual rotation of the elites in the middle posi-

tions.[35] (b) The next method of manipulation consists of the supreme ability of the ruling families to seduce opposition leaders and co-opt them into the status quo arrangements, either by bestowing on them influential political offices or by opening to them wide scope for enrichment at government expense.[36] (c) The third method takes the form of temporary alliances contracted by the ruling families, or alliances which give the impression of having been contracted with certain social forces as opposed to others.

Among the examples which may be given of these unofficial temporary alliances are: the playing of the sectarian card in Kuwait and Bahrain, such as giving preference to the Shiʿah in certain periods and granting them privileges and opportunities out of proportion to their numbers in the population; or an alliance with the tribal organization against the merchants and middle classes in the town at other times; or an alliance with the religious organization against the secular–nationalist current. These last two alliances appeared contemporaneously with the June 1967 defeat, crystallizing after the consumer revolution which accompanied the rise in petroleum revenue after 1973. They still exist up to the present in most of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries.[37]

The final regrettable result of the achievement of an effective monopoly of the sources of power and authority in society, that is the monopolization of governance and wealth by the ruling families in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, has been social and cultural stagnation and the compulsory freezing of the social forces in a contrived division of labour aimed at preserving retrogressive tribal–sectarian social relations and arrangements. The building of the systems of government in these states upon the legitimacy of domination and intimidation instead of constitutional legitimacy attained with the consent of the inhabitants, guaranteeing the monitorial authority of the people, must likewise lead to increasing friction and political violence. In addition, the rise of independent countries in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula may [not]* necessarily (under constitutional guarantees) lead to the adoption of the regional trend aimed at the fabrication of an independent 'personality' for each country and its ruling family, as an alternative to the Arab nationalist trend which calls for the merger of these personalities in a unified endeavour; neither will security–bureaucratic co-ordination through the Gulf Co-operation Council (to which reference will later be made) enable the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries to dispense with the Arab Mashrig's strategic and human depth which is acknowledged as their natural and logical extension.

4

Government expenditure generated from increased petroleum revenue does not mean only the expansion of the role of government and its centrality in the political life of people, but a great deal more. It means the state's complete penetration of the economy and consequently its bureaucratization,* and similarly the state's domination of the basic source of material power derived from the ownership of the country's economic resources. The expansion of the public sector's ownership is therefore not so innocent to begin with, since it greatly extends the domain controlled by the state, just as it does not lead to any form of socialism, in spite of the public ownership of economic resources, but rather to dependent state capitalism, as we have stated. How is this problem to be explained?

An analysis of the first situation, that is the development of the public sector in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, may guide us to a perception of the special characteristics of the second situation, namely dependent state capitalism in these countries. It should be clear from the beginning, however, 'that the concept of the public sector is narrower than the concept of state capitalism, since the latter refers to the mode of socio-economic production which includes the whole of society, while the public sector refers to public ownership of the economic projects and enterprises'.[38] However, by reasoning, from an analysis of the public sector to dependent state capitalism, we mean to say that the acceptance of a certain type of public sector in any country to a large extent determines the characteristics of state capitalism in that country.

The first thing that strikes one's mind when we speak about the development of the public sector and the expansion of the centralized state's bureaucracy is the number of employees in the government and the public sector and their percentage of the total workforce. This criterion, even though accurate, is nevertheless a secondary partial criterion which merely gives us a limited estimate of the actual proportions of the public sector and the state's public ownership, as elucidated by James O'Connor in his study of the role of the state under the conditions of monopolistic capitalism in the west.[39] According to this procedure, we must regard the public sector as constituting, in addition to those employed by the government, all who depend primarily upon the state for their livelihood.

* *baqraṭah* – though not a dictionary word, we have concluded that this is a neologism derived from *bīrūqrāṭīyah*, 'bureaucracy'. (The author uses and defines the increased form *maṣdar, tabaqraṭa*, on the next page of the Arabic text.)

In a more detailed form, the size of the public sector is determined if we know the size of the following groups: (1) the employees of the government and the public sector institutions; (2) the recipients of government aid as a source of their livelihood; (3) the beneficiaries of the social security programmes, such as retired people; (4) students who are of working age, but do not work; (5) those who depend for a living upon government contracts and as purveyors to the government, that is to its enterprises and departments; (6) those who in their work benefit from the use of government facilities; (7) the beneficiaries of the government housing programme and government loans; (8) the beneficiaries of government price support for the basic commodities (rations); (9) the beneficiaries of public services, if the government provides them at less than their cost. We can add a tenth group of the populace to the foregoing, namely those who are affected in one way or another by government control of companies in the domestic sector, both private and joint.

If we can arrive at an estimate of the size of these groups of inhabitants, we can discover the real size of the public sector and the state's public ownership, and hence the degree of bureaucratization of the economy (that is central bureaucratic control by the government over the lives and income of the inhabitants). Can we, however, form a quantitative concept (leaving aside, now, the idea of valuation) of the real size of the public sector? The answer must be in the negative, since most of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries not only do not possess exact statistics, but moreover do not possess any reliable census data. With the exception of Bahrain and Kuwait, these countries did not take a general census before 1975, in addition to which the 1975 census is not reliable. Saudi Arabia conducted a sample survey in 1963–4, but did not officially publish the results, and the Sultanate of Oman has not to date undertaken a general census, while the statistics published concerning it are based on estimates.

Thus, most of the information available to us concerns the first group, those employed in government service and the public sector, which is included in Table 6.3.

These statistics give the impression that more than a third of the workforce (much more than that in Democratic Yemen) depend directly upon the government and public sector for their livelihood. This of itself simply means that in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries the government is the biggest employer, while the official ideological view advocates a free-enterprise economy.

However, the proportion of workers in government service and public sector is much higher than that, if we take the percentage of

Table 6.3 Numbers of employees in the public sector and their percentage of the total workforce in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries in 1981

Country	*Numbers employed in the public sector*	*Percentage of the total workforce*
United Arab Emirates	197,935	36
Bahrain	37,758	—
Saudi Arabia	252,898	16 (1980)*
Oman	38,840	12 (1975)†
Qatar	37,587	51.5‡
Kuwait	167,616	34.6
Democratic Yemen	—	—
Arab Yemen	—	—

Source: See the sources for Table 5.5 in Chapter 5 of this book.
Note: The sign '—' indicates insufficient data.
*A. Riza Islami and R. M. Kavoussi, *The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia* (Washington, DC: Washington University Press, 1984), p. 41.
†Fathi Muhammad Abu ʿAyanah, 'Sukkān Sulṭanat ʿOmān: dirāsah dimūghrāfiyah' (The Inhabitants of the Sultanate of Oman: a Demographic Study), *Majallat Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-ʿArabiyah* (Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies) 10, no. 40 (1984): 224.
‡Al-Qadi, *Al-Taṭawwur al-sarīʿ fī baʿḍ duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-nafṭīyah* (Rapid Development in some Oil Countries of the Arabian Gulf).

these from the citizens, since in fact more than two-thirds of the citizens work in government service. If we adopt Kuwait as a standard (and we are once more forced to take Kuwait, owing to the greater availability of public statistics there than in any other Gulf country), we find that 60 per cent of Kuwaitis of working age were employed in the government sector in 1981, in addition to 25.5 per cent of non-Kuwaitis who were economically active in 1981. The numbers which these percentages represent are as follows:[40]

Total of those employed in the government sector, as in Table 6.3, is 167,616

Composed of:	Original Kuwaitis	63,283
	Arabs	80,412
	Asians and others	17,755
	Stateless	6,166

If we continue with the Kuwaiti paradigm in our attempt to reach a

quantitative concept of the real size of the public and government sector, we must add to these the number of persons in the army, the police, and the National Guard. Since these numbers are not made public, we can postulate on the basis of external (and foreign) estimates that their numbers approach 23,000. Since we have also learned from the statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs that in that year there were 8,675 families (i.e., heads of families) receiving government assistance as a major source of income; and have learned from the Social Security Agency that the number of retired persons and those eligible, whether civilians or military men, as of 30 June 1981 was 88,395;[41] and if we add to all of these the students who are of working age but are not working, because of their receiving either government assistance or free education at government expense, their numbers thus depending basically upon the government's spending policy, whose number in 1981 was 95,448 we can arrive at an estimate of the numbers of those who depend directly upon the public and government sector. These estimates are given in Table 6.4.

This means that about half (47 per cent) of the total human productive capacity, that is all of the populace of working age (15 years of age and above) in Kuwait, are either employed in government service or benefit directly from the government sector. This includes the first four groups forming the public sector – but what about the other groups? The numbers in the fifth group (who depend for their livelihood on government contracts) and the sixth (those

Table 6.4 Actual numbers of the population groups composing the government and public sector, and those deriving direct benefit from it in Kuwait in 1981

Constituent groups deriving benefit	*Estimate of their numbers*
Government employees (civilian and military)	190,000
Those receiving government assistance	8,675
Pensioners (civilian and military)	88,395
Students of working age	95,448
Total	382,518

Source: Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'A Study of the Government Bureaucracy in Kuwait', *Al-Qabas* daily, 2 December 1985 (in Arabic).

who profit in their work from using government facilities, such as the artisans, craftsmen and skilled workmen who use machines, tools and instruments provided by the government apparatus itself) are difficult to compute independently; but if we take the extent of the government contracts as a whole, we will not err in assuming that their ratio exceeds 50 per cent of the total number of workers in the private and public domestic sectors composed of the two groups – 'self-employed and skilled workers'.

As for the seventh group, namely all those benefiting from the government housing programmes and government loans, the number of those profiting from the government housing programmes for those with low income reached 25,070 by the end of 1981, to which should be added the 22,088 persons who had submitted applications upon which no decision had been taken until the end of 1979. (We must include with these the number of those benefiting from real-estate loans offered by the Bank al-Taslif wa-al-Iddikhar [the Credit and Savings Bank], numbers of which are not available at present.) If we total up these people, we will arrive at the numbers benefiting from the government housing programmes.

Concerning those deriving benefit from other public services which the state sells at less than cost price, it is impossible to enumerate them, since they embrace all of the inhabitants. These public services include the government subsidy for rationed food stuffs, together with health, education, information, security, municipal, public works (such as roads, bridges, building and construction), electricity, water, petrol, postal and telegraph services, etc. Public services (if they are sold at less than cost price) must be regarded from two angles: as a basic ingredient of modern living for the inhabitants in general, and at the same time as an economy for the private sector and for the domestic manufacturing establishments. Any changes in the extent of the provision of these services and their type, and in government spending policies which finance them, will directly affect the lives, income and aspirations of the people.[42]

The tenth group, comprising those affected by government control over the private and joint domestic sector companies, constitutes a precise indicator of the degree of government and public sector penetration into the private, domestic sector of the economy. This penetration is a general phenomenon in all of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries. The reader has only to ask about the extent of state ownership in the largest of the joint-stock companies in each country (whether they offer their shares for circulation in the securities market or not) to find that the result will be uniform and startling.[43]

If we return to our Kuwaiti paradigm, we discover that the government was a shareholder in all of the joint-stock companies registered in the securities market up to 25 December 1982, that is before knowing the results of the government's purchase of the shares of companies hurt by the securities market collapse known as the 'crisis of climate' [i.e., of confidence] of June 1982. However, the government owns a controlling interest (i.e., 30 per cent of the shares or more) in 55 per cent of all the joint-stock companies (if we exclude the privately-owned companies), as is shown in Table 6.5. There is additional information, not given in this table, which reveals that the government owns more than fifteen of these companies to the figure of 50 per cent or more of the shares, that is 40 per cent of the total number of joint-stock companies, leaving out the four privately owned companies. There is talk about the intention of the government to buy 10 per cent of all the companies to guarantee the presence of a government representative on all the boards of the domestic sector companies. If conditions are thus, we should ask: What is the need for the existence of the private sector, and what is the margin of activity available to it?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that the private sector plays an important role in rounding out the control of the ruling elite over the economy. Thus the ruling elite gets possession of the state resources which it does not own through the private sector, by nominally legal means – namely by entering government contracts and bidding competitions through the avenue of the companies which it establishes directly or indirectly by means of 'fronts', that is through other persons, or by entering companies as 'silent partners'. Thus, what the ruling elite gives with one hand through the state budget as salaries and wages, and as capital to be invested in development or government compensation programmes, is regained with the other hand through the ownership of real or front companies, or as silent partners grabbing the commissions on government contracts, auctions and supplies.

The broad road to enrichment in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries must, therefore, pass through the ruling elite and the public sector, at the expense of the state and its public budget. All groups of the populace associated with the corporations are aware of this fact and have built their dealings with the state on this basis. As for the degree of domination which this control gives the ruling elite over society, if the mechanisms for the achievement of effective monopoly of the sources of power and control in society are added on, it is certainly most formidable, of a kind unparalleled throughout history.[44]

Table 6.5 Government ownership in the private sector: the percentage of shares owned by the government in joint-stock and private companies registered in the Kuwait Stock Exchange up to 25 December 1982

Type of company	*No. of companies*	*No. of companies of which the government owns 30% or more of the shares*	*Percentage of its category*
Financial companies	15	7	47
Manufacturing companies	14	9	64
Transportation and service companies	6	3	50
Real estate companies	3	2	66
Privately owned companies	4	—	—
	42	21	55*

Source: *Al-Anbā' Daily Newspaper*, (Kuwait), 25 December 1982.
*The percentage on the basis of 38, after the exclusion of the privately owned companies.

It is true that the programmes of public services in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries (except for the two parts of Yemen) are much better than comparable programmes in the rest of the Arab countries. The citizens of these countries eat better, are better housed, wear better clothes, are better educated, consume the most modern and expensive kinds of goods and are more open and freer in their approach to the outside world than the rest of the Arabs. They share with them, however (and possibly to a somewhat greater degree), in carrying the burden of the authoritarian state octopus and feeding the limitless, greedy appetite of the ruling elite.

Nevertheless, the efficiency of public service programmes and the ability of modern government structures to organize the infrastructure, if linked to the absolute power generated by the ruling elite's effective monopoly of the sources of power and control over society, give the state a tremendous capacity to dominate the life, income and activities of the inhabitants. It is not strange, therefore, that the poli-

tical system of the authoritarian state in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries should be marked by the nine previously mentioned characteristics, which need not be reiterated here. They are the characteristics which unite all the Arabs, particularly with regard to the lack of governments representing the interests of the inhabitants, the absence of published constitutions, the arbitrary suspension of civil rights, the basing of the state's legitimacy upon domination and intimidation, the absence of any kind of free, meaningful elections, and the lack of social organizations expressing the interests of the people.

The essence of the matter under this rubric is that the authoritarian state is not merely a system of government, but is rather the political expression of a socio-political system or a mode of production for which I have adopted the term 'dependent state capitalism', for want of a better one. In its ideal form, the state extends the tentacles of its domination to the economic system, monopolizing the ownership of the means of production; to the political system, monopolizing the means of organization; and to the social system, offering itself as an alternative to its institutions, substituting for competing ideologies the ideology of domination and terror, for its original values the values of hedonistic consumption, and for its culture the culture of fear and intimidation. The authoritarian state does all this while production relations remain capitalistic or built upon the principle of class exploitation and the realization of profit, however it may be camouflaged.

This should not be taken to mean that we advocate the abolition of the state, or that we oppose state intervention in the economy or support other causes which call, among other things, for the weakening of the state in order to supply a favourable climate for class exploitation as practised by the merchant and ruling elite. We believe that the state should play a decisive role in the struggle against the imperialist plundering of the resources of the Arab countries and of their real independence.[45] However, the authority of the people over the state must first be recovered, along with the imposition of their supervision of it through freely elected bodies and institutions and political systems which express their true interests and aspirations. Clear boundaries must likewise be drawn for the authority of the state and the demarcation of the citizen's private space and freedom, and for the prevention of bureaucratic infringement on his integrity. There is thus no escape for the Arabs in general, and especially for those of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, from continuing the struggle for constitutionalism and democracy, and for Arab solidarity in support of a unification scheme ensuring the achievement of genuine vigorous growth.

If this is achieved, would you say that it might eliminate the authoritarian character of the state under which we live? That does not necessarily follow, for there are degrees of authoritarianism, and struggle against authoritarianism is a never-ending process whose origin you will find in the contradictory nature of the functions of the modern state. However, this is a topic with which we shall have another round in another place.

7 Conclusion

The looming crisis in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society

In this study we have tried to look at Gulf and Arab Peninsula society from a perspective different to what is customary, that is which varies from the perspective of a random succession of events, accompanied by the appearance of shaykhs and sultans in a monotonous manner, as seen in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 of this book. This traditional perspective does not lead to a precise understanding of the social structure, but rather to a blind alley represented by the strange conclusion which Serjeant reached that Arab Peninsula society is 'habitually in a state of anarchy'. The traditional viewpoint, in fact, logically leads to this conclusion, owing to its lack of conceptual tools to analyse the succession of events and to interpret the alarming tribal, sectarian and social fragmentation of society in the Peninsula.

Thus, the different perspective which we have applied in this study is based on the precise use of a group of conceptual tools to generate a theoretical model of society which permits the deduction of a number of postulates concerning the active social-cultural dynamics in this society which can be substantiated, and for the comparative truth of which historical evidence can be presented. To this theoretical model of society we have temporarily applied the term 'the natural state thesis', in the anticipation of a better designation. The central concept among the totality of the analytical concepts used in this study is 'the Arab-Islamic mercantile mode of production' (or in brief 'the Arab mercantile mode of production') which, for the sake of this study, we postulate was dominant in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula until the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

In this study, the concept of 'the Arab mercantile mode' is comparable to the term 'the natural state', the introduction of which into the analysis abates the intensity of the anarchy of which Serjeant complains, making Arab society in the Gulf and the Peninsula more easily intelligible. We have mentioned elsewhere that the three

following institutions represent the foundations upon which Arab society in general depended, namely: the precedence of commerce in the economic system (or the mercantile mode), combined with political tribalism as a general ethos and organizing principle (not merely as a kinship or lineage relationship), which operated through the religious-sectarian institution with its deep, historical roots. Part of the success and efflorescence which the Arab mercantile mode attained in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society, in the way that we have set forth, must be attributable to the weak influence of the central tax-levying state – the Mameluke and the Ottoman, which we have termed the 'sultanate' state – on the course of events, not only in the Arab Peninsula, but rather in the whole of the western Indian Ocean. We would like to have tested the validity of the concept of the Arab mercantile mode in the shadow of the sultanate state, but the scope of this study does not permit it, so we have postponed it for the time being.

We have deduced the constituent elements of the sociological model of the Arab mercantile mode of production as consisting of: (a) *muḍārabah* trade; (b) the tribal institution as the channel for the redistribution of the income derived from trade; (c) the mechanics of monetary commercial relations under the auspices of the exchange market which determined prices; and finally, (d) the seasonal arrangements which controlled economic activities and their dates of occurrence. There also is another element which cannot be gone into for lack of space, namely the cultural, normative ideological factor which regulated the mercantile mode society. Similarly there is no room to study the ethnic-demographic structure of this society. These are matters we have left to another time and place, since they demand a detailed examination for which the present study has no room.

The immediate aim of presenting the concept of the Arab mercantile mode is the clarification of the bases and sources of the structural crises which Arab society in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula was undergoing, under the pressure of western imperialism and growing colonialist activities in the region. The fall of Hormuz in 1622 gave concrete form to this structural crisis. Since this event, Arab-Islamic mercantilism has suffered one set-back after another. In explaining the reasons for the Arab-Islamic mercantile roll-back we have relied upon the works of three Dutch economic historians, namely Van Leur, M.A.P. Meilink-Roelsfsz (in his *Asian Track and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1630,* published in 1962), and Niels Steensgaard, most of whose studies concentrate on the eastern Indian Ocean. In spite of the development which Steensgaard brought into the fruitful debate which went on between them,

particularly his expansion of it to include the western Indian Ocean, the field is still wide open, needing more investigation, precision and documentation before the veils of ambiguity are dispersed from this difficult period of our history.

Thus, upon our arrival at the mid-nineteenth century, we find the region itself completely absorbed within the economic world system of western capitalism. This means that the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula region became absolutely peripheral, specializing in the production of a kind of secondary goods produced for the world market, not for local markets by virtue of their being a commercial area as it had been previously. This description applies to the trade in pearls, coffee, frankincense, leather, horses, pilgrimage trading, smuggling, etc. We can better understand this kind of commodity specialization through the unequal relationships in the world division of labour under the capitalist market: the 'dependency relationships' in the view of Samir Amin, 'the centre–periphery' in the words of Wallerstein, and 'the clash of the more inclusive tax-levying, capitalist and kinship worlds' according to Eric Wolf.[1]

The transformation of the Arab Peninsula into a peripheral trading area in the mid-nineteenth century was contemporaneous with the birth of Britain's grand imperial design in the Arab East and the Peninsula, whose historical origin we have shown to be traceable to the confrontation with the Egyptian resurgence in the time of Muhammad ʿAli in order to prevent its recurrence. This design aimed at firmly tying the Gulf, the Peninsula and the Arab East to Britain by guaranteeing the fragmentation of the countries of the region and the prevention of their unification, even after independence, in a much broader form than the Sykes–Picot Agreement, which has captured the attention of the historians and politicians, and still does. We have stated that imperialist thought and policies passed through various phases and were subject to evolving conceptions which we seldom find explained in political history texts, since to embark on such matters requires going into the history of the imperialist countries themselves in depth, instead of being content with regurgitating our own history.

The fragmentation of the Gulf and the Peninsula – like the countries of the Arab East – has continued from that time up to the present, that is after independence and their taking over, in theory, the direction of their own affairs. Nationalist thought might be faulted for considering Arab unity one of the incontrovertible, self-evident truths, but the fragmentation of the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula was not subject to any historical or material justification for the existence

of independent sovereign entities – as can be said of the western Arab countries, since the splitting up of the Gulf countries was totally subject to global imperialist policy demands and considerations. This situation was reflected most significantly in the most deplorable arbitrariness which characterized the drawing of boundaries in the previously mentioned ʿUqair Conference of 1922.

Between 1622 (the fall of Hormuz) and 1922 (the ʿUqair Conference) there were three centuries separated by two structural crises: the first leading to the economic decline which prepared the way for the imperialist–colonialist hegemony over the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, and the second facilitating the entry of the countries of the region into the age of dependent authoritarian states. Like the first crisis, the second was not merely a political crisis or a crisis of governing systems, but an economic crisis – with fragmentation coming in as one of its causes – a social crisis in which political and social forces became dangerously disunited and fragmented, and a cultural crisis related to the attempt of the Arabs in general to determine their status with respect to their history, heritage and culture and to world culture as borrowers and contributors. This modern structural crisis would reach its most tragic climax in the fall of Beirut in 1982.

In the period between the discovery of petroleum and the mid-1960s, the *rentier* state was a transitional period leading to the era of the authoritarian state, though not a necessary transitional stage, since there are various paths leading to the authoritarian state. Egypt, Syria and Iraq each have, since the end of the 1950s, entered upon the era of the authoritarian state by the avenue of coups, nationalization and the bureaucratization of the economy, not by way of the *rentier* state. Jordan, in the same period, entered the authoritarian state epoch out of considerations connected with reasons of state and the preservation of the system of government from collapse, and so did Democratic Yemen – and what a difference between its system of government and that of Jordan! Thus the *rentier* state was a transitional stage in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula environment, but it is not a necessary stage for entering the authoritarian state era in other environments.

We no sooner reach the end of the 1960s, than we find most of the Arab countries had joined the ranks of the authoritarian state. Here the differentiation between the *rentier* state and the authoritarian state becomes very necessary although they may exist simultaneously. The *rentier* state represents a limited portion of the economic order, related to the fact that the source of national income comes in the

form of external royalties (or rent), and to the part that royalties play in government expenditures and the ensuing results. The importance of this concept ceases at this point, while the authoritarian state represents a distinct political system in the succession of autocratic political systems throughout history. The authoritarian state constitutes a complete economic system, which we call 'dependent state capitalism'. It possesses a specific cultural mode in the phenomenon of the 'mass society', in which the middle classes and their pecuniary modes of consumption are mutually incompatible within the hegemony of the old ruling families.[2]

The concept of the authoritarian state, with its corporate institutions and its penetration of the economic system and civil society, is therefore a more comprehensive and preferable tool to the *rentier* state' in understanding Gulf and Arab Peninsula society. Why do the policies of this dependent authoritarian state lead to a structural crisis represented in an economic, social and cultural stagnation attendant upon its policies?

2

The answer to this question is latent in the fact that the tactics and policies of the authoritarian state generally lead to a dead end, owing to the central bureaucratic control of the economy and society being conducted in a manner which prevents or limits the possibilities of true growth, for fear that such growth would upset the various social arrangements and relations which guarantee, for the ruling elite, the continuation of their monopoly of the sources of power and wealth in society. We have stated that the affluence and prosperity which petroleum income generates are in fact only apparent affluence and prosperity, for the following reasons.

The fragmentation of the Arab homeland led to the creation of independent entities, but these entities, especially in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, represent very limited markets in view of the narrowness of the productive base, the volume of consumption, and the scope for investment.[3] Since these markets previously depended on re-export and transit, the appearance of independent entities, the sanctification of artificial boundaries, the state's massive interference in the economy and consequently the variations in economic legislation, have resulted in the placing of heavy shackles upon investment across the boundaries between the Arab countries of the Peninsula and the Arab East. All of us know that such conditions have encouraged the export of Arab capital to Western Europe and North

America, especially after the price revolution of 1973, resulting in the birth of 'petro-dollars'.[4]

Needless to say, the export of capital, or of a large portion of the petroleum income, has deprived the countries of the Arab Peninsula and the Arab East of extensive opportunities for profitable investment in their human, natural and technological resources, and has deepened the technological dependency of these countries on the west. Profitable investment at the Arab national level does not necessarily take the form of inter-state loans, and therefore the demand of the petroleum countries of the Gulf that their loans and investments within the Arab countries should be treated like those of the International Bank itself contradict and nullify any political commitment to Arab nationalist motives, granted that some of these investments are liable to be plundered and misappropriated by the political and military leaders in these countries.

Furthermore, the affluence and prosperity which the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries have witnessed have been superficial, because they have depended upon government expenditure without this expenditure being accompanied by the broadening of the productive base of the economy. Economic prosperity has been dependent upon the two dynamic sectors of construction and building and of importing and exporting. Thus, as soon as the building and construction sector had become stabilized after the boom of the 1970s, particularly after the completion of the public projects (housing, roads, harbours and other projects in the area of infrastructure), and as soon as the import-export sector had reached stable levels reflecting the true size of local markets, especially after the closing off of the Iraq–Iran markets by the Iraq–Iran War, and the shrinkage of the other markets, the actual economic growth rates began to fall and the inability of the economy to generate new employment opportunities became apparent. There is therefore no room for the local economy of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries to further expand.[5]

This judgement will remain sound if conditions stay as they are – but they are likely to become more critical even after the Gulf countries have passed the present oil-pricing crisis. Thus the crisis in the economy and economic policies in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries is a profound structural crisis embedded within the structure of the economic system. It is not a crisis based on the collapse of OPEC petroleum pricing when the price went down from thirty dollars per barrel in the first quarter of 1981, to less than ten dollars in the first quarter of 1986 – rather it is much deeper than that.[6] It is possible, of course, to go on distorting this fact by keeping govern-

ment spending levels high by means of a greater deficit in the public budget and withdrawing from the public reserves (and in some countries by not declaring a public budget at all, as Saudi Arabia did not in 1986), but that will not make the crisis vanish. The structural crisis of which we are speaking is not merely economic; rather it is also social and cultural in ways no less important than the economy.

The effective monopoly of the sources of power and wealth which the ruling elites practise, creates 'mobility closures' in society which will lead, with the passage of time, to increasing friction between the social classes and ranks. If we take the structure of the governments and upper echelons of government bureaucracies, we find that though the names change from time to time, nevertheless recruitment for these offices occurs from well defined groups which do not go beyond the bounds of the ruling family, the big merchants and certain members of the middle class belonging to families known for their close connections, either with the ruling family or the big merchants, similar to the customer–big-merchant relationship. There is another 'closure' similar to this one in the private and joint sector, in which the members of the ruling family and the merchant elite monopolize membership on the boards of governors of the joint-stock companies or the large companies owned by one family or a limited group of merchant families.

The spread of education on a wide scale in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, the rise in the standard of living, and the increase in income levels are factors which naturally lead to a rise in the level of expectations among the members of the middle and lower classes. Thus the desire to improve one's employment situation or to guarantee a higher level of income, and especially the right to seek a higher social standing on a new social ladder, comes to be regarded as an acquired right.[7] The members of these classes, however, face a reality which does not recognize this right, since they confront obstacles to mobility which prevent the realization of their expectations, while seeing with their own eyes the monopolization of authority and wealth by the ruling elite in a provocative manner. This naturally generates situations in which pressure on the political system increases, presaging the flare-up of a vast social struggle between the ruling elite and the populace in general.

How are the ruling elites dealing with this state of simmering anger generated by the social stagnation related to the authoritarian states' policies? They deal with it by transforming social institutions into corporations through which the authoritarian state extends the tentacles of its domination to civil society, in addition treating it with

further repression and intimidation. The idea of the 'corporation' is a new one in the literature of the political analysis of Arab society and thus the word 'corporation' appears unfamiliar. The intended meaning of the notion of the 'corporation' is that a group or social force expresses itself as being in mutual accord with the state through leaders recognized by it, either implicitly, as in Kuwait, or explicitly, as in Arab Yemen. Thus the corporation becomes an extension of the state apparatus and an effective means of social control. This was the traditional state of affairs in Fascist Italy and Franco's Spain. Some writers go so far as to claim that the western hedonistic state is in general tending towards the corporation mode in reaching decisions, by means of bargaining between these corporations outside the elected parliaments.[8]

The idea of 'corporations' can also generate some confusion within the Arab countries, for the intent is not to give 'corporation' a positive meaning, i.e., social solidarity, nor at the same time a negative connotation, i.e., a conspiratorial group. Some Yemeni writers have become confused on the matter by picturing the Supreme Council for Tribal Affairs as a symbol of national unity, while there are those who find the justification for advocating the use of corporations a substitute for 'the democracy befitting the rabble for peoples unworthy of democracy'. There are those who believe that corporations such as the tribal or sectarian corporations guarantee a minimum of democracy within the corporation (if not outside it at the national level), such as the 'tribal democracy' embodied in the tribal by-election or secondary elections in Kuwait.[9] The negative meaning which the idea of the corporation might acquire is that of a group of people becoming jointly liable for the purpose of investing in a designated item or monopolizing it for the corporation itself in an illegal manner.

Both the positive and negative cases skirt the truth and both might be partially true. The corporation may prevent the fragmentation of groups by transforming the people into impoverished individual atoms, one of the characteristics of the mass industrial society.[10] But, there is no trace of democracy in corporations, however, for relationships within the corporation are asymmetrical between the shaykhly leaders, their families and the rich of the tribe or the tribal confederation, on the one hand, and the generality of the members of the tribe on the other. Thus the corporations lead to the strengthening of client relationships between patrons (plural of *muʿazzib*, i.e., the chief or owner of the business) and clients. Whoever wishes to advance in this environment must find a member of the ruling family or one of the

big merchants to become his patron – otherwise he will find no room to advance to reach the higher positions in society. Networks of client relationships appear among the middle classes in the urban areas in a manner parallel to the old client relationships between merchant and captain and diver and seaman in the old society, and between the lower-class members of the tribes in the air-conditioned ghettos at the edges of the metropolitan petroleum cities.

In spite of the positive or negative meanings of the idea of the corporation, there is no doubt that the corporation weakens political loyalty to the state and the Arab national affiliation of the populace in general. It weakens political loyalty because with the passage of time the corporation is transformed into a lobby or instrument of pressure in order to achieve certain material gains or advantages. In the absence of societal organizations such as political parties, professional unions, and social movements which encourage national fusion and assimilation, citizens tend to define their relationship to the state, not in terms of citizenship, but in terms of the corporation (tribal, sectarian or ethnic) on the basis of pure interest, in a manner similar to the way the sectarian system works in Lebanon. It is a weak, precarious system, for no sooner does it collapse than the state is surprisingly easily and quickly torn to pieces.

If this is the state of affairs at the local–national level, what about things at the Arab nationalist level when the citizen loses touch ideologically with those outside his immediate group. Otherwise, what is there to bring together the Shammari and the ʿAnazi, or the Wahhabi and the Zaidi, or the Maronite and the Alawite, or the Christian and the Shiʿi, in the Arab national community, if what links him with his local national community is a relationship of purely material interests?

Whoever believes that the spread of education and the mass media in the long run weakens tribal, sectarian or local geographic allegiances is mistaken, since the opposite is true. The spread of education in the Gulf and Arab countries leads to their becoming more firmly and deeply rooted in what we may call the tribal consciousness, just as the mass media offer possibilities for better communication between members of the tribes and sects, as happened to the system of sects in India.[11] The phenomenon of the use of the tribal appellation in names is now spreading in the Gulf countries in an unprecedented manner. All of this pours into the general channel of the structural crisis which reveals a number of pathological symptoms. I believe that the confusion of values and the lack of standards are the most serious of these symptoms in their effect on Gulf and Peninsula

society, which are undoubtedly the result of the decline of the socialist and Arab nationalist current following the defeat of June 1967, when society lost its spirit.[12]

3

The ruling elite in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula from the beginning took a hostile stand against the Arab nationalist current, using repression and intimidation against the opposition and resistance movements opposed to the elite's monopolization of the sources of power and wealth. Nasserist Egypt, with its sponsorship of the Arab nationalist trend, constituted a direct threat to the ruling systems in the Gulf and Peninsula in that disturbed decade between October 1956 and June 1967. This threat took a new direction when the socialist measures were first announced in Egypt in 1961, then in Syria and Iraq. Upon this turn in history, the opposition and resistance movements in the Gulf and the Peninsula passed through two phases of activity: the politicization of broad groups of the populace and the entrenchment of the resistance movements by providing them with a fundamental, radical ideology – which we have tried to demonstrate by actual examples.

Nasserism, through its alliance with the forces of Arab nationalism, deeply touched political and social life in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula, for it embraced the opposition forces in all the Arab Gulf countries, impelling the ruling family in Saudi Arabia to split on the question of Arab nationalism.[13] It played an important role in the political struggle between the imamate and the sultanate in Oman and a similar role in sponsoring the armed resistance movements in Zofar and Democratic Yemen, entering as a direct participant in the Civil War in Arab Yemen on the side of the army and the people in general against the Zaidi Imamate supported by Saudi Arabia. The June defeat, therefore, came with resounding and destructive force, with its echoes reverberating throughout the Arab Peninsula to the present day.

Organized intimidation was not enough to stop this great Arab nationalist tide. The Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries therefore resorted to the creation of artificial alliances between the conservative social and political forces in order to confront this Arab nationalist tide. The tribal forces emerged in the form of a tribal corporation, about which we have spoken, to counter the sedentary forces: the merchants on the one hand, and the new middle classes on the other. The merchants split among themselves between those supporting the

Nasserist and Arab nationalist current and those opposed to it, but this current began to lose its force amongst the big merchant class – or oligarchy – after the initiation of socialist measures in Egypt, then in Syria and Iraq. As a matter of fact, the merchants supporting the Arab nationalist and Nasserist current constituted – and still do – the pillars of the liberal reformist trend whose historical roots go back to the 1938 constitutional movements which we have mentioned. The June defeat greatly weakened this current, reducing friction between the reformist current and the ruling elite, thus removing one of the sources of pressure upon the political system.

The new middle classes have had a different story. We distinguish between the new middle classes, which appeared as a result of the spread of the official system of education and the apparatus of the modern state, and the old middle classes composed of ship captains (excluding merchants), small landowners, tradesmen and artisans (caulkers, builders, goldsmiths, etc.), storekeepers in the settled areas and the shepherds among the tribesman. The policies of the *rentier* state guaranteed that these groups would not be transformed into depressed lower classes (through employment in government service, property assessment or social welfare policies). These groups were transferred through the operation of collective mobility from the functions of the old middle classes to those of the new middle classes, thus greatly lessening the impact of downward mobility on society.[14]

In spite of this, we can consider these sectors of the populace to have been the greatest losers, owing to the process of social transformation on a large scale through which the region has passed. They have in large part become dependent upon government jobs and in need of sponsors to protect their very modest interests and gains – sponsors, whom they usually choose from among the merchants and the ruling family. As a result of the extension of the government sector, they are at the mercy of the government bureaucracy and exposed to the caprices of central administrators composed of ministers and high officials, even for their basic livelihood needs, while the ruling elites put themselves above the law – if law exists. It is not strange, therefore, that the new middle classes formed the backbone of the Nasserist and Arab nationalist current, using this current itself to express their rebellion and opposition to existing conditions.[15]

The June defeat was like a blow which awakened the members of these classes from the narcotic effects of vast hopes for the fulfilment of which the Nasserist and Arab nationalist current had raised their expectations, or hopes which they had placed in Nasser. This was the beginning of the reverse suffered by the Arab nationalist current

among the members of the middle classes. However, this reverse was not entirely spontaneous, for the ruling elite in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries embraced the revival of the spirit of religious fanaticism, encouraging the presentation of Islam as the alternative to Arab nationalism.[16] It was easy for the religious vigilantes (who had a special interest) and the religious middle class in general to accept the claim that Arab nationalism was 'a heresy brought in by the west', yet the call for a return to origins or the pious forebears, as a blessed salvation (that is to save us from the evils of the world) does not meet with the same acceptance except among the fanatical religious movements.

It is a matter of the utmost importance to distinguish between the spread of the religious current among the middle classes following the June defeat, and the appearance of the extremist, reactionary religious movements with their semi-Fascist ideology, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, the ultra-conservative Shi'ites and other small splinter groups. Regrettably, we do not yet possess documented analytical studies of the circumstances and the conditions which enabled these movements to attain positions of control over events. There are, however, a number of clear facts: the first is that these movements are directed primarily at the middle classes; secondly, that the ruling elite directly sponsored them, and thirdly that in the storehouse or arsenal of the ruling elite and the imperialist countries religion constitutes an effective weapon against nationalism, socialism and constitutionalism.[17]

The reader should not fail to notice that the spread of the religious trend among the middle classes – especially the oppressed lower echelons of them – was contemporaneous with the consumer revolution which followed the oil price increase after the October 1973 war, although in fact they represent two contradictory currents.[18] While the consumer revolution encourages people to be occupied with profit, the acquisition of wealth and the possession of luxury goods, instead of politics, the religious movements work indirectly and sometimes in spite of themselves, to repoliticize the people and preoccupy them with public affairs and political ideas such as sovereignty (that is that sovereignty belongs to God and the fanatics who speak in His name), the Islamic state and alternative political (and social and economic) systems – which produced their worst conflagration in the collapse of the Shah's system of government in Iran and the establishment of the so-called Islamic state on a sectarian basis. At this point the balance of power in the region was upset, demanding additional measures to restore it to a state of stability.

We have previously stated that imperialist policy in the region was built on the creation of local axes through which the imperialist countries might extend their influence and control. From the 1930s onward, these axes were: Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Iraq and the Shah's Iran. The balance of forces began to change when Nasserist Egypt entered the political battlefield in the Arab East after the Suez War of 1956. The situation degenerated to the disadvantage of the conservative forces by their loss of the Iraqi axis in 1958 and therefore efforts were directed at the prevention of an Egyptian–Syrian–Iraqi alliance which might be an alternative axis in opposition to the conservative forces.[19] We do not yet possess documented studies of the circumstances and the conditions which led to the success of these forces in preventing an Arab nationalist alliance between the three leading countries of the Arab East. The June 1967 defeat came along, not only to stop the Arab nationalist current, but also to manifest the supreme usefulness of Israel to imperialist policy as an effective strike force, not prevented from this by its being a pariah state in the region. The responsibility of keeping it under its wing passed over from France before the June 1967 war to the United States afterwards. This was a turning-point in the role of Israel, to which the political historians within the region have not yet turned their attention.[20]

When the regime of the Shah of Iran fell, the conservative forces in the region lost the second axis supporting imperialist policy, with only the Saudi axis remaining. It is true that the Iraq–Iran War, which broke out in September 1980, relieved the political pressure on the conservative forces, but the times demanded a reassessment. The birth of the Co-operation Council for the Arab Gulf Countries came along in 1981 as one of the manifestations of a reassessment, with its immediate goal being 'security co-ordination', in spite of all the cloaks with which it was clothed to give it a serious Arab nationalist, unification or regional co-operative appearance among the countries of the region. Security co-ordination here is not concerned with the exchange of information about 'criminals' or 'terrorists' only, but rather to provide guarantees to prevent the rise of organized opposition movements and to achieve a degree of similarity – or integration, if you wish – in the internal policies of the authoritarian state, in addition to permission for the existence of an undeclared western military presence in the region.[21]

The immediate aim of imperial policy after the June defeat was the resolution of the Palestinian question by *fait accompli*, which represents one of the chronic sources of political instability. The conservative

forces in the region have a direct interest and a large investment in the elimination of the Palestinian question from the Middle East political agenda. This, when it comes to pass, along with the general acceptance of the methods of 'security co-ordination' among the Arab countries of the Gulf and the Arab East, would lead us to expect only an increase in organized repression which these countries practise against their peoples, and a greater number of morbid symptoms rampant in Arab society in the Gulf and the Arab East.

4

These, then, are the elements of the structural crisis which will become further aggravated if conditions remain as they are at present. Is there an alternative or are there alternatives to the continuation of present critical conditions? The answer to this question must be in the affirmative, but the existence of these alternatives does not necessarily mean that they are practical or possible here in the present or future. There are a number of conditions and variables which sometimes join forces slowly, or rapidly at other times, to make these alternatives possible or improbable at any given time. In view of the fact that we know only a little of the structure of the social and political forces, the logic of their alliances and their relative political weights, we cannot prophesy or control these conditions or variables at the present time.

The formation of new social movements striving to achieve national integration or Arab national fusion is the appropriate logical alternative to the tribal, sectarian and regional corporations.[22] At the same time it is the practical solution to the ideological parties of the opposition which have been drowning in Jacobite armed violence and revolutionary ideology and which, owing to the June 1967 defeat, have lost all justification for their existence. The rise of political and social movements on democratic bases is the effective framework for opposition and resistance movements, having historically established its effectiveness.[23] However, the question now is: Is it possible to create social and political movements at the local and Arab national levels in the shadow of the organized repression and armed violence of the authoritarian state? The decisive factors in this activity are seriousness in the creation of popular movements and the readiness of the populace to rally round to defend them and the legitimacy of their demands, not the reaction of authoritarian governments.

As for what the legitimate demands which these popular move-

ments could strive to achieve are, they might be any of the issues which will be mentioned, as they have appeared in the programmes of the opposition and resistance movements in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries over the past twenty years. This is not an exhaustive list, but it includes the main popular demands, even though their order may vary and insistence upon them may differ from one country to another:

- Legislation to limit the privileges and powers of the ruling elite, and their monopoly of the sources of power and wealth under the authority of the law.
- The establishment of constitutional democratic rule in a form which is commensurate with the aspirations of the people.
- The transfer of the people from the rank of subjects in interest-centred and tribal associations to citizens equal before the law.
- Holding governments accountable to the legislative authority of the representatives of the people, and providing the provision of constitutional guarantees for individual liberties, respect for the human dignity of citizens, and the prevention of bureaucratic confiscation of these freedoms.
- Halting the squandering of the financial, natural and human resources of the countries and the carrying out of the necessary administrative and social reforms for their national utilization.
- Putting an end to the haemorrhage to which the resources of the nation are exposed, on account of useless armament, the domination of militaristic values and the proliferation of the apparatus of repression, intimidation, and organized terror.
- Adherence to rational planning policies in order to achieve long-range comprehensive socio-economic and cultural development.
- A call to achieve a dynamic, progressive formula by which the Arabs will define their position with respect to their culture and heritage, and for an openness to world culture as borrowers and contributors.
- Continuance of efforts to achieve an Arab national unity project as the guarantee for stopping imperialist spoilation of the nation's resources.
- No insistence on the demand for the creation of a democratic republic in Palestine and a refusal to exchange Palestine (or any part of it) in exchange for political stability of the existing ruling Arab regimes.
- The substitution of a crucial Arab-Islamic strategic alliance for 'security co-ordination' between the existing regimes, and the

attempt to wrest Western Asia from imperialist hegemony by combining in a long-term joint Arab-Islamic effort.

- The revival of the high Arab national goals which illuminated the way for the Arabs during the years of struggle for independence, and making room for competing ideologies to play their guiding role by encouraging the creation of social and political movements.

Any arrangement of these demands in the generalized form in which they appeared after redrafting above, or in their precise details, may constitute a comprehensive programme of activism for social and political movements, since all of them have been present in the Arab nationalist agenda for a long time. These demands are not all utopian dreams, for most of them are realizable if what can be termed 'the clear alternative' to the present situation is achieved, and by that we mean a determination to establish a democratic constitutional government. Such talk might at first seem to be unrealistic under present circumstances, but we should remember that something similar has actually happened in the last ten years. In the mid-1970s, democratic constitutional government was imposed upon the military in Greece, just as it was recently imposed upon the military in the Sudan in the mid-1980s. This points to the possibility of a similar situation coming to pass in the Arab Peninsula, even if we cannot at the present time specify the variables.

The other probability of an alternative to the authoritarian state is represented by the politicization of the tribal majority in the urban areas, that is, the possibility of their banding together in the cities in a political alliance with the merchants and the middle classes. If this alliance came about, it would deprive the ruling elite of their chief social base and the huge human reservoir from which they recruit the units for the apparatus of repression and intimidation. However, the difficulties which stand in the way of possible alliance with the urban forces are due to the fact that the tribes which have settled in segregated or air-conditioned ghettos in the suburbs of the metropolitan petroleum cities play the same role as the depressed lower classes in the tin shanty towns at the edges of the great Arab cities.

These tribes are not a lumpen proletariat nor are they from the working class, for they are in general composed of employees occupying the middle and lower ranks on the civil and military job ladder, small transport and taxi drivers, dealers in guarantees to foreign workers, lessors of commercial permits to others and at best small real-estate owners in the low-income areas.[24] To summarize, we can

say that the great majority of tribesmen who have settled in the urban areas work in the lower positions of the service sector and belong to the tribal corporations which constitute their sole means of getting ahead, such as acquiring citizenship, for instance, and to which they can resort for help in time of need. Since the tribal majority does not possess, or show any inclination towards, an ideological affiliation, it therefore represents a huge reservoir of social forces upon which the ruling elite can draw by increasing their material benefits. At the same time, the opposition forces could draw from this reservoir, if they could exploit their unsatisfied legitimate demands.[25]

We have seen how the opposition and resistance movements tried to recruit tribal forces (in Zofar and Democratic Yemen, for instance); or to enter into tribal-religious alliances (Juhayman al-ʾUtaybi's movement in Saudi Arabia, with another example from the last National Assembly in Kuwait), or into mutual interest alliances (as in the alliance of 'the representatives from the outlying areas' in Kuwait). The tribal-forces variable will remain the ambiguous factor in the composition of the present situation. In our estimation, it is the one which in the long run will give to one side the victory over the other (to the ruling elite or the urban opposition forces).

The Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, with their huge financial resources, are in a better position than any other Arab countries to sponsor an alternative Arab national developmental scheme clearly articulated in the context of the pivotal issues of the nation. It is not enough that this proposal should be built upon vague, abstruse slogans revolving, as in the past (that is in the troubled decade from 1956 to 1967), around generalities of unity, freedom, socialism, and the liberation of Palestine. Muhammad ʿAbid al-Jabiri has eloquently portrayed the amount of damage which ambiguity and abstruseness can bring down upon Arab national issues, and the rich opportunities they give to the opportunistic, demagogic, political leaders.[26]

An Arab national developmental scheme expressing the desires of the inhabitants is the appropriate instrument for the remobilization of the people for the achievement of the clear alternative of democratic constitutional rule, and for recovering a degree of balance in the life of Arab society in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, in order to rescue it from the political, economic and cultural inertia which the policies of the authoritarian state impose upon it.

Statistical appendix

Table A.1 Some general indicators for the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, 1984

Country	*National income (in millions of dollars)*	*Number of inhabitants (in thousands)*	*Average income (in dollars)*	*Life expectancy (in years)**
United Arab Emirates	28,480	1,277	22,300	71
Bahrain	4,260	407	10,480	68
Saudi Arabia	116,380	10,833[a]	10,740	56
Oman	7,380	1,186	3,230	53
Qatar	6,020	292	20,600	72
Kuwait	27,570	1,790	15,410	71
Democratic Yemen	1,020	2,021	560	46
Arab Yemen	4,170	7,790[a]	510	44

Source: *International Bank Atlas for 1986*, borrowed from: *Majallat al-Watan al-ʿArabi* (11 July 1986), p. 47.
Notes: Age estimates for 1983; [a]information is not reliable from the source.

Table A.2 Population estimates for the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries between 1962 and 1981

Country	*Year*	*Number of inhabitants*
United Arab Emirates	1967	180,184
	1980	1,043,000[a]
Bahrain	1965	182,203
	1981	350,798
Saudi Arabia	1962	3,300,000
	1980	9,454,000[a]
Oman	1969	750,000[a]
	1980	900,000
Qatar	1970	130,000
	1981	265,000[a]
Kuwait	1970	733,196
	1980	1,357,952
Democratic Yemen	1969	1,486,000
	1976	1,805,000
Arab Yemen	1968	5,000,000[a]
	1981	8,540,119

Sources: John I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher (eds) *Population of the Middle East and North Africa: a Geographical Approach* (London: University of London Press; New York: Africana Pub. Corp. 1972), various references; Hasan al-Khayyat, *Al-Raṣīd al-sukkānī li-duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabīyah* (Population Stock in the Arabian Gulf Countries), Doha: Qatar University, Documents and Human Studies Centre, 1982), *passim*.
Note: [a] information not reliable from this source.

Table A.3 Percentage distribution of economically active inhabitants according to sectors of economic activity (various years)

		Sector of activity		
Country	*Year*	*Agriculture*	*Industrial*	*Services*
United Arab Emirates	1968	18	34	48
Bahrain	1971	7	34	59
Saudi Arabia	1970[a]	40	20	40
Oman	1971	83	4	13
Qatar	1970	4	32	64
Kuwait	1970	2	33	65
Democratic Yemen	1973	45	12	43
Arab Yemen	1972	85	15*	

Source: *I.L.O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1974.
Notes: *This figure is for industrial and service activities combined; [a]information not reliable.

Table A.4 Remittances by workers in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries and Libya to the mother country, 1973–80 (in millions of dollars)

Country	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*
Jordan	45	75	172	388	408	438	510	630
Sudan	4.2	2.5	140	160	130	240	270	—
Syria	5	62	99	140	234	231	290	—
Egypt	85	189	366	755	896	1,762	8,282	2,625
Democratic Yemen	33	41	58	119	188	257	314	342
Arab Yemen	135	—	270	676	986	946	1,025	—

Source: Ibrahim Saad al-Din and Mahmoud Abdel-Fadel, 'The movement of Arab workers: effects and policies', Schedule 2.1, p. 78 (unpublished paper).
General comment: The sign '—' indicates insufficient data.

Table A.5 Sample of the largest joint-stock companies active in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula countries, and the government's portion of their shares

Company	*Government's share in capital (percentage)*
Kuwait	
Kuwaiti Insurance Co.	73.7
Kuwaiti Petroleum Investment Co.	80.1
Kuwaiti Investment Co.	64.1
National Industries	59.2
Kuwait Warehousing Co.	58.1
Public Warehousing Co.	58.7
United Real Estate Co.	53.2
Mobile Telephones Co.	49
Kuwaiti Cement Co.	34.6
Foreign Investments Co.	30
Metal Pipes Co.	16.6
Gulf Bank	12.2
Bahrain	
Bahraini National Bank	50
Bahraini Transportation Co.	43
Aluminium Co. of Bahrain	70
Qatar	
Qatari National Bank	50
Qatari Steel Co., Ltd.	70
Qatari Petrochemical Co.	84

Saudi Arabia	
Arab–American Oil Co. (National Petroleum Co.)	100
Saudi Airways	100
International Continental Hotel	100
Petromin	100
Steel Cylinder Manufacturing Co.	100
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co.	51
Arab-Petroleum Marine Installations Co.	51
Saudi Basic Industries Co.	100
Petroship Co.	100
United Arab Emirates	
Plastic Pipe Manufacturing Co. (Abu Dhabi)	50
The National Khazzab Co. of Abu Dhabi	100
Emirates Cable and Wireless Communications Co.	100
United Arab Emirates Development Bank	100
United Arab Heavy Industries Co. (Ajam government and others)	100
Gulf Mineral Water Co. (Ajman government and others)	100
Aluminium Co. of Dubai, Ltd.	80*
Dubai Electrical Co.	100*
Safi Trading and Refrigeration Co. (Rulers of Fujaira and others)	100
Raʿs al-Khaima National Bank	30
Sharja Bank	20
National Industries Co. (Sharja)	50

Sources: 'Al-Taqrīr al-iqtiṣādī li-Bank al-Kuwait al-Markazī li-ʿām 1985' (The Economic Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait for 1985) p. 160; and Lubna Ahmad al-Qadi, *Al-Taṭawwur al-sarīʿ fī baʿḍ duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-nafṭīyah* (Rapid Development in some of the Arab Gulf Petroleum States), (Kuwait: Muʾassasat al-Kuwait li-al-Taqaddum al-ʿIlmi, 1985), pp. 149–55.
Note: *Shares owned by the ruler of Dubai.

Notes

1. Introduction: current writings about the region

1 Qutb al-Din al-Nahrawali al-Makki, *al-Barq al-Yamānī fī-al-fatḥ al-ʿUthmānī* (The Yemeni Flash (lightning) concerning the Ottoman Conquest), (Riyad: Manshurat Dar al-Yamamah, 1967); Hamid ibn Zurayq, *al-Fatḥ al-mubīn fī sīrat al-sādah al-Bū Saʿīdīn* (A Plain Introduction to the Biography of the Bu Saʿids), (Cairo: Dar Ihyaʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyah, 1977); ʿUthman ibn Bishr al-Najdi al-Hanbali, *ʿUnwān al-majd fī tārīkh Najd* (The Banner of Glory on the History of Najd), 2 vols (Riyad: Wizarat al-Maʿarif al-Saʿudiyah, 1970); Ibrahim Fasih al-Baghdadi, *ʿUnwān al-majd fī bayān aḥwāl Baghdād wa-al-Baṣra wa-Najd* (The Banner of Glory to Explain Conditions in Baghdad, Basra and Najd), (Baghdad: n.pub., 1962); Yaha ibn al-Husayn ibn al-Qasim, *Ghāyat al-amānī fī akhbār al-Quṭr al-Yamānī* (The Ultimate Aspiration regarding the History of Yemen), ed. Saʿid ʿAbd al-Fattah ʿAshur, 2 vols (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-ʿArabi, 1968); Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, *Tārīkh Najd* (The History of Najd), (Cairo: n.pub., 1924); *Tārīkh al-Kuwait* (The History of Kuwait), supervised by Yaʿqub ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rashid (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1961); 1st edn, 2 vols (Baghdad: al-Matbaʿah al-ʿAsriyah, 1926); Amin al-Rihani, *Tārīkh Najd al-ḥadīth wa-mulḥaqātih ... wa-sīrat ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Fayṣal Āl Saʿūd* (The Modern History of Najd and its Dependencies ... and the Biography of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Faysal Āl Saʿūd), (Beirut: al-Matbaʿah al-ʿIlmiyah, 1928); and Muhammad ibn Khalifah al-Nabhani, *al-Tuḥfah al-Nabhānīyah fī tārīkh al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah* (The Nabhani Gem on the History of the Arabian Peninsula), 12 vols (Cairo: al-Matbaʿah al-Maymudiyah al-Tijariyah, 1923–49).

2 M. Niebuhr, *Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East,* 2 vols (Edinburgh: R. Morison [Morrison?] and Son, 1792); John Lewis Burkhart, *Travels in Arabia* (London: Henry Colburn, 1829); William Gifford Palgrave, *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia* (London: Macmillan, 1865); Charles M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1888); Harry St John Bridger, *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London: Constable, 1928); Hugh Scott, *In the High Yemen* (London: Murray, 1942); David George Hogarth, *The Penetration of Arabia* (London: n.pub., 1905; Beirut:

Khayat's, 1966); R. H. Kierman, *The Unveiling of Arabia* (London: n.pub., 1937); and Robin Leonard Bidwell, *Travellers in Arabia* (London: Hamlyn Pub. Group, 1976). See also, in French: Jacqueline Pirenne, *A la découverte de l'Arabie; cinq siècles de science et d'aventure* (Paris: Le Livre contemporain, 1958).

3 Arnold Talbot Wilson, *The Persian Gulf: a Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the 20th Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928); Arabic translation by ʿAbd al-Qadir Yusuf entitled: Al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: *mujmal tārīkhī min aqdam al-azminah ḥattā awāʾil al-qarn al-ʿishrīn* (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Amal, 1940). See also: John Gordon Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia,* completed and edited by R. L. Birdwood, 6 vols (Calcutta: Superintendent, Govt Printing, 1908–15); Arabic translation entitled: *Dalīl al-Khalīj* (Gazetteer of the Gulf), (Doha: n.pub., 1967); William Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles* (London: Murray, 1963); Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *The Letters of Gertrude Lowthian Bell,* 2 vols (London: Ernest Benn, 1927); Harold Richard Dickson, *Kuwait and her Neighbours,* edited for publication by Clifford Witting (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1956); Stephen Helmsley Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925); Arabic translation by Jaʿfar Khayyat, entitled *Arbaʿat qurūn min tārīkh al-ʿIraq al-ḥadīth* (Four Centuries of the History of Modern Iraq), (Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Tafayyud al-Ahliyah, 1941); John Bagot Glubb, *War in the Desert: an R.A.F. Frontier Campaign* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960); and Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Handbook on the Persian Gulf* (London: Public Records Office, 1953).

4 Amin al-Rihani, *Mulūk al-ʿArab aw riḥlah fī al-bilād al-ʿArabīyah* (The Arab Kings or A Journey Through Arab Lands), 2 vols (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1924); Fuʾad Hamza, *Qalb Jazīrat al-ʿArab* (The Heart of the Arabian Peninsula), (Cairo: al-Matbaʿah al-Salafiyah, 1933); Faysal al-ʿAzmah, *Fī bilād al-luʾluʾ* (In the Land of the Pearl), (Damascus: n.pub., 1944); Hafiz Wahba, *Jazīrat al-ʿArab fī al-qarn alʿishrīn: ṭabīʿat Jazīrat al-ʿArab wa-ḥālatuhā al-ijtimāʿīyah al-ḥāḍirah* (The Arabian Peninsula in the Twentieth Century: the Nature of the Arabian Peninsula and its Present Social State), 4th edn (Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlif wa-al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr, 1961); Qadri Qalʿaji, *Al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (The Arabian Gulf), (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-ʿArabi, 1965); Rasim Rushdi, *Kuwayt wa-Kuwaytīyūn: dirāsāt fī māḍī al-Kuwayt wa-ḥāḍirihā* (Kuwait and Kuwaitis: Studies in Kuwait's Past and Present), (Beirut: Matbaʿat al-Rahbaniyah al-Lubnaniyah, 1955); ʿAbd al-Masih Antaki, *Al-Riyāḍ al-muzaharrah bayn al-Kuwait wa-al-Muḥammarah* (The Blossoming Gardens between Kuwait and Muhammarah), (Cairo: n.pub., 1906); Amin Saʿid, *Al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī fī tārīkhih al-siyāsī wa-nahḍatih al-ḥadīthah* (The Arabian Gulf in its Political History and its Modern Resurgence), (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-ʿArabi [1965]); and Thurayya Muhammad Qabil, *al-Biblūjrāfīyā [sic] al-mukhtārah ʿan al-Kuwayt wa-al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (A Select Bibliography on Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf), (Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1970).

5 C. Carleton, *Al-Qāfilah: Qiṣṣat al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ* [correctly: Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East*], translated by Burhan

Dajani (Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafah, 1959); Wilfred Thesiger, *Arabian Sands* (London: n.pub., 1959); John Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (London: Cresset Press, Western Printing Services; New York: Praeger, 1962); Daniel Van der Meulen, *Faces in Shem* (London: n.pub., 1961), and *The Wells of Ibn Saud* (London: Murray, 1957); Tom Little, *South Arabia: Area of Conflict* (London: Pall Mall; New York: Praeger [1968]); Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (London, New York: Norton, 1980); Charles Hepburn Johnston, *The View from Steamer Point, Being an Account of Three Years in Aden* (London: Collins; New York: Praeger, 1964); and David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saʿud* (London: Pan Books, 1982). See also: David Smiley and Peter Kemp, *Arabian Assignment* (London: Cooper, 1975); Gary Troeller, *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Ropes of the House of Saʿud* (London: Frank Cass, 1976); and Jonathan Raban, *Arabia Through the Looking Glass* (London: Collins, 1979).

6 Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East: Oil and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1955); Muhammad Sadiq and William P. Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems and Future Prospects* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972); George Lenczowski, *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960); Ragaei el-Mallakh, *Economic Development and Regional Cooperation*, Kuwait Publications of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies 3 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and Naiem A. Sherbiny and Mark A. Tessler, eds, *Arab Oil: Impact on the Arab Countries and Global Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1976). See also: Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings, *Middle East Economics in the 1970s, a Comparative Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1976); United States, Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel* (Washington, DC.: n.pub., 1951); and Stephen Helmsley Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East, its Discovery and Development*, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1961).

7 Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, *Al-Khalīj laysa nafṭan* (The Gulf Is Not Petroleum).

8 Mahmud ʿAli Al-Dawud, *Muḥāḍarāt ʿan al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī wa-al-ʿalāqāt al-duwalīyah, 1890–1914* (Lectures on the Arabian Gulf and International Relations, 1890–1914), lectures delivered to students of the Department of Historical and Geographical Studies, 1960 (Cairo: Arab League – Institute of Higher Arab Studies, 1961); Jamal Zakariya Qasim, *Al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: dirāsah li-tārīkh al-Imārāt al-ʿArabīyah, 1840–1914* (The Arabian Gulf: a Study in the History of the Arab Emirates, 1840–1914), (Cairo: Matbaʿat ʿAyn Shams University, 1966); *Mukhtārāt min wathāʾiq al-Kuwait wa-al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-maḥfūẓah fī dūr al-sijillāt al-Briṭānīyah* (Selections from the Documents of Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf, preserved in the British Archives), collected by Jamal Zakariyah Qasim, Kuwait University Publications 8 (Kuwait University, 1972); Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakimah, *Tārīkh al-Kuwait* (The History of Kuwait), 2 vols, (Kuwait: The Kuwaiti Government Press, 1970–1973), and *Tārīkh al-Kuwait al-ḥadīth, 1750–1965* (The

Modern History of Kuwait, 1750–1965), (Kuwait: Dhat al-Salasil, 1984); Badr al-Din ʿAbbas al-Khususi, *Dirāsāt fī tārīkh al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-ḥadīth wa-al-muʿāṣir* (Studies in the Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabian Gulf) 2nd edn, (Kuwait: Dhat al-Salasil, 1984), vol. 1; Mustafa ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Najjar, *Al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī li-ʿalāqāt al-ʿIrāq al-duwalīyah bi-al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: dirāsah wathāʾiqīyah fī al-tārīkh al-duwalī* (The Political History of Iraq's International Relations with the Arabian Gulf: a Documentary study in the History of International Relations), Introduction by Jamal Zakariya Qasim (Basra: Basra University, Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1975); Amal Ibrahim al-Zayyani, *Al-Baḥrain bayn al-istiqlāl al-siyāsī wa-al-inṭilāq al-duwalī* (Bahrain between Political Independence and International Takeoff); Fuʾad al-ʿAbid, *Siyāsat Briṭānyā fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (British Policy in the Arab Gulf), 2 vols, (Kuwait: Dhat al-Salasil, 1981–4), and J. J. Saldanha, *Al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī li-al-Kuwait fī ʿahd Mubārak: dirāsah wathāʾiqīyah muqārinah bi-al-muʾarrikhīn al-maḥallīyīn* (The Political History of Kuwait in the Era of Mubarak: a Documentary Study Compared with Local Historians), translated and edited by Futuh ʿAbd al-Muhsin Khatrash (Kuwait: Kuwait University Press, 1985).

9 We can form a general impression of this research material from the following collection of studies: Ailon Shiloh, ed., *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1969); Louise E. Sweet, comp., *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, an Anthropological Reader*, 2 vols, (Garden City, NY: published for the American Museum of Natural History by the Natural History Press, 1970); Cynthia Nelson, ed., *The Desert and the Town: Nomads in the Wider Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973); and Dale F. Eickelman, *The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1981).

10 Salah al-Din al-Mukhtar, *Tārīkh al-Mamlakah al-ʿArabīyah al-Saʿūdīyah fī māḍīhā wa-ḥāḍirihā* (The History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Past and Present), 2 vols, (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, [1957]); Muhammad Yahya al-Haddad, *Tārīkh al-Yaman al-siyāsī* (The Political History of Yemen), 3rd edn, (Cairo: ʿAlam al-Kutub, 1976); Faʾiq Hamdi Tahbub, *Tārīkh al-Baḥrain al-siyāsī, 1783–1870* (The Political History of Bahrain, 1783–1870), (Kuwait: Dhat al-Salasil, 1983); in addition to al-ʿAqqad's widely read book: Salah al-ʿAqqad, *Al-Tayyārāt al-siyāsīyah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf), (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1965), and Section 4, concerning Najd and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, in his *Al-Mashriq al-ʿArabī al-muʿāṣir* (The Modern Arab East) 2nd edn, (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1983).

11 Take for example the assertion by Robin Bidwell that the Yemeni character is the product of their ancient civilization and that [that character] has not changed from the beginning of history to our day. The books by colonialists and journalists are full of such fallacies. See: Robin Leonard Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. xvi.

12 Concerning the differentiation between the traditional concept of tribalism, and political tribalism as an organizing principle and a general

perspective, see: Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Bināʾ al-mujtamaʿ al-ʿArabī: baʿḍ al-furūḍ al-baḥthīyah' (The Building of Arab Society: some Research Hypotheses), *Al-Mustaqbal Al-ʿArabi*, 8th yr, no. 79 (September 1985): 4–41, esp. pp. 26–8.

13 R. B. Serjeant, 'The interplay between tribal affinities and religious (Zaidi) authority in the Yemen', *Al-Abhath* (American University of Beirut) 30 (1982): 12.

14 Most colonialist writings produce this impression – see particularly two authors: J. B. Kelly, *Al-Ḥudūd al-sharqīyah li-Shibh al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah* (The Eastern Boundaries of the Arab Peninsula), trans. by Khayri Hamad (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1971); and Samuel Barret Miles, *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (London: Frank Cass, 1900), 2nd edn (1966).

15 See, for example, the theses put forward by Finnie, Mayer and Shehab: David H. Finnie, *Desert Enterprise: the Middle East Oil Industry in its Local Environment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); Arno J. Mayer, *Middle East Capitalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); and F. Shehab, 'Kuwait: a super-affluent society', *Foreign Affairs* 42, no. 3 (1964): 461–74. See also: Ali Humaidan, *Les Princes de l'or noir: évolution politique du Golfe persique*, Futuribles 8 (Paris: SEDEIS, 1968). For a general treatment of petroleum in the Middle Eastern environment, see: George W. Stocking, *Middle East Oil: a Study in Political and Economic Controversy* (Kingsport: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970).

16 The clearest example of this kind of historical writing is the treatment by Futuh ʿAbd al-Muhsin Khatrash of the texts of Saldanha, for which see Saldanha, *Al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī li-al-Kuwait fī ʿahd Mubārak: dirāsah wathāʾiqīyah muqārinah bi-al-muʾarrikīn al-maḥallīyīn* (The Political History of Kuwait in the Era of Mubarak: a Comparative Documentary Study compared with Local Historians).

2. The 'natural state' thesis of society in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

1 In addition to the misunderstanding which is possible or might be generated by the concept 'natural state' in the form of the environmental determinism of anthropological studies and in the evolutionary form of the proponents of the social compact, there is also the version that regards the international division of labour (the eternal system of nations) as [reading *ʿalā* for *ay*] a given, in the natural order of things, as David Ricardo expressed it in 1817 in *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (New York: Everyman, 1955), p. 81, *passim*.

2 The productive forces in the Arab Peninsula environment represent the sum of social production relations, together with technologies and means of production, which determined the gross productive capacity of the society. The level of the development of the productive forces was what determined the possibility of the appearance of a specific mode of production, not the reverse. This means that the mode of commercial

production was the result of the development of commercial relationships and institutions in the Arab Peninsula milieu. For fuller definitions of these concepts see: Oskar Lange, *Political Economy,* translated from the Polish by A. H. Walker (New York: Macmillan, 1963), vol. 1: *General Problems,* pp. 10–11 and 21–6.

3 About Braudel's concept of an 'economic world system', see: Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism,* translated from the French by Sian Reynolds (London: Collins, 1984), vol. 3: *Perspective of the World,* pp. 21–70. It is a matter of the utmost importance to note that Braudel's concept gives us a more exact understanding of the problem of backwardness and development in a historical, dynamic framework than the concepts which consider backwardness and development as phenomena peculiar to the twentieth century, that is only in the shadow of world capitalism.

4 This is the sector to which Maxime Rodinson assigned the term 'quasi-capitalist', but he neglected the other socio-economic sectors, without trying to tie them together. See: Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism,* (London: Allen Lane; New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 26–68.

5 The term 'embedded' in the 'Polyani' school gives a special connotation to the nature of economic activities in that they are firmly established [the Arabic gives *muma'sasah* for *mu'assasah*] activities, which are not necessarily subject to our understanding of them in capitalism, but which, owing to social and psychological considerations, fall in another place within the social structure. See: Karl Polyani, C. M. Arnesburg and W. H. Pearson, eds, *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 71 and 294–306.

6 The meaning of the word 'entrepôt' is a city devoted to commerce, especially re-export and transit trade. Historically, Siraf, Hormuz and Kuwait constituted average examples from history of old commercial cities in pre-modern history, or ports of trade, of which Polyani and his followers speak. For modern commercial cities, represented by Hong Kong, for example, taking into consideration the differences in international commercial environments and economic systems, see: Robert B. Revere, '"No Man's Coast": Ports of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean', in Polyani, Arnesburg and Pearson, ibid., pp. 36–83. See also: G. B. Endicott, ed., *An Eastern Entrepôt: a Collection of Documents Illustrating the History of Hong Kong* (London: HM Stationery Office, 1964).

7 Concerning this turning-point in history see: Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 232–61, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 325–44. Notice that the location of the inland cities was also tied to international trade routes, for example: N. Rostovtzeff, *Caravan Cities: Petra and Jerash, Palmyra and Dura* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932).

8 For a penetrating study of the relation of Egypt and the Syrian coast in international trade during this period, see: Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,* translated

from the French by S. Reynolds, 2 vols (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

9 J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955), and Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: the East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

10 Lopez considers that *muḍārabah* trade was the source or one of the sources of Commenda trade, which was one kind of 'contract' company which contributed to the expansion of commercial relations on a wide scale in the pre-capitalist world. Regarding a comparison between *muḍārabah* trade and the Commenda, see: Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 151–60; Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Abraham L. Udovitch, 'Commercial techniques in early Islamic trade', in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia* (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1970), pp. 37–65, and Robert S. Lopez and Irving W. Raymond, eds, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World* (New York: W. W. Norton, n.d.), pp. 174–84.

11 The sources mentioned in n. 10, and likewise al-Juzayri, make clear the parallelism between *muḍārabah* in trade and sharecropping in land and orchard plantations. See: ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Juzayri, *Al-Fiqh ʿalā al-madhāhib al-arbaʿah* (Jurisprudence according to the Four Schools), 5 vols (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Istiqamah, n.d.; reprinted in Beirut: Dar Ihyaʾ al-Turath al-ʿArabi, n.d.), vol. 2, pp. 338–45, 'The subject of lending'; vol. 3, pp. 34–62, 'The subject of *muḍārabah* speculation'. Al-Imam al-Shaybani mentions on the authority of ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab that the Hanafi School ranked gain, including *muḍārabah*, above the holy war (*jihād*), stating: 'To die between my saddle bags as I travel through the land [i.e., as a trader] seeking God's bounty is preferable to me than to be killed fighting for the faith, because God has ranked those who travel over the land seeking his bounty above warriors for the faith, in accordance with His word: "And others travel [as traders] through the land".' See Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, *al-Kasb* (Acquisition), edited by Suhayl Zakkar (Damascus: published and distributed by ʿAbd al-Hadi Harsuni, 1980), p. 33.

12 Al-Juzayri, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 49.

13 Abu al-Fadl Jaʿfar ibn ʿAli Al-Dimashqi, *Al-Ishārah ilā maḥāsin al-tijārah* (Evidence of the Merits of Commerce), (Cairo: n.pub., 1900), quoted in Lopez and Raymond, eds, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, op. cit., pp. 24–8.

14 These characteristics and terms have been gathered chiefly from the following sources: Abu ʿAli al-Muhsin ibn ʿAli al-Tannukhi, *Nishwār al-muḥāḍarah wa-akhbār al-mudhākarah aw Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh* (Text of the Lecture and Reports of Study, or The Universal History), (Baghdad; al-Maktabah al-Ahliyah, 1966); Abu ʿUthman ʿAmr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz, *Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiz* (The Letters of al-Jahiz), 2 vols (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 1964–5); Yaqut al-Hamawi, *Muʿjamā al-buldān wa-al-udabāʾ* (Lexicon of the Countries, and Lexicon of the Men of Letters) and 'A list of occupations derived from Yaqut', published by Hayim J. Cohen in 'The economic background and secular occupations of Muslim Jurispru-

dents and traditionalists in the classical period of Islam until the middle of the 11th century', *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 13, no. 2 (January 1970): 16–61.

15 Al-Juzayri, op. cit., p. 34.

16 The credit for bringing out the points of difference between *al-muḍārabah* in long-distance trade, and the other kinds of commercial relations is due to Fernand Braudel. See : Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism,* op. cit., vol. 2: *The Wheels of Commerce,* pp. 120–4. See also: J. H. Pryor, 'The Origin of the Commenda Contract', *Speculum* 52 (1977): 5–37.

17 We can conclude from the evidence readily available in the Gulf ports and the Arab Peninsula that traditional *muḍārabah* trade nevertheless continued until the end of World War II, but on the local level, in spite of the collapse of the economy of the 'natural state' a long while previously. In the case of Kuwait, we can mention Khalifah al-Muzʿal, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Flaij, ʿUthman al-Rashid and Ibrahim al-Rumayh, leading merchants who continued to deal in this manner until a late date.

18 Frederic C. Lane, 'Economic consequences of organized violence', *Journal of Economic History* 17 (1958): 401–17. It was reprinted in Frederic C. Lane, ed., *Venice in History: the Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).

19 Three kinds of activity played decisive roles in pre-capitalist economic development, according to the Polanyi school, namely reciprocity, redistribution and monetary exchange. See: Karl Polanyi, 'The economy as instituted process', in Polanyi, Arnesberg and Pearson, op. cit., pp. 243–70.

20 Steensgaard, op. cit., pp. 60–7.

21 Naʿim Zaki Fahmy, *Ṭuruq al-tijārah al-duwalīyah wa-maḥaṭṭātuhā bayn al-sharq wa-al-gharb (awākhir al-ʿuṣūr al-wusṭā)* (International Trade Routes and Ports-of-Call between the East and West (the Late Middle Ages)), (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Misriyah al-ʿAmmah li-al-Kitab, 1973), pp. 352–65.

22 Concerning bribery as a legitimate social institution in the Portuguese Empire, see: Charles B. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 299, *passim.*

23 Including the tolls often mentioned in: Qalqashandi's writings in *Subḥ al-aʿshā* (Morning for the Dim-sighted), Ibn Mumati in *Qawānīn al-dawlah* (Laws of the State), and al-Maqrizi in *al-Khiṭaṭ* (Topography) and *al-Sulūk* (Conduct or Deportment, i.e., of the Ayyubids and Mamelukes). Some rulers in this period likewise resorted to manipulating the value of gold coins, resulting in financial crises and economic depression. In his *Kashf al-ghummah* (The Removal of Distress), al-Maqrizi has mentioned that this was one of the causes of the famines that afflicted Egypt in the fifteenth century.

24 Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakimah, *Tārīkh Sharqī al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah, 1750–1800: nashʾat wa-taṭawwur al-Kuwait wa-al-Baḥrain* (History of the Eastern Arabian Peninsula, 1750–1800: the Rise and Development of Kuwait and Bahrain), translated by Muhammad Amin ʿAbdallah (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, [1965]), pp. 239–41.

25 Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: a Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 124–31.

26 We shall return to this topic in some detail and a brief treatment of the exceptional role of the East India Companies. See: Steensgaard, op. cit., pp. 114–26.

27 The books of the European travelling merchants are replete with references to them. See for example: Jean-Baptiste Travernier, *Les Six Voyages*, 2 vols. (Paris: *s.n.*, 1962); Edward Grey, ed., *The Travels of Pietro della Valle in India* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1892); and L. D. Hammond, ed., *Travellers in Disguise* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). See also: Abu Hakimah, op. cit., pp. 209–25.

28 Ibn Bishr, *Tārīkh Najd* (History of Najd), p. 22, quoted from Waddah Shararah, *Al-Ahl wa-al-ghanīmah: muqawwimāt al-siyāsah fī al-Mamlakah al-ʿArabiyah al-Sa-ʿūdīyah* (Family and Booty: the Foundations of Politics in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿah, 1981), p. 75. Shakir Mustafa mentions that Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi 'When he needed money ... demanded of the Karimi merchants four years' *zakāt* at one time' – see Shakir Mustafa, 'Dawr al-Baḥrain al-mutawassiṭ wa-al-Hindī fī al-tārīkh al-Islāmī' (The Mediterranean and Indian role of Bahrain in Islamic History), a paper delivered at the Symposium on Islamic Civilization from its Arab Cradle to its Worldwide Horizons, Kuwait, 17–20 December 1984, p. 19.

29 The role of the tribal elites over the long run may be a reflection of large population migrations in Arab society in the east. On this subject see: Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Bināʾ al-mujtamaʿ al-ʿArabī: bāḍʿ al-furūḍ al-baḥthīyah' (The Building of Arab Society: some Research Hypotheses) *al—Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī* 8, no. 79 (September 1985): 25–8.

30 This contradictory character of the role of the ruling institution in the Arab Peninsula has not been treated before. It was more obvious in Oman and Yemen than in any other place – see: J. B. Kelly, 'A prevalence of furies: tribes, politics and religion in Oman and Trucial Oman', in Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, Studies in Modern Asia and Africa, 8 (London: Allen & Unwin; Totowa, NJ: Rowman, 1972), pp. 135–6.

31 We have borrowed the term *al-musābalah*' from: Yusuf ibn ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, *Ṣafaḥāt min tārīkh al-Kuwait* (Pages from the History of Kuwait), (Cairo: Dar Saʿd, 1946), p. 91.

32 Bedouin credit methods existed not only in the commercial cities of the Peninsula, but also in all of the commercial cities on the borders of the desert, especially Basra, Nasiriyah, Aleppo, Damascus, etc. For a unique treatment of the bedouins and the townsmen from the standpoint of their participation in a single economy (and a single society), see; Frederik Barth, 'A general perspective on nomad–sedentary relations in the Middle East', in Cynthia Nelson, ed., *The Desert and the Town: Nomads in the Wider Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973), pp. 11–21.

33 The information about Kuwait is from John Gordon Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, completed and edited by R. L. Birdwood, 6 vols (Calcutta: Superintendent Govt Printing, 1908–1915) vol. 2B, p. 1076.

The data about Iraq are from Mirza Hasan Khan, *Tārīkh wilāyat al-Basra: dirāsah fī al-aḥwāl al-ijtimaʿīyah wa-al-siyāsīyah wa-al-iqtiṣā-*

dīyah (History of the Province of Basra: a Study of Social, Political and Economic Conditions), translated by Muhammad Wasfi Abu Maghli (Basra: Basra University, Centre for the Study of the Arab Gulf, 1980), p. 93.

34 It is possible to estimate the margin of profit in the *muḍārabah* trade, and the tolls and taxes which the rulers imposed on it, from the commercial correspondence in the Genizah, Cairo (which will be mentioned later), and other sources, and likewise from the correspondence of European merchants at the end of the seventeenth century. See: Abraham L. Udovitch, 'Formalism and information in the social and economic institutions of the medieval Islamic world', in A. Banani and S. Vryonis, eds. *Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam* (Wiesbaden: n.pub., 1977).

35 Steensgaard, op. cit., pp. 58–9.

36 In fact, all of the descriptive details which Max Weber applied to the ideal mode of capitalism in the commercial field are applicable to the *muḍārabah* trade in general, and not merely to the pearl trade, as stated by Rodinson. In my estimation, this confirms the fact that capitalism as an economic activity was not confined to Europe after the sixteenth century of the Christian era. For more details see: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner, 1920); Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam: a Critical Study* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); and Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism*, op. cit., pp. 7–11 and 76–117.

37 Most of the evidence from European documents in this period points to the fact that the margin of profit in long-distance trading might reach 200 per cent and sometimes 400 per cent. See Disney's calculations, even though they are confined to the pepper trade: A. R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in South-West India in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 108–22 168ff.

38 The phenomenon of the exchange market which automatically regulated prices, a characteristic inseparable from capitalism, appeared in Europe later than in the Arab East and the Arab Peninsula, and possibly the ancient Eastern civilizations. Concerning the importance of this view and the long debate about it in economic anthropology, see: Cyril S. Belshaw, *Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965); George Dalton, 'Theoretical issues in economic anthropology', in George Dalton, ed., *Economic Development and Social Change* (New York: The Natural History Press, 1971), pp. 178–225; and Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol 2: *The Wheels of Commerce*, op. cit., pp. 220–30.

39 See the kinds of goods in Table 2.2; and also: Fahmy, op. cit., pp. 191–254.

40 Both Schacht and Udovitch state that the Hanafi school of law lists differences in the price of a currency in calculation of profit. Concerning local currencies in the region see, for example: ʿAbd al-Fattah Hasan Abu ʿAliyah, 'Al-Nuqūd wa-al-maqāyīs fī Sanjaq al-Ḥasā fī al-ʿahd al ʿUthmānī, 1871–1913', (Currencies and Measurements in the al-Ahsaʾ District in the Ottoman Era, 1871–1913) a paper delivered at the

International Conference concerning Economic Life in the Arab Provinces in the Ottoman Period and the Documentary Sources, I, The University of Tunisia, 20–25 January 1984.

41 These commercial methods and techniques have not been studied in depth for this period, whose history if written would abound with references to them. Take, for example, the quotation from Ibn Hawqal (AD 975), which has often been quoted by historians, that he saw a cheque for the sum of 42,000 dinars written to the credit of a merchant in Sijilmasa in southern Marrakesh – see: Anwar ʿAbd al-ʿAlim, *Al-Milāhah wa-ʿulūm al-biḥār ʿind al-ʿArab* (Navigation and Oceanography among the Arabs), The World of Knowledge Series, 13 (Kuwait: al-Majlis al-Watani li-al-Thaqafah wa-al-Funun wa-al-Adab, 1979), p. 30; and Fahmy, op. cit., pp. 340–65.

42 Concerning these communities see: R. B. Serjeant, *The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles with Yemeni and European Accounts of Dutch Pirates off Mocha in the 17th Century* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1974), pp. 4–21. See also Mustafa, 'Dawr al-Baḥrain al-Mutawassiṭ wa-al-Hindī fī al-tārīkh al-Islāmī' (Bahrain's Mediterranean and Indian roles in Islamic History), pp. 18–20. See also: N. Chittick, 'The Shirazi colonization of East Africa', *Journal of African History* 6 (1965): 275–94.

43 Fahmy, op. cit., pp. 286–96. Regarding the caravanserai, the bazaar and the inn in the local sources, see: al-Maqrizi, *al-Khiṭaṭ* (Topography); Ibn al-Daqmaq, *al-Initṣār bi-wāsiṭit ʿaqd al-amṣār* (Victory through Founding Colonies); Abu al-Maḥasin, *al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah* (The Shining Stars). Among the foreign sources, see: Adam Mez, *al-Ḥaḍārah al-Islamīyah fī al-qarn al-rābiʿ al-hijrī aw ʿAṣr al-nahḍah fī al-Islām* (Islamic Civilization in the Fourth Century AH or The Renaissance of Islam; original title: *Die Renaissance des Islams*, Heidelberg, 1922), translated by Muhammad ʿAbd al-Hadi Abu Zayd, 2 vols (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji; Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1st edn 1940, 4th edn 1967).

44 See Subhi Labib, 'al-Tijārah al-Kārimīyah wa-tijārat Miṣr fī al-ʿuṣūr al-wusṭā', (Karimi and Egyptian Trade in the Middle Ages), *Al-Majallah al-Tārīkhīyah al-Miṣrīyah* 4, no. 2 (1952), and Earl J. Hamilton, 'The role of monopoly in the overseas expansion and colonial trade of Europe before 1800', *American Economic Review* 38 (1948).

45 Steensgaard, op. cit., pp. 56–7.

46 See, for example, the encomiums which Sir Arnold Wilson has cited about Hormuz in English literature: Arnold Talbot Wilson, *al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: mujmal tārīkhī min aqdam al-azminah ḥattā awāʾil al-qarn al-ʿishrīn* (The Persian Gulf, an Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the beginning of the Twentieth Century), translated by ʿAbd al-Qadir Yusuf (Kuwait: Matbaʿat al-Amal, 1940), p. 186.

47 See what Braudel says about the wealth of the Surat merchants: Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, op. cit., vol. 2: *The Wheels of Commerce*, pp. 583, 585, and vol. 3: *Perspective of the World*, pp. 486–90.

48 Ashtor offers the thesis that the struggle between the rulers and merchants in the environment of the Arab East in general is one of the dominant issues which historians have neglected: Eliyahu Ashtor, *A*

Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press; London: Collins, 1976), p. 114.

49 Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, op. cit., pp. 214–19.

50 ʿAbd al-ʿAlim, *Al-Milāḥah wa-ʿulūm al-biḥār ʿind al-ʿArab* (Navigation and Oceanography among the Arabs), op. cit., pp. 158–64.

51 Dates remained an important foodstuff until recently – see: Allan Villiers *Anbāʾ al-Sindbād: qiṣṣat al-milāhah al-ʿArabīyah al-ʿaẓīmah fī al-Muḥīt al-Hindī* (The Tales of Sindbad: The Wonderful Story of Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean) translated by Nayif Khurma (Kuwait: Matbaʿat Hukumat Kuwait, 1982), pp. 608–20.

52 Khan, *Tārīkh wilāyat al-Baṣra: dirāsah fī al-aḥwāl al-ijtimāʿīyah wa-al-siyāsīyah wa-al-iqtiṣādīyah* (History of the Province of Basra: a Study of Social, Political and Economic Conditions), op. cit., p. 82.

53 Allan Villiers, op. cit. See also: Sayf Marzuq al-Shamlan, *Tārīkh al-ghaws ʿalā al-luʾ fī al-Kuwait wa-al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (The History of Pearl Diving in Kuwait and the Arab Gulf), (Kuwait: Matbaʿat Hukumat Kuwait, 1975); Sulayman Ibrahim al-ʿAskari, *Al-Tijārah wa-al-milāḥah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī fī al-ʿaṣr al-ʿAbbāsī* (Trade and Seafaring in the Arab Gulf in the Abbasid Period), (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Madani, 1972); and Isa al-Qitami, *Dalīl al-muḥtār fī ʿilm al-biḥār* (A guide for the Perplexed in Oceanography), (Baghdad: Matbaʿat Dar al-Salam, 1915, 1st edn; Kuwait, Matbaʿat Hukumat Kuwait, 1964, 3rd edn).

54 One of the reasons for dividing the journey through the Red Sea into stages was that the northern part of the Red Sea was surrounded by coral reefs, where the large sailing ships would not be safe. They therefore unloaded their cargoes at Jiddah or ʿIdhab. The real reason, however, was to guard the Mameluke sultans' monopoly of the pepper trade in the Red Sea, which forbade non-Muslim merchants from entering its northern ports. See, for example: Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages 550–1350* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 289–311. Naʿim Zaki Fahmy ascribes the flourishing of the Karimi merchants to this monopoly. See Fahmy, *Ṭuruq al-tijārah al-duwalīyah wa-maḥaṭṭātuhā bayn al-sharq wa-al-gharb (awākhir al-ʿusūr al-wusṭā).* (International Trade Routes and their Ports-of-Call between the East and West (the Late Middle Ages)), op. cit., pp. 301–4.

55 Allan Villiers, op. cit., p. 27, and George Fadlo Hourani, *al-ʿArab wa-al-milāḥah fī al-Muḥīṭ al-Hindī fī al-ʿuṣūr al-qadīmah wa-awāʾil al-ʿuṣūr al-wusṭā* (Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times), translated by Yaʿqub Bakr (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1958), pp. 285–92.

56 Regarding the Monsoon winds or the east and west winds (*al-sabā* and *al-dabūr*), and the Trade Winds, see: G. R. Tibbets, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Coming of the Portuguese* (London: n.pub., 1971).

57 Fahmy, op. cit., pp. 267–80.

58 Lane, *Venice, a Maritime Republic*, op. cit., pp. 69–70 and 119–52.

59 The seasonal markets take on a special importance in economic development and in economic and social life generally for Braudel and his school, but they have been carefully studied up to now in the Arab societal

environment. The pilgrimage season is regarded as absolutely the most important of these seasonal markets. Regarding the theoretical importance of seasonal markets, see Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 2: *The Wheels of Commerce*, op. cit., pp. 81–137; especially Braudel's debate with Dominic and Javin Sourdel, who wrongly asserted that there was no trading season (or seasonal markets) in the Islamic states: pp. 125–9. Regarding the economic importance of the pilgrimage season in a comparatively late period, see: William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: the Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 18–23, 92–106 and 173–4.

60 Fahmy, op. cit., p. 284.

61 According to John Marlowe, Britain covered the Saudi budget for two successive years, 1941 and 1942, because of the financial deficit (due to the interruption of the pilgrimage to the Hijaz during World War II) – John Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (London: Cresset Press; Western Printing Services; New York: Praeger, 1962).

62 The interaction between the political and economic systems is one of the neglected elements in the analysis of Arab society and its institutions, with some aspects of which we are trying to deal in this study.

63 For fuller information about the Genizah documents, see the three volumes compiled by Goitein based on data derived from them: Solomon Dob Fritz Goitein: *A Mediterranean Society: the Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 2 vols (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967–71), and *Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

64 The magnitude of this commercial intercourse becomes perfectly clear in the second part of Eric Wolf's book: *Europe and the People without History*, op. cit., and Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, 2 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), vol. 2.

65 Lopez and Raymond, eds. *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, op. cit., pp. 108–14.

66 After the period of efflorescence which accompanied what Needham calls 'The Great Chinese–Arab Era' between the ninth and the fourteenth centuries. After the collapse of Mongol security (the Pax Mongolica), however, the importance of the sea routes in the east connecting with Egypt and the Syrian coast increased: Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954–), vol. 1, pp. 170–90 and 214.

67 In fact, concentration on the Arab East and agricultural production, and accordingly on the decline in the average amount of land tax, gives rise to the faulty impression which is based upon a neglect of trade, especially international *muḍārabah* trade. Issawi's mistake lies in his first deduction, which disregards the role of trade as a peacetime activity based upon the transformation of the Indian Ocean into an 'Islamic Lake', and in his failure to present evidence for economic breakdown before the sixteenth century. See: Charles Issawi, 'The decline of the Middle Eastern trade, 1100–1850', in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia*, op. cit., pp. 245–66. Udovitch shares with Issawi in the same mistake of careless

generalizing: Robert Lopez, Harry Miskimin and Abraham L. Udovitch, 'England to Egypt, 1350–1500: long-term trends and long-distance trade', in M. A. Cook, ed., *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 93–128, especially pp. 115–28.

68 As is apparent from the studies of Heyd, which are now outdated: W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* (Leipzig: *s.n.*, 1885–6); the Arabic translation of which is entitled: *Tārīkh al-tijārah fī al-Sharq al-Adnā fī al-ʿuṣūr al-wusṭā* (History of Commerce in the Near East in the Middle Ages), translated by Ahmad Muhammad Rida (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Misriyah al-ʿAmmah li-al-Kitab, 1985), vol. 1.

69 For a short treatment of this subject see: Al-Naqeeb, 'Binaʾ al-mujtamaʿ al-ʿArabī: baʿḍ al-furūḍ al-baḥthīyah' (Building Arab Society: some Research Hypotheses), op. cit., pp. 4–41.

70 There is no study of social life and economic conditions in the Arab Peninsula in this period which deals with the comprehensive historical reality, for there is always the fragmented picture of the commercial cities, the desert and the cultivated valleys in Oman and Yemen.

71 Lach's book referred to earlier gives us a general idea of the interaction between Europe and Asia in this period. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe.*

3. Gulf and Arab Peninsula society in 'the grand imperial design'

1 There are no comprehensive studies or histories of the region, but rather partial studies leading to generalizations of the kind put forward by Issawi regarding the decline of trade and a dark period, etc. There have likewise been no serious efforts towards the periodization of Arab-Islamic history to acquaint us with the important turning-points in the region. See Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago University Press, 1966), Introduction.

2 The rule of the military forces began with the Buwayhids, but it took a more obvious form with the Seljuqs as an introduction to the Mameluke era, an atypical period of a special nature in Arab-Islamic history without roots in that society – see: Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).

Regarding a later period, see: Nufan Raja al-Hamud, *al-ʿAskar fī Bilād al-Sham fī al-qarnayn al-sādis ʿashar wa-al-sābiʿ ʿashar al-milādīyayn* (The Military in Syria during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries AD), (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1981).

3 Andrew N. Watson, 'A medieval green revolution: new crops and farming techniques in the early Islamic world', in Abraham L. Udovitch, ed., *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1910: Studies in Economic and Social History* (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 29–85.

4 Needham contrasts the period between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries AD, 'the great Arab/Chinese period', with that between the third and the seventh centuries AD – 'The great Indian/Chinese period'; see: Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1954–), vol. 1, p. 214.

5 E. W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors*, 2nd edn, revised and with additional material by Robin Hallett (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Chap. 2, especially pp. 119–31. Regarding the importance of gold in traditional trade in general, see: Pierce Vilar, *A History of Gold and Money, 1450–1920* (London: Verso, 1969, 1984), pp. 46–122.

6 In order to form a general idea about the trade revolution, one must return to Heyd's book (the revised French version which came out in 1885–6) regarding the history of the Levant trade in the Middle Ages, of which an Arabic translation of vol. 1 was recently issued; and to Ashtor's book, which updated a good deal of the material upon which Heyd relied. See: W. Heyd, *Tārīkh al-tijārah fī al-Sharq al-Adnā fī al-ʿuṣūr al-wusṭā* (The History of Commerce in the Near East in the Middle Ages), translated by Ahmad Muhammad Rida (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Misriyah al-ʿAmmah li-al-Kitab, 1985); Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages, 550–1350* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 85–122.

Most of this material deals with Mediterranean trade. As for the Indian Ocean, one may have recourse to: A. Lewis, 'Maritime skills in the Indian Ocean, 1368–1500', *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 16 (1973): 238–66.

7 K. N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 39–62.

8 Charles B. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), and S. G. Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), vol. 1.

9 Regarding Portuguese trading practices, see: H. V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

10 We shall deal with this topic in some detail in the following pages.

11 Except during limited periods. Islamic hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean ended with the Battle of Lepanto, which will be discussed later.

12 See, for example: Rita Rose Di Meglio, 'Arab trade and the Malay Peninsula from the 8th to the 16th century', in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia* (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1970), pp. 105–35.

13 See: Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 39–51.

14 Regarding this topic from a broad historical viewpoint, see: Sheldon O. Watts, *A Social History of Western Europe, 1450–1720: Tensions and Solidarities among Rural Europeans* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1984), pp. 133–61. The expression 'the crisis of feudalism' is borrowed from Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982), p. 108.

15 See, for example: V. Minorsky, 'The Middle East in western politics in the 13th and 15th centuries', *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 27 (1940): 427–61.

16 Regarding the importance of this event from a European viewpoint, see: Kenneth Meyer Setton, *Europe and the Levant in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1974), article 10: 'Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril', pp. 133–68.

17 Important consequences would result from the fact that Portuguese exploration was unable to break the Arab-Islamic monopoly. Grousset goes so far as to make a historical connection between the Ottoman invasion of Europe and Portuguese exploration in the Indian Ocean, as though they were flanking manoeuvres by the two rivals. In accordance with this logic, when the Ottoman vanguard was arriving at Vicenza in 1498, Vasco da Gama landed at Callicut. In the year 1503 the Ottomans registered a series of victories over Venice, but only six years later, Francisco d'Almeida gained control over the Indian Ocean. In 1522 Suleiman the Magnificent gained possession of Rhodes, but only five years later the Portuguese defeated the Islamic fleet at Gujarat. During the 1530s the Ottomans were able to invade Austria, but they failed to wrest India from Joaõ da Castro ... and so forth until the Battle of Lepanto, which changed the whole course of events. Taken from: Needham, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 225.

18 'Reliving the Battle of Lepanto', *Economist* (5 April 1986), pp. 89–90.

19 R. B. Serjeant, *The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles with Yemeni and European Accounts of the Dutch Pirates off Mocha in the 17th Century* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1974), pp. 1–4.

20 Especially Shahrī's history and the manuscripts whose authors are unknown, such as the Saiwan manuscripts and Jarmuzis' history.

21 Amin Tawfiq Tibi, 'Wuṣūl al-Islām ilā-bilād Malibār (sāḥil al-Hind al-Gharbī) wa-al-taṣaddī li-al-ghuzāt al-Burtughālīyīn fī al-qarn al-sādis ʿashar min khilāl kitāb: *Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn fī baʿd aḥwāl al-Burtughālīyīn*' (The Arrival of Islam at the Land of Malibar (the West Coast of India) and Resistance to the Portuguese Invaders in the Sixteenth Century in the Book: The Gem regarding the Warriors in some of their Encounters with the Portuguese) (unpublished paper, 1986), p. 7. See also: A. Dos Capta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surote* (Wiesbaden: n.pub., 1979), and M. N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: the Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976). Panikkar reached the conclusion that the rulers of India didn't care whether their merchants sold their goods to the Arabs or the Portuguese, although the latter had the advantage that they sold these rulers the weapons and ammunition they wanted – K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953), p. 53, *passim.*

22 Serjeant, op. cit., pp. 14–21.

23 See by way of example: S. Ozbaran, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534–1581', *Journal of Asian History* 6 (1972): 45–87, and Mustafa ʿUqayl al-Khatib, *Al-Tanāfus al-duwalī fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī, 1622–1763* (International Competition in the Arabian Gulf, 1622–1763), (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAsriyah, 1981).

24 J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955), p. 118, *passim.* Wallerstein states that the literature about this period supports Van Leur's conclusion – Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), vol. 1, p. 331.

25 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ʿAwad, 'al-Ahammīyah al-istrātījīyah wa-al-tijārīyah li-Jazīrat Hormuz, 1507–1629' (The Strategic and Commercial Importance

of the Island of Hormuz, 1507–1629), (an unpublished paper, 1986), pp. 3–7.

26 See Ashtor's sources: *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, op. cit.

27 Among the clearest examples of that is the Persian alliance with the English, which led to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz, and the alliance of the Omanis with the English and then with the French at a later date, at the time of the Omani resurgence in the seventeenth century.

28 Boxer, op. cit.

29 Carlo N. Cipollo, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society 1000–1700*, 2nd edn (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 250–96.

30 Peter Kriedte, *Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists* (Gottingen: Berg Publishers, 1983), pp. 18–60.

31 For a brief treatment of this topic, see: Hamilton Alexander Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: a Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 49–59.

32 On the praise of Hormuz: 'Were the world a ring, Hormuz would be the jewel in it', etc., plus the extolling of the wealth of Hormuz by Milton, and Burton's translation of Camoens' poetic eulogy of Hormuz in his *Os Lusiadas*, see: Arnold Talbot Wilson, *The Persian Gulf: a Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the 20th Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928, [p. 101]). All succeeding references to this work will be to the Arabic translation: Arnold Talbot Wilson, *al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: mujmal tārīkhī min aqdam al-azminah ḥattā awāʾil al-qarn al-ʿisrīn*, translated with an introduction by ʿAbd al-Qadir Yusuf (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Amal, 1940), pp. 186ff.

33 Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 151.

Note that the basic difference which the Portuguese introduced into Indian Ocean trade was that the local merchants now dealt with representatives or agents of a heavily armed military state, that prices were fixed by official agreements among the states, and that trade in the Indian Ocean was determined by means of the *cartaze* without altering actual economic and political relations at the local level – see: Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 330ff., and Steensgaard, ibid., p. 151.

34 Most of the explanations regarding the supremacy of the East India Companies are drawn from the previous source, and from Van Leur's analyses. As for the role of the 'factors', see: Ian Bruce Watson, *Foundation for Empire: English Private Trade in India, 1659–1760* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1980).

35 Schumpeter has presented this question with clarity, for the inclusion of imperialism with capitalism, and terming pre-capitalist imperialism as colonialism is a matter of individual judgement and terminology, while imperialism as a matter of fact is a historical phenomenon appropriate to a description of the Arab Peninsula situation. Thus European penetration in its early stage did not go beyond the coastline, the ports and the commercial cities until the beginning of World War I in the twentieth century. 'Imperialism' is therefore a more precise term than 'colonialism'

for describing the phenomenon of European penetration into this environment. See: Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1951), pp. 64–98.

36 Or 'quasi-capitalism', as Maxime Rodinson, out of caution, has termed it, considering European capitalism, in the nineteenth century to be the ideal type (following Max Weber) for the world: Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (London: Allen Lane; New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 4–11.

37 On this see: Cheyney C. Ryan, 'The fiends of commerce: romantic criticisms of classical political economy', *History of Political Economy* 13, No. 1 (Spring, 1981): 80–94.

Although Mayer is speaking about a later period (the nineteenth century), his thesis is extremely important to understand the relation between the ruling class and the merchants in the imperialist countries. The author has carried our a full examination of this thesis: Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Al-Tārīkh al-jadīd wa-al-ḥaqā'iq al-khaṭirah' (The New History and its Important Truths), *Majallat al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyah* (Journal of the Social Sciences), (University of Kuwait) 13, no. 3 (Autumn, 1984): 215–27.

38 K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company 1600–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

39 For further details on this topic, see: A. R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in South-West India in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 101–36.

40 See the previously mentioned theses of Van Leur and Steensgaard.

41 The transfer of the economic centre of gravity of the Indian Ocean trade and its ports-of-call in the eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean has not been thoroughly studied, nor has it been made a subject of investigation in modern Arab history in a systematic way. For preliminary remarks see: K. N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company, 1600–1640* (London: n.pub., 1965), pp. 156–9, and Steensgaard, op. cit., pp. 172–92.

To pursue the discussion raised by the writings of the last author in European sources, see: Kristoff Glamann, 'European trade, 1500–1750', in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., *The Fortano Economic History of Europe* (Glasgow: Collins, 1974), vol. 2: *The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, pp. 427–526; and Bentley T. Duncan, 'Niels Steensgaard and the Europe–Asia trade of the early seventeenth century', *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 3 (1975): 512–18.

42 Regarding the commodities in circulation in the Indian Ocean trade in general during this period, see: Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1950*, op. cit., pp. 182–202; N. Groom, *Frankincense and Myrrh: a Study of the Arab Incense Trade* (London: n.pub., 1981); and Frederic C. Lane, 'Mediterranean spice-trade: its revival in the sixteenth century', in Frederic C. Lane, ed., *Venice in History: the Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).

43 A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1935); and Charles Philip Issawi, 'British trade and the rise of Beirut; 1830–1860', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8, no. 1 (January 1977).

44 Quoted from: Bernard Lewis, 'Some reflections on the decline of the Ottoman Empire', *Studies Islamica* 9 (1959): 118.

45 Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: the East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade*, op. cit., p. 175, *passim*.

46 Al-Khatib, *Al-Tanāfus al-duwalī fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī, 1622–1763* (International Competition in the Arabian Gulf, 1622–1763), pp. 185–229.

47 Wolf, op. cit., pp. 239–46.

48 Muhammad ʿAbdallah al-ʿAzzāwī, 'Nashāṭ Faransā al-siyāsī fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī wa-al-ijrāʾāt al-Briṭānīyah al-muḍaddah, 1793–1798' (France's Political Activity in the Arabian Gulf and British Counter-Measures, 1793–1798), *al-Khalij al-ʿArabi* (Basra University) 18, nos. 3–4 (1986): 29–43.

49 Among the minority is the study by ʿAbd al-Amir Muhammad al-Amin, 'Dawr al-qabāʾil al-ʿArabīyah fī ṣadd al-tawassuʿ al-Urubbī fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī khilāl al-qarnayn al-sābiʿ ʿashar wa-al-thāmin ʿashar' (The Role of the Arab Tribes in Resisting European Expansion in the Arabian Gulf during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), a paper delivered to the International History Conference, March, 1973. There are some other studies on this subject, but we must treat this type of study with caution. The failure to comprehend the concept of the era of the tribal elites allows writers to be carried away by the nationalist tribal interpretation *a priori* and its application to historical events and sources. The local resistance and its personification in the tribal elites was in total conformity with their control of the mercantile ports and the internal trade routes which constituted their chief source of income. Serjeant noted this in the case of Yemen – see: R. B. Serjeant, 'The interplay between tribal affinities and religious (Zaidi) authority in the Yemen', *Al-Abḥath* (American University of Beirut) 30 (1982): 32.

50 Mustafa ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Najjar, *et al.*, *Tārīkh al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-ḥadīth wa-al-muʿāṣir* (Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Gulf), (Basra: Basra University, 1984), pp. 15–108.

51 Amin al-Rihani, *Mulūk al-ʿArab aw riḥlih fī al-bilād al-ʿArabīyah* (The Arab Kings or a Journey through Arab Lands), 4th edn, 2 vols (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1960), vol. 2, pp. 433–9.

52 The struggle between the Qahtanis and the Adnanis continued in various forms beginning with the first century AH and spread to the provincial capitals. Books about the history of Syria, for instance, abound with references to this struggle down to the nineteenth century. See ʿAbd al-Karim Rafiq, *Al ʿArab wa-al-ʿUthmānīyūn, 1516–1916* (The Arabs and Ottomans, 1516–1916), (Damascus: Maktabat Atlas, 1974). Regarding Oman and their adoption of the Ibadi sect, see: J. C. Wilkinson, 'The origins of the Omani state', in Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, Studies in Modern Asia and Africa 8 (London: Allen & Unwin; Totawa, NJ: Rowman, 1972), pp. 71–9.

53 Samuel Barret Miles, *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*, 2nd

edn (London: Frank Cass, 1960); and Salah al-Aqqad, *Al-Tayyārāt al-siyāsīyah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf), (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1965), 2nd edn (1973), chap. 3.

54 There are clear references to an economic revival in this period in Oman. Sirhan ibn Saʿid al-Azkuwi al-ʿOmani, one of the local historians, has drawn attention to the fact that the Imam Sultan ibn Sayf took an interest in trade and 'possessed agents known for buying and selling (on his behalf). He amassed wealth and Oman prospered under his rule'; and regarding the Imam Balʿarab Banī Sultan ibn Saif, 'He owned male and female slaves – I heard it said that they numbered 1,700, ... and it was reported that he possessed twenty-four ships ...' See: Sirhan al-Azkuwi al-ʿOmani, *Tārīkh ʿUmān al-muqtabas min kitāb Kashf al-ghummah al-jāmiʿ li-akhbār al-ummah* (The History of Oman Adopted from the Book: The Removal of Distress, Embracing the History of the Nation), (Oman: Wizarat al-Turath al-Qawmi wa-al-Thaqafi, 1980), pp. 111–13.

55 Al-Aqqad, op. cit., pp. 116–34; and Wendell Phillips, *Oman: a History* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1971), pp. 53–6.

56 J. B. Kelly, 'A prevalence of furies: tribes, politics and religion in Oman and Trucial Oman', in Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, op. cit., p. 107.

57 Badr al-Din ʿAbbas al-Khususi, *Dirāsāt fī tārīkh al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-ḥadīth wa-al-muʿāṣir* (Studies in the Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabian Gulf), 2nd edn (Kuwait: Dhat al-Salasil, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 78–89.

58 Although local histories draw attention to the importance of the growing roles of the 'Mutawiʿah' in the political struggles of this period, nevertheless we still lack thorough studies of the question. It is clear, however, that the role of these men was part of a general manifestation of religious and sectarian fanaticism as a reaction to foreign penetration into the region.

59 This tripartite political struggle would continue, and later on would be focused on the Buraimi Oasis – Phillips, op. cit., pp. 163–83.

60 As an example of one of the interpretations of this phenomenon, see: R. D. Bathurst, 'Maritime trade and imamate government: two principal themes in the history of Oman to 1728', in Hopwood, ed., op. cit., pp. 100–3.

61 Regarding the role of Egypt in the Arab Peninsula in this period, see: al-Khususi, op. cit., pp. 121–80.

4. The 'Pax Britannica' era and the decline of the 'natural state' economy

1 These excuses appear in the colonialist writings as though the actions were philanthropic deeds for the good of humanity. See, for example: the Hon. G. N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, 2 vols (London: Longman Green, 1982); Lord Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, 3 vols (London: Benn, 1928), and Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox* (London: Hutchinson, 1942).

2 It is sad that this charge which was attached to the Arab Gulf coast, by

virtue of its being often repeated, also deceived the local transmitters of history as though it were the actual truth. Take, for example, Hamid ibn Sultan al-Shami, an inhabitant of the coast of Oman now called 'The Arab Emirates', who mentions that the reason for naming the Gulf the 'Pirate Coast' was due to the 'the State of the Corsairs' who came into the Gulf by way of Sind, and that the Portuguese expelled them in the year 900 AH. However, the one who checked the book corrected the author, noting in the margin that, 'There is no information in the Portuguese sources about "the Corsair State" in the Gulf, because the Portuguese themselves were the corsairs' – see Hamid ibn Sultan ibn Hamid al-Shami, *Naql al-akhbār fī wafāyāt al-mashāyikh wa-ḥawādith hādihi al-diyār* (Oman wa-al-Imārāt al-ʿArabīyah fī al-Khalīj) (The Transmission of Reports of the Decease of the Shaykhs and the Events of these Regions (Oman and the Arab Emirates in the Gulf)), verification by Falih Hanzal (Abu Dhabi: Dar al-Fikr al-Jadidah, 1987), p. 146. For the colonial viewpoint see: Charles Belgrave, *The Pirate Coast* (Beirut, n. pub., 1960).

3 Taken from: Arnold Talbot Wilson, *The Persian Gulf* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928, the Arabic version).

4 A. Hamilton, *A New Account of the East India* [sic], edited by Sir W. Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1930), p. 43, *passim.*

5 Wilson, op. cit., p. 322.

6 Ibid., p. 324.

7 R. D. Bathurst, 'Maritime trade and imamate government: two principal themes in the history of Oman to 1728', in: Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, Studies in Modern Asia and Africa, 8 (London: Allen & Unwin; Totowa: NJ: Rowman, 1972), p. 102.

8 Ibid., p. 101.

9 'A Treaty between H.M.G. and the Trucial Sheikhdoms for Suppressing Piracy and the Slave Traffic: [Great Britain and the Arab Tribes in the Persian Gulf], 8 January, 1820', in: Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, ed., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), vol. 1: *1535–1914*, doc. 35.

10 'Peace in perpetuity between H.M.G. and the Trucial sheikhdoms, 4 May 1853' (correct title: 'Perpetual maritime truce concluded by the Shaykhs of the Pirate Coast'), in: ibid., vol. 1, doc. 99.

11 Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840–1890* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 129–35.

12 Wilson, op. cit., p. 372. Regarding the economic motives of Britain in curbing the slave trade in East Africa, see: Richard D. Wolff. 'British imperialism and the East African slave trade', *Science and Society* 36 (Winter 1972): pp. 443–62.

There were other results of the campaign led by Britain to destroy the slave trade, for example the destruction of the cultivation of cloves in Zanzibar, whose production represented more than 80% of the cloves sold in the region. Slaves were the mainstay of agriculture in that island and the abolition of slavery led to the farms losing their workers. Thus, this was the end of the economic heyday of Zanzibar and the beginning of the dissolution of the Omani Sultanate and its influence in East Africa.

Princess Salima bint Sultan al-Sayyid Saʿid (Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar) concludes: 'that these three movements: slaves, exploration and missionary activity, [went] hand in hand, and that their prime [aim] was the crushing of Arab rule in Africa, which then emanated from Zanzibar'. The recording of this quotation here must not be understood as in any way constituting a defence of slavery, but has been mentioned only to clarify the actual results of colonial policies. See: Salimah bint al-Sayyid Saʿid ibn Sultan, *Mudhakkirāt Amīrah ʿArabīyah* (Memoirs of an Arab Princess), (Oman: Wizarat al-Turath al-Qawmi wa-al-Thaqafah, 1983), pp. 35–7.

13 Regarding conditions in general in the region during this period, see the section devoted to the Arab Peninsula in: Charles Philip Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 293–355.

14 About the Ottoman–British struggle during this period, especially the attempt by the former to regain their positions, see: 'Al ṣirāʿ al-ʿUthmānī al-Briṭānī fī minṭaqat al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī khilāl al-fatrah 1871–1914' (The Ottoman–British struggle in the Arabian Gulf region in the period 1871–1914), in Mustafa ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Najjar, *et al.*, *Tārīkh al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-ḥadīth wa-al-muʿāṣir* (The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabian Gulf) (Basra: Basra University, 1984), pp. 111–62; and Faruq ʿUthman Abaza, *al-Ḥukm al-ʿUthmānī fī al-Yaman, 1882–1918* (Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1882–1918) (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Misriyah al-ʿAmmah li-al-Kitab, 1986).

15 The collapse of artisan production, a common phenomenon in the Third World, accompanied the creation of the colonialist imperialist economy and the trade in European manufactured commodities.

16 The description of this procedure is derived from: Mirza Hasan Khan, *Tārīkh wilāyat al-Baṣra: dirāsah fī al-aḥwāl al-ijtimaʿīyah wa-al-siyāsīyah wa-al-iqtiṣādīyah* (A History of the Province of Basra: a Study of Social, Political and Economic Conditions), translated by Muhammad Wasfi Abu Maghli (Basra: Basra University, The Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1980). See also: Husayn Muhammad al-Qahwati, *Dawr al-Baṣra al-tijārī fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī, 1869–1914* (The Commercial Role of Basra in the Arabian Gulf, 1869–1914), (Basra: Basra University, Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1980).

17 Khan, op. cit., p. 69. See also: Stephanie Jones, 'The management of British India steamers in the Gulf, 1862–1945: Gray Mackenzie and the Mesopotamia Persia Corporation', in: Richard I. Lawless, ed., *The Gulf in the Early 20th Century* (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1986), pp. 25–63.

18 Concerning [reading *ḥawl* for *taḥawwal*] the trading ports, see: Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 240–4.

19 Regarding the impact of the commercial shipping lines and the opening of the Suez Canal in the region, see: Robert Geran Landen, *Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 178, *passim*; and R. J. Govin, *Aden Under British Rule, 1839–1967* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), pp. 82–3.

20 The dualism between commercial ships and sailing vessels continued until World War II, when local ownership of modern vessels began – see: Frank Broeze, 'Shipowners of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf since 1815', *Arab Journal of the Social Sciences* 1, no. 2 (1986): 225–59.

21 Allan Villiers, *Abūaʾ Al-Sindabād: qiṣṣat al-milāḥah al-ʿArabīyah al-ʿazīmah fī al-Muḥīṭ al-Hindī* (The Tales of Sindbad: the Wonderful Story of Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean), translated by Nayif Khurma (Kuwait: Matbaʿat Hukumat Kuwait, 1982). For a fuller study of the period of sailing ships, see: A. Villiers, *The Indian Ocean* (London: n.pub., 1952).

22 About the question of regional commodity specialization from the standpoint of the evolution of the scientific economic system under capitalism, see Wolf, op. cit., pp. 313–53.

23 For a general review of economic and political conditions in this period, see: Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London: Methuen, 1981).

24 Williiam Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and State in Arabia: the Hijaz under Ottoman control, 1840–1908* (Colombus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 25 and 171.

25 Ibid., pp. 101–6.

26 Wolf, op. cit., p. 336.

27 Ochsenwald, op. cit., p. 96.

28 Sayf Marzuq al-Shamlan, *Tārīkh al-ghaws ʿalā al-luʾluʾ fī al-Kuwait wa-al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (The History of Pearl-Diving in Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf) (Kuwait: Matbaʿat Hukumat Kuwait, 1975). This book contains information about pearl-diving in Kuwait in particular.

29 The collection of studies published in the following source includes papers on this phenomenon in the Arab environment – see: Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977).

30 Muhammad G. Rumaihi, 'The mode of production in the Arab Gulf before the discovery of oil', in Tim Niblock, ed., *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf* (Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 49–60.

31 Paul W. Harrison, *The Arab at Home* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924), p. 80, also quoted in Rumaihi, ibid., p. 56.

32 Rumaihi, op. cit., p. 55.

33 We shall return to this subject when we talk about the genesis of the absolutist state in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula in Chapter 6 of this book.

34 Halliday states that the British never recognized that Oman was in reality a British colony. See; Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans: a Political Survey of Instability in the Arab World* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin; New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 271. For a more extensive study of imperialist policies in the region and their local results, see: Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967).

35 Tom Little, *South Arabia: Area of Conflict* (London: Pall Mall; New York: Praeger [1968]).

36 I am indebted to the study of Lienhardt for bringing out this dynamic aspect of traditional rule in the Arab Peninsula – see Peter Lienhardt,

'The authority of the shaykhs in the Gulf: an essay in nineteenth-century history', *Arabian Studies* 2 (1975): 61–75. See also: I. Peterson, 'Tribes and politics in Eastern Arabia', *Middle East Journal* 31, no. 3 (Summer 1977): 297–312.

37 Most of the books on the history of Kuwait touch on this event – see, for example: Husayn Khalaf al-Shaykh Khazʿal, *Tārīkh al-Kuwait al-Siyāsī* (The Political History of Kuwait), 5 vols (Beirut: Matbaʿat Dar al-Kutub, 1962), vol. 2: *ʿAṣr al-Shaykh Mubārak* (The Era of Shaykh Mubarak), pp. 280–6.

38 For estimates on the size of the tax on pearl-diving in Kuwait for the period 1910–15, see: Shamlan, op. cit., pp. 319–26.

39 Britain paid a (nominal) yearly salary of 500 rupees to the sultans and shaykhs of Hadramawt until close to the time of independence. It likewise supported the Saudi budget for the years 1940–2 when the pilgrimage was interrupted on account of the war, until the United States intervened in February 1943 with the announcement that the defence of Saudi Arabia constituted a vital United States interest. This allowed official transfers from the US Treasury directly to Saudi Arabia, which brought British influence in this part of the Arab Peninsula to an end. See: John Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (London: Cresset Press, Western Printing Services; New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 131ff.

40 W. B. Fisher, 'Southern Arabia: a human reservoir', in: John I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher, eds, *Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: a Geographical Approach* (London: University of London Press; New York: African Pub. Corp., 1972), pp. 283–5.

41 The average level of this immigration increased noticeably after World War I, especially after the fall of Shaykh Khazʿal's regime in Arabistan and the formation of a powerful central government in Tehran in 1925, as will become clear later.

5. From *rentier* to authoritarian state

1 Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921* 2nd edn (Hassocks, Eng.: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 9.

Karl Marx greatly admired Muhammad ʿAli's reforms, for he wrote that he was the only person 'who could have replaced the "glorious turban" [meaning by that the Turkey of the Middle Ages, as explained by Marx] with a real head'. He described Egypt in his time as 'the only part (of the Ottoman Empire) which possessed a vital force at that time'– quoted from Vladimir Lutsky, *Tārīkh al-aqṭār al-ʿArabīyah al-Ḥadīth* (Modern History of the Arab States), (Moscow: Dar al Taqaddum, 1971), pp. 74ff.

2 This dualism in the execution of imperial policy (the Indian Government on the one hand and the Ministry of External Affairs in London, on the other) would continue until the independence of India in 1947, with coordination achieved through joint cabinet committees. It is important to make it clear that this duality was only at the level of execution.

3 Or which was currently called 'the Eastern Question' at that time –

Kedourie, op. cit., p. 10. The question of the division of the territories of the Ottoman State came about a quarter of a century after the division of the territories of the Sultanate of Oman in what is called 'Canning's award' of the year 1861, according to which Britain gained possession of Zanzibar and the territories of the Sultanate in East Africa. Regarding the details of this matter, see: Robert Geran Landen, *Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

4 For a brief treatment of the influence of the utilitarian view in Mill, father and son, upon the old liberalism, see: Bryan S. Turner, *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1984), pp. 17–23.

As for the influence of German idealism upon the new liberalism, W.S. Blunt has aptly portrayed it in his book *The Future of Islam* (1882).

5 The eclipse of Canning's influence indicated a big change in imperialist policy in the region: Allan Cunningham, 'Stratford Canning and the Tanzimat', in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds, *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 245–64.

6 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: being a Personal Narrative of Events*, new edn (London: n. pub., 1924).

7 Ibid., pp. 24ff. (I have quoted Blunt directly, from which the Arabic translation differs in minor respects.) It appears that Blunt's ideas had a profound influence on our great scholar, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, the author of *Tabāʾiʿ al-istibdād* (The Characteristics of Despotism), particularly Blunt's ideas in his book, *The Future of Islam* (1882), which has been translated into Arabic as *Mustaqbal al-Islām.* See Husayn Ahmad Amin 'Al-Tayyār al-qawmī al-ʿArabī' (The Arab Nationalist Current), *Majallat al-Hilal* (September 1986): 76ff.

8 For a brief treatment of these events, see: John Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (London: Cresset Press, Western Printing Services; New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 78–97.

9 Ibid., pp. 58–65; Marlowe is right in concluding that this imperialist design as conceived by the Curzon school came along too late in time. However, it did not fail, but was only modified according to the dictates of circumstances and new considerations which will be mentioned later on.

10 Regarding the matter of the McMahon promise, which Antonius calls 'Great Britain's Pledge', see: George Antonius, *Yaqẓat al-ʿArab: tārīkh ḥarakat al-ʿArab al-qawmīyah* (The Arab Awakening: the History of the Arab National Movement), translated by Nasir al-Din al-Asad and Ihsan ʿAbbas (Beirut: Dar al-ʿIlm li-al-Malayin, 1939), 6th pr. 1980, pp. 251–75.

11 With regard to the attendant circumstances surrounding the signing of the Sykes–Picot Agreement from a pro-British viewpoint, see: Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, op. cit., pp. 29–66.

12 It is a strange thing that neither Antonius nor the writers contemporary with these events made any connection between the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the appearance of the third Saudi state, and the support of the

Great Powers for it at the expense of its neighbours, in spite of the fact that the connection between them was pivotal and decisive. See, for example, how Antonius deals with the Saudi expansion, in Antonius, op. cit., pp. 457–70.

13 Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution: an Interpretive History of Modern Iran* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 79–93.

14 J. B. Kelly, 'A prevalence of furies: tribes, politics and religion in Oman and Trucial Oman, in Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, pp. 118–23.

15 Concerning an initial chronology of the events of 1920 as a dividing line in our modern history, see: Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Al-Uṣūl al-ijtimāʿīyah li-al-dawlah al-tasalluṭīyah fī al-mashriq al-ʿArabī' (The Social Principles of the Absolutist State in the Arab East), *Al-Fikr al-ʿArabi al-Muʿasir* 27–8 (Autumn 1983): 189–94.

16 Marlowe is speaking about Iraq, but it applies to all the countries of the Arab East, especially to the Arab Peninsula: Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 113–14.

17 We have three eyewitness accounts of what happened at the ʿUqair Conference: that of the Lebanese journalist, Amin al-Rihani, that of King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz's adviser, St John Philby, and that of Major Dickson, the political officer in Kuwait, who was a member of Sir Percy Cox's official delegation and recorded the minutes of the Conference. All of these sources agree on the arbitrariness of the drawing of the boundaries, though Salah al-Aqqad mentions apropos of this Conference that both Sir Percy Cox and St John Philby made extensive studies of the introduction of the idea of setting up fixed boundaries on the ground in the Arab Peninsula, but unfortunately he doesn't mention his sources. See: Amin al-Rihani, *Mulūk al-ʿArab aw riḥlah fī al-bilād al-ʿArabīyah* (The Arab Kings, or a Journey through Arab Lands), 2 vols (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1924), vol. 2, pp. 67–71; Harry St John B. Philby, *Saʿudi Arabia* (London: Benn; New York: Praeger, 1955); Harold Richard Dickson, *Kuwait and her Neighbours* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 266–80; and Salah al-ʿAqqad, *Al-Mashriq al-ʿArabī al-muʿāṣir* (The Contemporary Arab East), 2nd edn (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1983), pp. 486ff.

18 Peter Slugget and Marion Farouk Slugget, 'The precarious monarchy: Britain, Abd-Aziz Saud and the establishment of the Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its dependencies, 1925–1932', in Tim Niblock, ed., *State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 36–57, especially pp. 48–55.

19 For a historical presentation of these events, see: Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: a Study in Iraqi Politics*, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), and A. Shikara, 'Faisal's ambitions of leadership in the Fertile Crescent', in Abbas Kelidar, ed., *The Integration of Modern Iraq* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 32–45.

20 For a more thorough study of this period of Iranian history, see: Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 118–49.

21 We have no statistical studies of this extremely important subject, but we

can conclude from historical references that among the reasons for the migration from southern Iran during this period were the following: the brutality of the central government, tax evasion, the evasion of conscription, etc. Some statistical information recorded by Baqir al-Najjar confirms the existence of Iranian migration to southern Iraq and the west coast of the Gulf. Al-Najjar quotes, for example, from a recent study that the average ratio of Iranians among the total of foreign immigrants to Kuwait for the period of 1917–27 was 48 per cent, which was the highest ratio for any foreign nationality until 1942. Thus, half of the immigrants to Kuwait in this period were Iranians. This question turned into one of the heated political issues in 1938, during the constitutional experiment, and was one of the reasons for its collapse. Another statistic mentions that the Iranians were 8.4 per cent of the inhabitants of Bahrain and 47 per cent of the foreign residents there, according to the 1941 statistics. See: Baqir al-Najjar, 'Al-Hijrah ilā al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: dirāsah fī al-tārīkh al-ijtimāʿī li-al-hijrah wa-dawr al-sharikāt al-nafṭīyah fī al-niṣf al-awwil min al-qarn al-ʿishrīn', (Immigration to the Arabian Gulf: a study of the social history of immigration and the role of the oil companies during the first half of the twentieth century), unpublished study, pp. 43 and 46.

22 Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East: Oil and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1955). Regarding the American open-door policy, see: Raymond Frech Mikesell and Hollis Burnley Chenery, *Arabian Oil: America's State in the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949).

23 We do not yet possess a thorough study of the nationalist movement in the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula in its historical framework in the early period, but I shall make mention of two studies: Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari: 'Tārīkh al-ḥarakah al-dīmūqrāṭīyah al-ūlā fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī' (History of the first democratic movement in the Arabian Gulf), *Al-Muʾarrikh al-ʿArabi* 15 (1980), and Khalil ʿAli Murad, 'Al-Ḥarakah al-waṭanīyah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī' (The Nationalist Movement in the Arabian Gulf), in Mustafa ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Najjar, *Tārīkh al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī al-ḥadīth wa-al-Muʿāṣir* (The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabian Gulf), (Basra: Basra University, 1984), pp. 163–95.

24 Neither the circumstances attending the rise of the 1921 reform movement, nor those surrounding its collapse, have until now been revealed. Although ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rashid was contemporary with and a participator in these events, yet all the elucidation he provides doesn't exceed what is given in the following extract:

> The Emir opened the way for the establishment of an Assembly to look into the country's concerns and interests in order to assist in the administration of affairs and in decision-making, covenanting with them not to decide upon any important matter without the Assembly's approval. It was in fact established ..., but it is most regrettable that this newborn creature was very short-lived, for hardly had it exercised authority when it gave up the ghost and was laid in its grave ...

See: *Tārīkh al-Kuwait* (The History of Kuwait), under the supervision of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rashid (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1971), p. 235.

25 Muhummad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, *Qaḍāyā al-taqhyīr al-siyāsī wa-al-*

ijtimāʿī fī al-Bahrain, 1920–1970 (Problems of Political and Social Change in Bahrain, 1920–1970), (Kuwait: Mu'assassat al-Wahdah li-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawziʿ, 1976).

26 Rosemarie J. Sa'id, '1938 reform movement in Dubai', *Al-Abḥāth* (December, 1970); and Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, 'Harakat 1938 al-iṣlāḥīyah fī al-Kuwait wa-al-Baḥrain wa-Dubai' (The 1938 Reform Movement in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai), *Majallat Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-ʿArabiyah* 1, no. 4 (1975): 29–68.

27 Satiʿ al-Husari, *Al ʿUrūbah awwalan* (Arabism First), 2nd edn (Beirut: Dar al-ʿIlm li-al-malayin, 1955), p. 7.

28 The Arabic translation of the text of the report was published in: Najdah Fathi Safwat, 'Mawqif Brīṭānyah min al-waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah' (Britain's position with regard to Arab unity), *Al-Bahith al-ʿArabi* 8 (July–September 1986): 116–22. It seems that this report was written in June, 1933, that is a little before the death of King Faisal (King of Iraq), in order to persuade him that his call for the holding of a pan-Arab conference in Baghdad on Arab unity was impractical and impossible [incapable of realization].

29 United States, Federal Trade Commission, *The International Petroleum Cartel* (Washington, DC: n. pub., 1951); George Lenczowski, *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960); Stephen Helmsley Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East: its Discovery and Development*, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press, for RIIA, 1961), and George W. Stocking, *Middle East Oil: a Study in Political and Economic Controversy* (Kingsport: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970).

30 In fact, the tripartite struggle between the multi-national petroleum companies, ruling regimes and popular Arab nationalist movements could provide a full record of the history of the region after World War II, but I have not seen any published studies proceeding along these lines, though we can mention Sampson's book about the growth of the multinational petroleum companies and the emergence of OPEC as giving us a glimpse of this struggle – Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters.*

Another glimpse lies hidden in the nationalization which the petroleum and other sectors have witnessed in the Third World: S. Piccioto and J. Faundez, eds, *Nationalization in the Third World* (London: n. pub., 1979).

31 In order to form a background for the development of petroleum pricing policy, see the various studies published in the following book: Z. M. Mikdashi [*et al.*], eds, *Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry* (Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Centre, 1970).

32 Y. H. Mohammad, 'An interpretive survey of the structure of the world oil market', *Arab Journal of the Social Sciences*, 1, no. 2 (1986): 196–214. For a general treatment of this subject, see: M. S. El-Azhari, ed., *The Impact of Oil Revenues on Arab Gulf Development* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

33 H. Mahdavy, 'The patterns and problems of economic development in *rentier* states: the case of Iran', in M. A. Cook, ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 428–67.

34 Including the petroleum sector. It is of importance to recognize that the petroleum sector has expanded at the present time, but it is still marginal in the preceding areas.
35 Concerning the effect of capital accumulation on the role of the state which the nationalization of petroleum has produced, see: Peter Nore, 'Oil and state: a study of nationalization in the oil industry', in Peter Nore and Teresa Turner, eds, *Oil and Class Struggle* (London: Zed Press, 1980), pp. 69–88.
36 I am relying in this analysis on Paul M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964).
37 This procedure is not followed systematically throughout all of the petroleum states of the Arab Peninsula, for there are palpable differences among them in this area.
38 Due to the sensitivity of this subject, there are very few studies dealing with it, most of them published in newspapers or weekly magazines, like *Al-Taliʿah* in Kuwait. It appears that Ghanim Najjar, measuring by what was published in the newspaper, *al-Watan*, in 1984–5, possesses abundant information about this operation in its early stages between 1950 and 1965. As for what followed, there is ample information through the answers of the ministers concerned to questions from the members of the National Assembly.
39 See Table A.5 in the Statistical Appendix at the end of the book.
40 Paul Villeire, 'Al-Batrūl wa-al-ṭabaqah al-waẓīfiyah' (Petroleum and the Functional Class), translated by Khidr Khidr, *Dirasat ʿArabiyah* 2 (December 1979): 110–14.
41 By the mere recording of the average public expenditures [we see that] these levels continually tend to increase, according to the thesis of James O'Connor. The reason for this goes back to social and political pressures on governments and the efforts of special interest groups and lobbies, etc. Thus the case of the *rentier* states is part of a general phenomenon but it is a case in which the average public expenditure represents huge amounts compared with other states in the Third World. James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 3–12.
42 This is the role undertaken by citizens of the petroleum states to provide guarantees for non-citizens or a commitment to fulfil their obligations if they should fail to meet them. This role has been expanded into a form of trading in guarantees. For an initial treatment of this subject, see: Saad al-Din Ibrahim, *Al-Niẓām al-ijtimāʿi al-ʿArabī al-jadīd: dirāsah ʿan al-āthār al-ijtimāʿīyah li-al-tharwah al-nafṭīyah* (The New Arab Social Order: a Study of the Social Effects of Petroleum Wealth) 2nd edn (Cairo, Dar al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi, 1982), pp. 31–4.
43 This is another example of parasitical commerce, whose historical origin in the region we find in the supply of labourers for the foreign petroleum companies in return for a fee for each head which the agent or contractor supplies. In the unpublished study of Baqir Najjar are to be found the names of a number of these agents who previously practised this business in Kuwait and Qatar. For examples of the situation in the Arab Peninsula, see: al-Najjar, 'Al-Hijrah ilā al-Khalij al-ʿArabī: dirāsah fī al-tārīkh al-ijtimāʿī li-al-hijrah wa-dawr al-sharikāt al-nafṭīyah fī al-niṣf al-awwil

min al-qarn al-ʿishrīn' (Migration to the Arabian Gulf: a study in the social history of migration and the role of the petroleum companies during the first half of the twentieth century), op. cit., pp. 11–12, 27–8. Al-Najjar draws his data from Ian Seccombe and Richard I. Lawless, 'The Gulf labour market and the early oil industry: traditional structures and new forms of organization', in Richard I. Lawless, ed., *The Gulf in the Early 20th Century: Foreign Institutions and Local Responses* (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1986), pp. 91–124.

44 *Al-ʿAmālah al-ajnabīyah fī aqṭār al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: buḥūth wa-munāqashāt al-Nadwah al-Fikrīyah al-latī naẓẓamahā Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah bi-al-taʿāwun maʿ al-Maʿhad al-ʿArabī li-al-Takhṭīt* (Foreign Labour in the Arabian Gulf Countries: Studies and Discussions of the Symposium Held by the Arab Unity Studies Centre in Collaboration with the Arab Planning Institute), edited by Nadir Furjani (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-ʿArabiyah, 1983).

45 Similarly, the gulf is widening between the rich Arab petroleum states and the poor non-petroleum states, although petroleum revenue has influenced all Arab countries, but to disparate degrees. The effects of petroleum income reaches the poor countries through the remittances of the workers from the petroleum countries, as shown in Table A.4 in the Statistical Appendix at the end of the book. See: Saad al-Din Ibrahim, op. cit., pp. 195–252, and Galal A. Amin, *The Modernization of Poverty: a Study in the Political Economy of Growth in Nine Arab Countries, 1945–1970* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

46 This represents a most effective weapon used by governments to abort opposition movements and seduce their leaders, a matter to which we shall return a little later.

47 Mahdavy, 'The patterns and problems of economic development in *rentier* states: the case of Iran', op. cit., pp. 436–8.

6. The authoritarian state in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula

1 Perlmutter summarizes the literature about the phenomenon of 'the authoritarian state' without postulating the need for carefully investigating the qualitative differences between its various forms in the Third World nations at this stage of our studies – see: Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: a Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).

For a comparative treatment of the matter of the state in its historical framework, see: Ali Kazancigil, ed., *The State in Global Perspective* (Gower Press; UNESCO, 1986).

2 The phenomenon of migration from the desert to the city has been neglected in the pressing concern with regional and world immigration, termed 'immigration to oil', [that is, 'to the oil-producing countries'], and therefore its mechanics and modes have not been studied. Among the rare studies of the subject, see: Donald P. Cale, 'Pastoral nomads in a rapidly changing economy: the case of Saudi Arabia', in Tim Niblock, ed., *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 106–21.

3 Concerning the question of the middle classes in the Gulf, see: Khaldoun H. al-Naqeeb, 'Changing patterns of social stratification in the Middle East: Kuwait (1950–1970) as a case study' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1976).
4 On account of Egypt's loss of income from the Suez Canal after the 1967 War, Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasser was forced, at the Khartoum Summit (August 1967) to agree to the withdrawal of all of Egypt's forces from Arab Yemen over a period not extending beyond December 1967, in return for aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
5 See n. 23 to Chapter 5 of this book, and also: ʿAdil al-Tabatabaʾi, *Al-Sulṭah al-tashrīʿīyah fī duwal al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: nashaʾtuhā, taṭawwuruhā, al-ʿawāmil al-muʾaththirah fīhā* (Legislative Authority in the Arabian Gulf States: its Origin, Development and the Factors Influencing it), (Kuwait: Manshurat Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-ʿArabiyah, 1985), chap. 2, pp. 29–159.
6 Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, *Qaḍāyā al-taqhyīr al-siyāsī wa-al-ijtimāʿī fī al-Baḥrain, 1920–1970* (The Issues of Political and Social Change in Bahrain, 1920–1970), (Kuwait: Muʾassassat al-Wahdah li-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawziʿ, 1976) and Fuʾad Ishaq al-Khuri, *Al-Qabīlah wa-al-dawlah fī al-Baḥrain: taṭawwur niẓām al-sulṭah wa-mumārasatuhā* (Tribe and State in Bahrain: the Evolution of the System of Authority and its Exercise), (Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmaʾ al-ʿArabi, 1983), pp. 293–327.
7 Regarding the complete circumstances surrounding this question, see the testimony of one of the leaders of this Committee, *ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Bākir min al-Baḥrain ilā al-manfā 'Sant Hilānah'* (From Bahrain to Exile in 'Saint Helena'), (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1965).
8 Fred Halliday, *Arabia without Sultans: a Political Survey of Instability in the Arab World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin; New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 280–5; and Robert Geran Landen, *Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).
9 Wendell Phillips, *Oman: a History* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1971), pp. 160–83.
10 Salah al-ʿAqqad, *Al-Tayyārāt al-siyāsīyah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī* (Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf), 2nd edn (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1974), pp. 304–18.
11 Halliday, op. cit., pp. 304–54.
12 Concerning this event and its historical and legal implications, see: Najat ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jasim, *Al-Taṭawwur al-siyāsī wa-al-iqtiṣādī li-al-Kuwait bayn al-ḥarbayn, 1914–1939* (The Political and Economic Development of Kuwait between the Two Wars, 1914–1939), (Cairo: al-Matbaʿah al-Fanniyah al-Hadithah, 1973), pp. 145–88; al-ʿAqqad, op. cit., pp. 249–53; and al-Kuwait, Daʾirat al-Maṭbuʿat wa-al-Nashr; *Ḥaqīqat al-azmah bayn al-Kuwait wa-al-ʿIrāq* (The Truth of the Crisis between Kuwait and Iraq), (al-Kuwait: al-Daʾirah, 1961).
13 *Al-Ṭalīʿah fī maʿrakat al-dīmūqrāṭīyah* (*Al-Talīʿah* in the Battle for Democracy), (al-Kuwait: Kazimah li-al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawziʿ, 1984), pp. 9–15; and al-ʿAqqad, op. cit., pp. 253–62.
14 Khaldoun H. al-Naqeeb, 'Constitutional crises as indicators of political

conflict in Kuwait, 1938–1986', a paper presented at the AAUG Nineteenth Annual Convention, Boston, USA, 1986.

15 Tom Little, *South Arabia: Area of Conflict* (London: Pall Mall; New York; Praeger, [1968], pp.161–86.

16 Halliday, op. cit., pp. 227–39.

17 This is a topic which the author discusses in detail in a book he is presently preparing for publication under the title, 'The authoritarian state in the Arab East'.

18 This is a matter which Bettelheim clearly sets forth – see: Charles Bettelheim, *Calcul économique et formes de propriété* (Paris: Maspéro, 1970). See also Roberts' comments on Bettelheim's presentation: Hugh Roberts, 'Is Algeria socialist?', *Gazelle Review* 8 (1980): 1–10.

19 What is intended by 'dependence' is not merely that it is influenced by the fluctuations of the world market, as are all states in the existing capitalist world economic system, but dependence as a power relationship, that is the loss of control over its own resources, in addition to its subjection to the fluctuations of the world market.

20 This summary is derived from Esbjrn Eide and Mark Thee, eds, *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 220.

21 The idea of 'hegemonic control' is borrowed from Antonius Gramsci, and means the voluntary acquiescence of the people to the authority or domination of the ruling group.

22 This question has been raised in most of the Arabian Gulf countries ever since the 1930s and has had obvious implications for the reform movement, especially in Kuwait. For a brief presentation, see the testimony of Khalid al-ʿAdsani, *Niṣf ʿām li-al-ḥukm al-niyābī fī al-Kuwait* (Half a Year of Parliamentary Government in Kuwait), (place and publisher unknown, 1947).

23 Edith Penrose, 'Oil and state in Arabia', in Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics,* Studies in Modern Asia and Africa 8 (London: Allen & Unwin; Totowa, NJ: Rowman, 1972), pp. 274ff.

However, ʿAli al-Kawari states that the allocations for the head of state in the Gulf had greatly surpassed this proportion by 1971, as follows:

Country	*Allocations for the head of state as a percentage of current expenditures*
Abu Dhabi	42.7
Bahrain	42.0
Qatar	64.7
Kuwait	5.5

See: ʿAli Khalifah al-Kawari, *Humūm al-naft wa-qaḍāyā al-tanmiyah fī al-Khalīj al-ʿArabī: majmūʿat buḥūth wa-muḥāḍarāt wa-dirāsāt* (Petroleum Headaches and Development Issues in the Arabian Gulf:

A Collection of Research Papers, Lectures and Studies), (Kuwait: Kazimah li-al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawziʿ, 1985), p. 162.

24 Husayn M. al-Baharna, *The Arabian Gulf States: their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems*, 2nd revised edn (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1975).

25 Al-Khuri, *Al-Qabīlah wa-al-dawlah fī al-Baḥrain*, pp. 331–54.

26 Ghassan Salamah, *Al-Siyāsah al-Khārijīyah al-Saʿūdīyah mundh ʿām 1945: dirāsah fī al-ʿalāqāt al-duwalīyah*, Silsilat al-Dirasat al-Istratijiyah 3 (Saudi Foreign Policy since 1945: a Study in International Relations), Strategic Studies Series 3 (Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmaʾ al-ʿArabi, 1980).

27 Fred Halliday, 'North Yemen today', *MERIP Reports* 130 (February 1985): 3–9.

28 I found the best term for them in Franco's Spain, since the Spanish corporations [reading *taḍāmunīyāt* for taḍāmunāt] represent the ideal form of an organization of this kind. See: Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 215–83.

29 In all the Arab Peninsula countries, the institutions of the army and police are built upon obvious tribal bases. If tribal considerations are less clear in the modern army, there are always parallel military systems, like the National Guard in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the tribal militias in Arab Yemen.

30 This information is derived from unpublished analyses written by the author for the newspaper, *Al-Qabas*, while covering the election campaign for the fifth National Assembly (December 1984–February, 1985).

31 The classification of this continuum has not been clearly delineated up to the present, and needs further study. However, it is useful for the clarification of the implicit distinctions in the institutions of government in the Arab Peninsula countries.

32 Halliday terms this 'republican tribalism' – Halliday, op. cit., *Arabia without Sultans: A Political Survey of Instability in the Arab World* pp. 114–26. Elena Julupofaskaya, *Thawrat 26 Sibtambir fī al-Yaman* (The September 26th Revolution in Yemen), (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1982).

33 Julupofaskaya, op. cit., pp. 277–80.

34 This judgement remains true even in the case of the comparison of the tribal systems in the Arab Peninsula with those of military rule in the eastern Arab states.

35 As may be ascertained from studies of the strategic ruling elites – see, for example: Manfred W. Wenner, 'Saudi Arabia: survival of traditional elites', in Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley, 1975), pp. 157–91.

36 Helen Lackner, *A House Built on Sand: a Political Economy of Saudi Arabia* (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), pp. 89–102 and 202–6.

37 This is what Fuʾad Zakariya terms 'Petroleum Islam' or 'Petro-Islam' – see: Fuʾad Zakariya, *Al-Ḥaqīqah wa-al-wahm fī al-ḥarakah al-Islāmīyah al-muʿāṣirah* (Truth and Illusion in the Modern Islamic Movement), (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1986), pp. 21–6.

38 For an extensive treatment of this topic, see: Ajnas Saks, *Namādhij al-*

qiṭā al-āʿāmm fī al-iqtiṣādīyāt al-mukhtalifah (Types of Public Sectors in Various Economies), (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-ʿAmmah li-al-Taʾlif wa-al-Nashr, 1970), p. 5.

39 James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1973).

40 Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Dirāsah ʿan al-bīrūqrātīyah al-ḥukūmīyah fī al-Kuwait' (A Study of Government Bureaucracy in Kuwait) *al-Qabas,* 12 February 1985.

41 Statistics of the Social Security Agency found in its annual reports, which reflect in the latter part of 1981 the phenomenon of relatively early retirement (of those between 40 and 50 years of age) of the Kuwaiti workforce.

42 This aspect has not been sufficiently studied by the specialists.

43 See Table A.5 in the Statistical Appendix at the end of this book. In fact, state control of the domestic private sector in Arab Peninsula societies goes beyond control through the purchase of shares in private companies to various complex forms of control. The Kuwaiti economist, Professor Jasim Saʿdun, has informed us in private correspondence that this control is derived not only from a monopoly of petroleum revenue and the state's being the chief manager of the financial surpluses (the financial reserves) resulting from excess oil revenues, but as a result of its being responsible for the price of shares in the securities market, and also for the distribution of dividends for the shareholders of some of them and finding a solution for the chronic indebtedness of others. If we add to this the state's indirect hegemony through the granting of permission to engage in an activity or to prohibit it, and the granting of incentives such as land, loans and preferential treatment or the withholding of them, the extent of the state's control over the domestic private sector becomes apparent to us.

44 In fact, the unique ability of the state to co-ordinate the infrastructure is an additional characteristic of the modern state, making the domination of the present state unprecedented in human history. See: Michael Mann, 'The autonomous power of the state: its origin, mechanisms and results', *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213.

45 Concerning the contradictory nature of the state's role in the Third World environment, see: 'State capitalism and the Third World', in James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), pp. 84–102.

7. Conclusion: the looming crisis in Gulf and Arab Peninsula society

1 We can detect this clash in modern competition in the thorough examination of it produced by Peter Worsley, *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984).

2 For a critical review of the concept of the mass society in western sociological thought, see: Alan Swingewood, *The Myth of Mass Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 1–23.

3 The Arab Peninsula cities were known as commercial stations directed outward and towards the transit trade. When the boundaries were drawn,

these countries were locked in upon themselves, without being prepared for new conditions of this kind.

4 Compare this with the proposals put forward on this question by al-Duri: Muhammad Ahmad al-Duri, 'Nahw istighāl amthal li-al-batrūl al-ʿArabī' (Towards a Better Exploitation of Arab Petroleum), *Al-Taliʿah* (Beirut), 21st year, 12 (October, 1985): 18–47.

5 This fact appears clearly in the contract statistics in the Arabian Gulf over the last decade, without needing to go into the details of these statistics or trying to assess their long-range results. See: Henri ʿAzzam, 'Al-Muqāwalāt fi al-Khalij: min al-mashārīʿ al-kubrā ilā al-aʿmāl al-ʿādīyah' (Contracts in the Gulf: from larger projects to run-of-the-mill operations), *Majallat al-Iqtisad wa-al-Aʿmal* (November 1986): 37–44.

6 I am indebted to Dr Khayr al-Din Hasib for the crystallization of this idea on the basis of extensive discussion. For a review of the implications of the economic recession in the region due to the collapse of OPEC pricing, see: Howard Bowen-Jones, 'The Gulf today: an overview of a region in recession', *Arab Gulf Journal* 6, no. 2 (October 1986): 9–24.

In spite of the petroleum price rise from $16 to $19 per barrel in the first half of 1987, the true income of the OPEC States fell, in comparison with the period of 1985 itself, by an average of 29 per cent for Qatar, 28 per cent for Saudi Arabia and 21.8 per cent for Kuwait, owing to the decline in the value of the dollar and the fluctuations in currency prices. If the levels of world economic growth continue to decline, it is possible that this state of affairs may persist in the near future – see: *The Economist*, 13 June 1987, p. 75.

7 That modern education is a means for the growth of the middle classes is one of the axioms of contemporary sociology; but the rapid growth of educational systems has led to the importation of sterile systems *in toto* – for an initial evaluation, see: J. S. Birks and J. A. Rimmer, *Developing Education Systems in the Oil States of Arabia: Conflict of Purpose and Focus* (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984).

8 See, for example, Thurborn's attempt to systematize this question: Yuran Thurborn, *Sulṭat al-dawlah: ḥawl diyāliktīk al-ḥukm al-ṭabaqī* (The Power of the State: Concerning the Dialectic of Class Rule), (Beirut: Dar al-Muruj, 1985), pp. 81–153. The term 'the military–industrial complex' may represent one of the current indicators in this field.

9 This mistaken understanding of the 'tribal democracy' myth has crept even into the revolutionary movement literature, as in one of the brochures of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, which was compiled, it appears, to combat tribalism as a reactionary, not a revolutionary phenomenon. When 'the tribal man' is defined, the brochure states that one of his characteristics is the demand for 'absolute equality' ... and 'the alleged mentality of absolute equality for the tribal man scarcely excludes anything – equality in rights and duties, in prerogatives and obligations, in living conditions and external appearance', etc. Naturally this is an imprecise and illogical comprehension of it, for what is wrong with demanding equality? All that the brochure wants to get at is the tribesman's refusal to accept authority proceeding from the division of labour or to take orders from those with whom he has no tribal ties.

See: Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, *Al-Qabalīyah: min ayn ... wa-ilā ayn? Naẓrah ʿalā ḥāḍir wa-mustaqbal al-qabīlah fī ʿOmān* (Tribalism: Where From and Where To? A Look at the Present and Future of the Tribe in Oman), 2nd edn (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿah, 1981), pp. 23–5.

10 The theme of changing persons into individual particles within the framework of the mass society is one of the leading ideas regarding collective behaviour, the understanding of which is necessary for the understanding of modern society – see: Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 47–72.

11 Relations between the traditional sects have reappeared through the avenue of parties, elections and the modern mass media – see: 'Al-Ṭabaqāt al-ijtimaʿīyah fī al-Hind: shuqūq qadīmah fī ṣūrah jadīdah' (Social classes in India: old cleavages in a new form), *Majallat al-Thaqafah al-ʿAlamiyah* (Kuwait), 6th year, no. 33 (March 1987): 31–40.

12 On this subject see the lecture by Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, 'Al-Tanshiʾah al-ijtimāʿīyah fī ʿaṣr muḍṭarib' (Social upbringing in a troubled age), in *al-Jamʿiyah al-Kuwaitiyah li Taqaddum al-Tufulah alʿArabiyah, al-Kitāb al-Sanawi al-Thālith, 1985–1986* (The Kuwaiti Society for the Advancement of Arab Childhood, annual volume 3), pp. 17–40.

13 Ghassan Salamah, *Al-Siyāsah al-Khārijīyah al-Saʿūdīyah mundh ʿām 1945: dirāsah fī al-ʿalāqāt al-duwalīyah* (Saudi Foreign Policy since 1945: a Study in International Relations), Strategic Studies Series 3 (Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmaʾ al-ʿArabi, 1980), pp. 617–54.

14 Concerning the State of Kuwait, see: Khaldoun H. al-Naqeeb, 'Changing patterns of social stratification in the Middle East: Kuwait (1950–1970) as a case study', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1976), chap. 4.

15 This claim is built on observation and probability, not derived from field study, although information drawn from field studies about other Arab countries supports it. See: Saad al-Din Ibrahim, 'Egypt's Islamic militants', in Nicholas S. Hopkins and Saad al-Din Ibrahim, eds, *Arab Society: Social Science Perspectives* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1985), pp. 494–507.

16 See, for example, the angry presentation by Lafif Lakhdar of this question as an opposing radical viewpoint: Lafif Lakhdar, 'Why the reversion to Islamic archaism?' *Khamsin* 8 (1981): 62–82.

17 Saad al-Din Ibrahim, 'Al-Masʾalah al-ijtimāʿīyah bayn al-turāth wa-taḥaddīyāt al-ʿaṣr' (The social question between heritage and the challenges of the times), a paper presented to Al-Turāth wa-taḥaddīyāt al-ʿaṣr fī al-waṭan alʿArabī (al-iṣālah wa-al-muʿāṣarah): buḥūth wa-munāqashāt al-nadwah al-fikrīyah al-latī naẓẓamahā Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah, (The Heritage and the Challenges of the Times in the Arab Homeland (Authenticity and Contemporaneity): Studies and Discussions of the Symposium Organized by the Centre for Arabic Unity Studies)), (Beirut: al-Markaz, 1985), pp. 473–524.

18 Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert and Jon G. Wagner, *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982), pp. 245–55.

19 Just as it was reflected in the struggle for Syria on the part of the three regional axes: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq – see: Patrick Seale, *Al-Ṣirāʿ ʿalā Sūriyah: dirāsah li-al-siyāsah al- ʿArabīyah baʿd al-ḥarb, 1945–*

1958 (The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Arab Politics after the War, 1945–1958), translated by Samir ʿAbduh and Mahmud Falahah (Beirut: Dar al-Kalimah li-al-Nashr, 1980). See also: Jamil Matar and ʿAli al-Din Hilal, *Al-Niẓām al-iqlīmi al-ʿArabī: dirāsah fī al-ʿalāqāt al-siyāsīyah al-ʿArabīyah* (The Arab Regional System: a Study in Arab Political Relations), (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1979), pp. 76–102.

20 Ibrahim M. Oweiss, 'The Israeli economy and its military liability', *American Arab Affairs* 8 (Spring 1984): 39 and *passim.*

21 Concerning the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council, see: Majid al-Majid, *Majlis al-Taʿāwun al-Khalījī: azmat al-siyāsah wa-al-sharīʿah* (The Gulf Co-operation Council: a Crisis of Policy and Law), (London: Taha li-al-Nashr, 1986). About the undeclared foreign military presence in the Arab Peninsula, see: Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf and Trends in the Arab–Israeli Military Balance* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984). Concerning regional security considerations for the appearance of the Council, see: J. E. Peterson, 'The G.C.C. and Regional Security', *American Arab Affairs* 20 (Spring 1987): 62–90.

22 The word *jihawīyah* ('regional') is a North African Arab usage. It is more precise and specific than the word *iqlīm* ('region') and *iqlīmīyah* ('regionalism'), which have a more general geographical meaning. Here it means the area or dependence on a geographical or urban area.

23 It appears that the rise of social and political movements as alternatives to ideological parties is a general phenomenon at the present time, not confined to Western Europe as Cohen observes: Jean L. Cohen, 'Beyond reform and revolution: the problem of French socialisms', *Telos* 55 (Spring 1983): 5–12.

24 It has become clear that the great social-economic transformations in the Third World states (including the Arab Peninsula) have not brought forth a working class historically comparable to the European proletariat. See the discussion of this matter in the two following sources: Nicholas Abercrombie and John Urry, *Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 67–85 and 107–27; and Peter Lloyd, *A Third World Proletariat?* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

25 As occurred in what are called 'the bread riots' in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in the late 1970s and the early 1980s – see: Husayn ʿAbd al-Razzaq, *Miṣr fī 18–19 Yanāyir: dirāsah wathāʾiqīyah* (Egypt on 18–19 January: a Documentary Study), (Beirut: Dar al-Kalimah li-al-Nashr, 1983).

26 Muhummad ʿAbid al-Jabiri, *Al-Khiṭāb al-ʿArabī al-muʿāṣir* (Contemporary Arab Rhetoric), (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿah, 1981).

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[Translator's note: the order of entry follows that of the Arabic text, not that of the English alphabet. Diacriticals are only rarely inserted for Arabic names. The system of transliteration for book and article titles is that used by the US Library of Congress, except for the adoption of popular spellings of certain names.]
Note: 'n.pub.' means that the publisher of the title referred to is unknown.

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